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I. INTRODUCTION
DISABILITY' nondiscrimination laws, such as the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),2 and the disability rights
movement which spawned them have, at their core, a central prem-
ise that is both simple and profound. That premise is that people
denominated as "disabled" are just people, not different in any criti-
cal way from other people. Paradoxically, commentators, enforce-
ment agencies and the courts, with manifest good intentions, have
frequently interpreted and applied these laws in ways that reinforce
a diametrically opposite premise-that people with disabilities are
significantly different, special and need exceptional status and pro-
tection, One is reminded of Justice Brandeis's admonition that citi-
zens should be most on guard "when Government's purposes are
beneficent" and that the greatest dangers arise from "encroach-
ment by [people] of zeal, -well-meaning but without
understanding."3
1. Terminology regarding disabilities can be a sensitive issue. For a discussion
of terminology that individuals with disabilities and the organizations representing
them prefer and the reasons behind such predilections, see ROBERT L. BURGDORF
JR., DISABILrrv DIsCIuMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 15-23 (1995) [hereinafter
BURGDORF, DisABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW]. This Article makes
use of the currently preferred terminology except in quoted materials where the
now outmoded wording is used in the original. In particular, this means that the
Article shall comply with the following two conventions: (1) noun plus preposi-
tional phrase formulations (such as "person with a disability," "Americans with epi-
lepsy," "individual with a hearing impairment" and "citizens with diabetes") will be
used instead of adjective and noun phrasing (such as "disabled person," "mentally
retarded children" and "hearing impaired people") and instead of phrases that
turn the disabling condition into a noun (such as "the disabled," "an epileptic"
and "the learning disabled") and (2) the word "disability" will be used in place of
the word "handicap." See Robert L. BurgdorfJr., The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARv C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 413, 414 n.7 (1991) (discussing "revolution" that has occurred over past
decade in regard to disability terminology) [hereinafter Burgdorf, Analysis and
Implications].
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
3. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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Recent public, legal and juridical discourse concerning affirm-
ative action initiatives has often included rhetorical flourishes about
the negative effects of singling out groups of citizens for preferred
treatment. An article in the Washington Post declared: "Misapplied,
affirmative action is at best an entitlement program that exalts
group identity over individual promise. At worst, it yields corrup-
tion .... But even properly applied, affirmative action is unsettling
for Americans. It is at odds with the end it serves."4 Even some
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States have written in
disparaging terms about various kinds of group preferences. 5
There are, of course, staunch defenders of affirmative action and
other remedial and corrective programs. 6 For instance, the United
States Commission on Civil Rights wrote:
4. Lincoln Caplan, Why Affirmative Action is Divisive, Difficult-and Necessary,
WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1995, at C3.
5. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 538 (1980) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (noting with respect to minority business set-aside program that "[a]t best
the statutory preference is a somewhat perverse form of reparation for the mem-
bers of the injured classes"). In Fullilove, Justice Stevens also noted: "Preferences
based on characteristics acquired at birth foster intolerance and antagonism
against the entire membership of the favored classes." Id. at 547 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). Also in Fullilove, Justice Powell said: "'Distinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."' Id. at 497 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)). In one case, the
Court noted with respect to racial preferences for admission to medical school that
"there are serious problems ofjustice connected with the idea of preference itself
.... [P] referential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that
certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on a
factor having no relationship to individual worth." Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978). In another case, Justice Brennan noted with
respect to racial criteria in redistricting, that "preferential treatment may act to
stigmatize its recipient groups, for although intended to correct systemic or institu-
tional inequities, such a policy may imply to some the recipients' inferiority and
especial need for protection." UnitedJewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144, 173-74 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
6. See, e.g., Adarand Const. Co. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 242-64 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (arguing to uphold constitutionality of minority preference for fed-
eral contractors); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 482 ("As a threshold matter, we reject the
contention that in the remedial context the Congress must act in a wholly 'color-
blind' fashion."); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) ("Government may take race into account when it acts not to
demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities
by past racial prejudice, at least when appropriate findings have been made byjudicial, legislative, or administrative bodies with competence to act in this area.").
Even Justice Powell, an outspoken critic of most preference programs, found
in Bakke that diversity in a student body could be a sufficiently compelling reason
to justify the consideration of race in admissions, so long as it is done in a proper
way. Id. at 311-19. Justice Powell suggested that the Harvard University admission
program was the proper way to consider race in admissions and appended it to his
opinion. See id. at 321-24.
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Without affirmative intervention, discriminatory processes
may never end. Properly designed and administered af-
firmative action plans can create a climate of equality that
supports all efforts to break down the structural, organiza-
tional, and personal barriers that perpetuate injustice.
They can be comprehensive plans that combat all manifes-
tations of the complex process of discrimination. In such
a climate, differences among racial and ethnic groups and
between men and women become simply differences, not
badges that connote domination or subordination, superi-
ority or inferiority.7
In the absence of compelling remedial necessity, the notion of
singling out one group of citizens for superior treatment or special
protection under our laws seems inherently un-American and con-
trary to the constitutional edict of "equal protection of the laws."8
To the extent that affirmative action, set-asides and other race-con-
scious measures have been permitted in government programs and
activities, the courts subject them to "strict scrutiny" and require
them to be narrowly tailored to the promotion of a compelling gov-
ernmental objective. 9
Without fanfare or debate, however, a special treatment or pre-
ferred group approach has crept into the interpretation of laws
prohibiting discrimination based on disability in this country. Such
an approach may have an appropriate place in laws and programs
that establish special benefits or programs for people with disabili-
ties, including affirmative action programs. Notably, no statutory or
constitutional prohibition of discriminating in favor of people with
disabilities, 10 comparable to the "reverse discrimination" analysis
7. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE 1980s: DISMAN-
TLING THE PROCESS OF DISCRIMINATION 41 (1983). This report, though somewhat
dated, provides a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the objectives and character-
istics of affirmative action efforts. See id.
8. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 ("It is far too late to argue that the guarantee
of equal protection to all persons permits the recognition of special wards entitled
to a degree of protection greater than that accorded others.").
9. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2482 (1995) (noting that in
order to survive equal protection challenge, state redistricting plan must be "nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest"); Adarand, 515 U.S. at
223 ("'Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a
most searching examination'" (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 273 (1986))).
10. See BURGDORF, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAw, supra note
1, at 125-26. This difference may stem from the inherent nature of the concept of
disability. Disability is conceived in negative terms as the absence or impairment
of something that other people have (e.g., the absence of a limb, the inability to
hear or to connect with reality in the same way that other so-called "normal" peo-
1997]
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that has sometimes prevailed in race and gender discrimination
cases, exists.'1 In the context of laws prohibiting discrimination
based on disability, however, the special treatment approach has
impaired the interpretation and enforcement of these laws. The
approach has generated unnecessary complexity, harsh technicali-
ties and niggardly standards regarding protection under such
statutes.
This Article examines the extent to which a preferred group
mentality has tainted regulatory and judicial interpretations of the
scope of protection afforded under the primary federal laws that
prohibit discrimination based on disability. Part II of this Article
reviews the history surrounding the enactment of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), the statutory predecessor to
the ADA. ' 2 Part III considers the 1974 Amendments to the Rehabil-
itation Act ("1974 Amendments"), where Congress created a three-
prong definition of an "individual with a handicap" that was im-
ple do). Logically, "reverse discrimination" on the basis of disability would be dis-
crimination against those who do not lack something or discrimination in favor of
the control group against which the class of people with disabilities is delineated.
11. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509-11 (1989)
(striking down city's requirement that prime contractors subcontract at least 30%
of city contracts to minority businesses); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265 (invalidating, by
divided opinion, special admissions program that set aside positions for racial and
ethnic minorities); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't Of Correctional Servs., 520
F.2d 420, 427-29 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding in absence of "clear-cut pattern of long-
continued and egregious racial discrimination" quota for promotions constituted
"constitutionally forbidden reverse discrimination"); Sterling v. Klamath Forest
Protective Ass'n, 528 P.2d 574, 578 (Or. Ct. App. 1974) (finding that preference
for members of racial minorities over more qualified whites would constitute re-
verse discrimination under Oregon civil rights statute). But seeJohnson v. Transp.
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 640-42 (1987) (upholding affirmative action program that
established short-range goals and permitted gender and 'race to be considered as
factors in promotion decisions in traditionally segregated job classifications);
United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979) (upholding affirma-
tive action plan that reserved 50% of openings in craft training program for black
employees until percentage of black employees became equal to percentage of
blacks in labor force). See generally, BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 785-870 (1983) (discussing Supreme Court deci-
sions between 1978 and 1980 that "made and remade the law on reverse discrimi-
nation in the context of affirmative action plans").
In Adarand, the Supreme Court ruled that all racial classifications, whether
remedial or not, and whether imposed by federal, state or local governments must
be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-27 ("[S]uch
[racial] classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures
that further compelling governmental interests.").
12. For a discussion of the history surrounding the enactment of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973, see infra notes 18-97 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 42: p. 409
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ported verbatim into the ADA. 13 Next, Part IV of this Article ad-
dresses various judicial misconstructions of the three-prong
definition as well as the problems that these misinterpretations
have caused. 14 Because the constricted interpretation of protection
under the ADA represents a considerable journey down the wrong
road, Part V provides principles that courts can follow to reconsider
and reorient the law so that analysis and interpretation can take a
path that is more consistent with the purposes and philosophy of
federal laws that proscribe discrimination based on disability. 15
Part VI discusses the consequences of traveling down the wrong
road. 16 Finally, Part VII provides analytical alternatives to the pre-
vailing interpretations. 17
II. STARTING DOWN THE WRONG ROAD-SEcrION 504 OF THE
REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
A. The Origins of Section 504
The pervasiveness and perniciousness of discrimination based
on disability has been abundantly documented in legal literature.1 8
The executive, judicial and legislative branches of government, in-
13. For a discussion of the 1974 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act
through which Congress created a three-prong definition of an "individual with a
handicap," see infra notes 98-145 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of various judicial misconstructions of the three-prong
definition as well as the problems that these misinterpretations have caused, see
infra notes 146-545 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of principles that courts can follow to reconsider and
reorient disability nondiscrimination law, see infra notes 546-623 and accompany-
ing text.
16. For a discussion of the consequences of traveling down the wrong road in
disability nondiscrimination law, see infra notes 624-818 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of analytical alternatives to the prevailing interpretations
in disability nondiscrimination law, see infra notes 819-75 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF
INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 1742, 159 (1983) (documenting long pattern of discrimina-
tory practices against handicapped in United States) [hereinafter ACCOMMODATING
THE SPECTRUM]; Jack Achtenberg, "Crips" Unite to Enforce Symbolic Laws: Legal Aid for
the Disabled: An Overview, 4 U. SAN FERNANDO VALLEY L. REv. 161, 163-64 (1975)
(citing various examples of discrimination based on disability including theater
manager saying, in effect, that if you are in wheelchair, he didn't want you here);
Richard A. Bales, Once Is Enough: Evaluating When a Person Is Substantially Limited In
Her Ability to Work, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 203, 210-11 (1993) (discussing congres-
sional findings in ADA indicating recognition that discrimination against individu-
als with disabilities persists and is pervasive throughout all facets of life including
relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits and jobs); Burgdorf,
Analysis and Implications, supra note 1, at 415-26 (discussing pervasiveness of dis-
crimination based on disability and stating "people with disabilities are victims of
widespread discrimination and constitute a severely disadvantaged segment of
society").
1997]
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dependent federal agencies and numerous other authorities have
all condemned such discrimination, identified the serious problems
that it poses and described the personal, social and fiscal costs that
it entails. 19
19. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 28-50 (1990) ("The [Education and
Labor] Committee... concludes that there exists a compelling need to establish a
clear and comprehensive Federal prohibition of discrimination on the basis of dis-
ability in the areas of employment in the private sector, public accommodations,
public services, transportation, and telecommunications."); id. at 25-26 (discussing
need for legislation addressing problem of disability discrimination); S. REP. No.
101-116, at 5-20 (1989) (describing need for legislation to deal with disability dis-
crimination); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TowARD INDEPENDENCE 3
(1986) (discussing need for legislation); TASK FORCE ON THE RIGHTS & EMPOWER-
MENT OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES, EQUALITY FOR 43 MILLION AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES: A MORAL AND ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE 8 (1990) (discussing need for
legislation because "[ilndividuals with disabilities experience staggering levels of
unemployment and poverty").
In Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), the Supreme Court noted that
"[d]iscrimination against the handicapped was perceived by Congress to be most
often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indif-
ference of benign neglect." Id. at 295-96. Furthermore, in a concurrence, Justice
Stevens noted that "through ignorance and prejudice the mentally retarded 'have
been subjected to a history of unfair and often grotesque mistreatment.'" City of
Cleburne, Inc. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 454 (1985) (Stevens, J., con-
curring) (quoting Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City Of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 197
(5th Cir. 1984)). Similarly, in a separate concurrence Justice Marshall dramatically
highlighted the plight of people with mental retardation stating:
[T]he mentally retarded have been subject to a "lengthy and tragic his-
tory" of segregation and discrimination that can only be called grotesque.
During much of the 19th century, mental retardation was viewed as
neither curable nor dangerous and the retarded were largely left to their
own devices. By the latter part of the century and during the first decades
of the new one, however, social views of the retarded underwent a radical
transformation. Fueled by the rising tide of Social Darwinism, the "sci-
ence" of eugenics, and the extreme xenophobia of those years, leading
medical authorities and others began to portray the "feeble-minded" as a
"menace to society and civilization . . . responsible in a large degree for
many, if not all, of our social problems." A regime of state-mandated
segregation and degradation soon emerged that in its virulence and big-
otry rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses ofJim Crow. Mas-
sive custodial institutions were built to warehouse the retarded for life;
the aim was to halt reproduction of the retarded and "nearly extinguish
their race." Retarded children were categorically excluded from public
schools, based on the false stereotype that all were ineducable and on the
purported need to protect nonretarded children from them. State laws
deemed the retarded "unfit for citizenship."
Segregation was accompanied by eugenic marriage and sterilization
laws that extinguished for the retarded one of the "basic civil rights of
man"-the right to marry and procreate. Marriages of the retarded were
made, and in some States continue to be, not only voidable but also often
a criminal offense. The purpose of such limitations, which frequently ap-
plied only to women of child-bearing age, was unabashedly eugenic: to
prevent the retarded from propagating. To assure this end, 29 States en-
acted compulsory eugenic sterilization laws between 1907 and 1931. Prej-
udice, once let loose, is not easily cabined. As of 1979, most States still
categorically disqualified "idiots" from voting, without regard to individ-
[Vol. 42: p. 409
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Apart from a post-World War II measure enacted in 1948 that
prohibited discrimination based on "physical handicap" in U.S. civil
service employment ("1948 Act"), 20 the first attempt to provide pro-
tection from disability discrimination focused on adding disability
to the types of discrimination prohibited under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Civil Rights Act). 21 In December 1971, Representative
Charles Vanik (D-Ohio) introduced in the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives a bill to amend Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (Title
VI),22 which prohibits discrimination in federally assisted programs,
to add "physical or mental handicap" to the prohibited grounds for
discrimination.2 3 In his remarks in support of the bill, Congress-
man Vanik declared that "the treatment and regard for the rights of
handicapped citizens in our country is one of America's shameful
oversights" and that his proposed legislation would ensure equal
opportunities for people with disabilities "by making discrimination
illegal in federally assisted programs and activities." 24 A companion
bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate in early 1972 by Senator Hu-
bert Humphrey (D-Minn.) on behalf of himself and Senator
ual capacity and with discretion to exclude left in the hands of low-level
election officials. Not until Congress enacted the Education of the Hand-
icapped Act, were "the door[s] of public education" opened wide to
handicapped children. But most important, lengthy and continuing iso-
lation of the retarded has perpetuated the ignorance, irrational fears, and
stereotyping that long have plagued them.
Id. at 461-64 (footnotes and citations omitted) (Marshall,J, concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also Louis HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, THE ICD SURVEY OF Dis-
ABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM 70, 75
(1986) (finding that two-thirds of Americans with disabilities between ages of 16 to
64 are not working, but would like to be); Louis HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, THE ICD
SURVEY II: EMPLOYING DISABLED AMERICANS 12 (1987) [hereinafter EMPLOYING Dis-
ABLED AMERICANS] (finding employment discrimination remains significant barrier
to Americans with disabilities).
In enacting the ADA, Congress expressly found that "historically, society has
tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some im-
provements, such forms of discrimination ... continue to be a serious and perva-
sive social problem." 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (2) (1994). Further, it declared that
individuals with disabilities "have been faced with restrictions and limitations, sub-
jected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of
political powerlessness in our society." Id. § 12101 (a) (7).
20. Act ofJune 10, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-617, 62 Stat. 351 (prohibiting discrim-
ination "in any case because of any physical handicap, in examination, appoint-
ment, reappointment, reinstatement, reemployment, promotion, transfer,
retransfer, demotion, or removal, with respect to any position the duties of which,
in the opinion of the Civil Service Commission, may be efficiently performed by a
person with such a physical handicap").
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1994).
22. Id. § 2000(d).
23. See H.R. 12154, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
24. 117 CONG. REC. 45974-75 (1971).
1997]
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Charles Percy (R-Ill.).25 Senator Humphrey asserted that America
should no longer "live with the hypocrisy that the promise of
America should have one major exception: Millions of children,
youth, and adults with mental or physical handicaps."26 He insisted
that "the civil rights of 40 million Americans now be affirmed and
effectively guaranteed by Congress." 27 This guarantee could be ac-
complished by passing his bill and would ensure "equal opportuni-
ties for the handicapped by prohibiting needless discrimination in
programs receiving Federal financial assistance." 28  Some sixty
members of the House and twenty members of the Senate cospon-
sored the Vanik and Humphrey bills, but no hearings were held in
either chamber and the bills died in the respective judiciary
committees.
In a separate bill introduced in 1972, Representative Vanik
sought to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Tide VII) 29 to
"make discrimination because of physical or mental handicap in
employment an unlawful employment practice, unless there is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise."30 This
bill also died in committee.
When Humphrey's and Vanik's attempts to amend Title VII to
add disability to the list of prohibited grounds for discrimination
failed,31 similar language was incorporated into a broader rehabili-
tation bill and was enacted into law as section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act.32 The new law also included two provisions imposing
affirmative action requirements. First, section 501 required depart-
ments, agencies and instrumentalities in the executive branch of
the federal government to submit an affirmative action plan for the
hiring, placement and advancement of individuals with disabili-
ties.33 Additionally, section 503 mandated that federal contracts
over $2500 must contain a provision requiring the contractor to
take affirmative action to employ and advance workers with disabili-
25. See S. 3044, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
26. 118 CONG. REc. 525 (1972).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
30. H.R. 14033, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
31. See S. 3044, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 12154, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971).
32. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
33. See id. § 791.
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ties.34 Although they are framed in terms of affirmative action,
court decisions have interpreted both section 501 and section 503
as implicitly prohibiting discrimination by the entities that are sub-
ject to the affirmative action obligation. 35 The Rehabilitation Act
also included section 502, which established an Architectural and
Transportation Barriers Compliance Board within the federal gov-
ernment to facilitate the removal of architectural and transporta-
tion barriers that impede the mobility and access of people with
disabilities. 36
B. A Drafting Disaster-The Wording of Section 504
The details of the drafting of the language of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act are shrouded in some mystery. Seven Senate
staff members met in August of 1972 to discuss a bill to extend and
strengthen the federal vocational rehabilitation program; the bill
had already been "marked-up" by the Senate Labor and Public Wel-
fare Committee.3 7 At the meeting, the staff members agreed to add
34. See id. § 793. The minimum contractual amount was raised to $10,000 in
1992. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569,
§ 505(a)(1), 106 Stat. 4344, 4427.
35. See Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1278-80 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting that
section 501 of Rehabilitation Act "prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of handi-
cap by the federal government" and additionally "[section] 501 requires the fed-
eral government to act affirmatively in order to reasonably accommodate
handicapped employees or applicants."); Shirey v. Devine, 670 F.2d 1188, 1200-01
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding section 501 of Rehabilitation Act implicitly prohibits
discrimination on basis of employee's handicap by federal government); Prewitt v.
United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 304 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Congress clearly
recognized both in section 501 and in section 504 that individuals now have a
private cause of action to obtain relief for handicap discrimination on the part of
the federal government and its agencies."); Ryan v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 565
F.2d 762, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (declining to decide appellant's claim that section
501 of Rehabilitation Act implies "a private right of action for disability discrimina-
tion" and instead finding that "it is clear to us that [section 501] impose[s] a duty
upon federal agencies to structure their procedures and programs so as to ensure
that handicapped individuals are afforded equal opportunity in both job assign-
ment and promotion"); Rhone v. United States Dep't of the Army, 665 F. Supp.
734, 742 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (holding that, under section 501(b) of Rehabilitation
Act, "[t]he Federal Government shall become a model employer of handicapped
individuals" and "shall not discriminate against a qualified physically or mentally
handicapped person"); see also Moon v. Secretary of Labor, 747 F.2d 599, 604 (11th
Cir. 1984) (upholding agency rejection of appellant's claim of discrimination in
violation of section 503 of Rehabilitation Act); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F.
Supp. 1088, 1103-04 (D. Haw. 1980) (holding claimant who was "denied employ-
ment because of either an impairment he had or an impairment [prospective em-
ployer] believed he had" falls under protection of section 503 of Rehabilitation
Act).
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 792 (1994).
37. See generally RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS:
TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY 41-59 (1984) (providing comprehensive
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a new section to the bill comparable to Title VI and Tide IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 (Tide IX). 3 8 One staff member
retrieved a copy of Title VI from his office, and the group adapted
its language to craft a provision that they added to the very end of
the Rehabilitation Act. 39
The new section, which was enacted as section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, provided: "No otherwise qualified handi-
capped individual in the United States, as defined in Section 7(6),
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. ' 40 A comparison of the language of the new section with
the statutory language that would have resulted if Humphrey's and
Vanik's proposals to amend Title VI had been enacted is informa-
tive. The pertinent language of the amended Title VI would have
read: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of...
physical or mental handicap, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. '41 The
differences are significant. Title VI states that "[n]o person" is to
be subjected to discrimination, yet section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act says that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual" is
to be subjected to discrimination. 42 Moreover, while Title VI un-
restrictively prohibits the proscribed types of discrimination, sec-
tion 504 prohibits discrimination only if it is "solely by reason of
handicap."43
Section 504 has been heralded as one of the milestones of the
disability rights movement. 44 To some people with disabilities and
background on origins of section 504 of Rehabilitation Act). The author con-
ducted personal interviews of some of the participants in the formative meetings,
including the meeting of the seven staffers. See id. at 47, 183 n.5.
38. See id. at 51-52. Title IX prohibits discrimination based on sex or blind-
ness in any federally funded education program. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688
(1994).
39. See SCOTCH, supra note 37, at 51-52.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
41. S. 3044, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 12154, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1971). For a discussion of both bills, see supra notes 22-32 and accompanying
text.
42. Compare H.R. 12154 (seeking to amend Title VI), with 29 U.S.C. 794(a)
(giving language contained in section 504 of Rehabilitation Act).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
44. See SCOTCH, supra note 37, at 52 (noting that within several years after
enactment, "section 504 would be seen as landmark legislation, bearing both tre-
mendous costs and benefits"); see also FRANK BowE, HANDICAPPING AMERICA 205
(1978) (noting that section 504 of Rehabilitation Act is landmark for disability
420 [Vol. 42: p. 409
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their advocates, the provision has almost mystical significance. It is
hard to overplay section 504's import as the first broad civil rights
law outlawing discrimination based on disability. Yet, however
groundbreaking and beneficial section 504 was and whatever credit
the Senate staffers deserve for their creativity, innovation and initia-
tive, the largely unmentioned fact is that section 504 is a disaster
from a drafting standpoint. The drafting problems in the one sen-
tence provision are so numerous and severe that this author uses
section 504 in his classes on legislation as a case study on how not to
draft legislation.
One problem with the wording of section 504 is its cross-refer-
ence to the definition of "handicapped individual" that was added
to the Rehabilitation Act.4 5 The Rehabilitation Act defined "handi-
capped individual" in terms of employability and ability to benefit
from vocational rehabilitation services. 46 This definition had been
formulated in light of the programmatic purposes of the rest of the
Rehabilitation Act. It was totally inappropriate for use with a provi-
sion that prohibited discrimination in all kinds of programs and
activities conducted by recipients of federal assistance, not just
those offering rehabilitation services, and that guaranteed equal ac-
cess to a broad range of opportunities, not just employment. Con-
gress noticed this error and addressed it in 1974 by devising the
three-prong definition of disability described later in this Article.
Another shortcoming of the language of section 504 is the use
of the phrase "otherwise qualified. ' 47 In issuing the first regula-
tions of section 504 in 1978, the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare ("HEW") identified the problem created by the word
"otherwise" in this formulation:
The Department believes that the omission of the word
"otherwise" is necessary in order to comport with the in-
law); Jack Achtenberg, Law and the Physically Disabled: An Update with Constitutional
Implications, 8 Sw. U.L. REv. 847, 853 (1976) (noting that section 504 of Rehabilita-
tion Act was "a landmark act"); Sharon Rennert, Note, All Aboard: Accessible Public
Transportation for Disabled Persons, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 360, 361 (1988) ("Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is the cornerstone of the civil fights movement
for disabled people.").
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (referring to section 7(6) of Rehabilitation Act for
definition of handicapped individual).
46. See id. § 706(8)(A) ("[T]he term 'handicapped individual' means any in-
dividual who (i) has a physical or mental disability which for such individual consti-
tutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment and (ii) can reasonably be
expected to benefit in terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation
services.").
47. See id. § 794.
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tent of the statute because, read literally, "otherwise" qual-
ified handicapped persons include persons who are
qualified except for their handicap, rather than in spite of
their handicap. Under such a literal reading, a blind per-
son possessing all the qualifications for driving a bus ex-
cept sight could be said to be "otherwise qualified" for the
job of driving. Clearly, such a result was not intended by
Congress.48
To remedy this problem, HEW omitted the word "otherwise" and
simply referred to "qualified" in its regulation.49 In 1979, the
Supreme Court expressly endorsed HEW's position and declared
that "[a] n otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all
of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap."50 Other fed-
eral agencies issuing section 504 regulations followed HEW's lead
and omitted the unfortunate word "otherwise." The ADA also
speaks of "qualified" in lieu of "otherwise qualified."51
The U.S. Civil Rights Commission and the National Council on
Disability have suggested that, whether framed as "qualified" or
"otherwise qualified," neither phrase is necessary in section 504 and
both distort the thrust of the statute. 52 The U.S. Civil Rights Com-
mission declared: "The limitation of protection to 'otherwise quali-
fied' appears unnecessary. If a handicapped person is denied an
opportunity because he or she is not qualified, the discrimination is
not 'solely on the basis of [his or her] handicap.' To have been
discriminated against, one must, ipso facto, be qualified."5 3 In the
report in which it proposed the enactment of the ADA, the Na-
tional Council argued that the "otherwise qualified" language is il-
logical, unnecessary, problematic and serves to obscure the real
impetus of the statute.54 Similarly, in Alexander v. Choate,5 5 the
48. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A § 84 (1997).
49. Id.
50. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407 n.7 (1979).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (using term "qualified individual with a
disability"); see also id. § 12112(a) ("No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual.").
52. See BURGDORF, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note
1, at 189-90 (1995) (discussing views of National Council).
53. ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 18, at 17-42, 159.
54. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, supra note 19, at 19-22. The
National Council observed:
The phrase "otherwise qualified" is not found in other types of nondis-
crimination laws, presumably because it is assumed that denials of oppor-
tunity because of failure to meet legitimate qualifications do not
constitute discrimination condemned by these laws. From this point of
view, the phrase "otherwise qualified" in section 504 may be considered a
[Vol. 42: p. 409
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss2/3
"SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITED" PROTECTION
United States Supreme Court 'stated that "the question of who is
'otherwise qualified' and what actions constitute 'discrimination'
under the section would seem to be two sides of a single coin. '56
Attesting that the "qualified" or "otherwise qualified" language is
not required, Title III of the ADA does not incorporate such a
phrase. 57
Another dubious aspect of section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act is the use of the word "solely. '58 On its face, this phrasing per-
mits covered entities to discriminate against people on the express
grounds of their disabilities, so long as that discrimination is accom-
panied by some other unprohibited grounds. For example, a recip-
ient of federal financial assistance could send an employee a "pink
slip" stating that the employee is being terminated because he or
she has a disability and because the employee has red hair or likes
baseball or reads poetry. Because such action would not be pre-
mised "solely" on discrimination based on disability, it would not be
actionable under the literal language of section 504.59 The ADA
does not include the word "solely."60
C. The Protected-Class Problem
Perhaps the most significant problem with the wording of sec-
tion 504 is that it appears to create an eligibility class for protection
from discrimination under the statute. Despite a popular miscon-
ception that civil rights laws afford protection only to certain
groups, federal civil rights laws and constitutional nondiscrimina-
tion requirements generally protect all individuals from discrimina-
tion on the grounds prohibited, whether it be race, gender,
redundancy. A person who is denied a benefit because he or she does
not possess the requisite qualifications has not been subjected to discrimi-
nation; such an individual has been excluded because of an absence of
qualifications, not on the basis of [disability] discrimination. On the
other hand, if the qualifications established for ajob or activity are them-
selves discriminatory, the concept of "otherwise qualified" in the statute
only further complicates the analysis. Id. at 19-20.
55. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
56. Id. at 299 n.19.
57. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1994); see also id. § 12182(b) (A) (i) (incor-
porating concept of "eligibility criteria," but framing it as consideration in delinea-
tion of discriminatory practices, not of defining protected class eligible for
statutory protection).
58. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) ("No otherwise qualified handicapped indi-
vidual.., shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation
in .. .any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.") (emphasis
added).
59. See id.
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1994) (containing ADA prohibitions).
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national origin, age or religion.61 Judicial precedents have estab-
lished that race discrimination prohibitions protect whites, blacks
and other racial groups. 62 Furthermore, gender discrimination
proscriptions can be invoked by males and females.63 Discrimina-
tion based on a person's national origin is unlawful no matter what
the country of origin.64 Similarly, religious freedom is guaranteed
to atheists, agnostics and members of traditional deistic religions.65
The Age Discrimination Act of 197566 applies to individuals of any
age who are subjected to discrimination because of their age.67
61. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982)
(holding that state-supported all-female college violated Equal Protection Clause
because men were prohibited from full-time attendance); McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-87 (1976) (noting that discrimination prohib-
ited by Tite VII applies to discrimination against whites); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg.
Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973) (noting that national origin should be interpreted
broadly to mean country from which person's ancestors came).
62. See, e.g., McDonald, 427 U.S. at 280 ("Title VII prohibits racial discrimina-
tion against.., white [people] upon the same standards as would be applicable [to
discrimination against black people]."); Gary A. Greenfield & Don B. Kates, Jr.,
Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CAL. L.
REv. 662, 676-80 (1975) (arguing that racial discrimination should be interpreted
as encompassing any discrimination in which discriminator perceives victim as hav-
ing distinct racial characteristics).
63. See, e.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731 (1982) (holding that university rule ex-
cluding men from nursing program violated Equal Protection Clause); Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (holding that statute permitting wives but not husbands
to recover alimony violated Equal Protection Clause); Sibley Mem'l. Hosp. v. Wil-
son, 488 F.2d 1338, 1340-41 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (allowing male private duty nurse to
bring action under Title VII for alleged sex discrimination); Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that refusal to hire males as
flight attendants violated Title VII).
64. See, e.g., Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 88 ("The term 'national origin' on its face
refers to the country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from
which his or her ancestors came.").
65. See Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144-45 (5th
Cir. 1975) (holding that discrimination against atheist employee prohibited by Ti-
tle VII); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1997) (setting forth EEOC guidelines on discrimina-
tion because of religion and providing religious practices defined as including
"moral and ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held
with the strength of traditional religious views"); see also Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333, 339 (1970) (announcing test for conscientious objector is whether beliefs
professed by registrant are sincerely held and whether they are "in his own scheme
of things" religious); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965) (holding
that conscientious objector exemption is available to persons whose nontheistic
beliefs "occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in
God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption").
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1994).
67. See 18 C.F.R. § 1309.1 (1997) (defining "age" to include any chronological
age). But see Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 631 (a)
(1994) (providing that application of ADEA limited to persons who are at least 40
years of age).
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Despite the notoriety and scholarly debate attached to foot-
note four of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Carolene Products Co.,68 the Court has generally not restricted height-
ened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause to "discrete and
insular minorities." 69 Rather, the Court has applied strict or mod-
erate judicial scrutiny to types of classifications, such as race or gen-
der, regardless of whether the individual invoking the Equal
Protection Clause is a member of a minority or the majority.70
Section 504 seems to deviate from the norm of other civil
rights laws by establishing a protected class-a designated group of
persons whose members are the only individuals entitled to invoke
the protection of the statute. Because section 504 prohibits dis-
crimination aimed at an "otherwise qualified individual with a disa-
bility," a prospective plaintiff has been required to establish that:
(1) he or she has a disability and (2) he or she is nevertheless quali-
fied for the position or program at issue. 71
These two required elements have a certain tension between
them that courts have described as a "catch-22. ''72 In Doe v. Region
13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Commission,73 the United States
68. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
69. Id. at 152-53 n.4. Justice Powell termed footnote four in Carolene as "the
most celebrated footnote in constitutional law." Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Prod-
ucts Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1087, 1087 (1982); see also Owen M. Fiss, The Forms
ofJustice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 6 (1979) (terming footnote four "the great and mod-
em charter for ordering the relations between judges and other agencies of
government").
70. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995) ("[T]he
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the
race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classification."); Craig v. Bo-
ren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (holding statute unconstitutional because it discrimi-
nated against males in violation of Equal Protection Clause by allowing females to
purchase "near" beer at 18 years of age, but not males until age of 21).
71. See Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1996)
(noting that plaintiff must show that he or she is disabled, but also that he or she is
otherwise qualified to perform job).
72. See Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704
F.2d 1402, 1408 n.6 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting catch-22 situation that arises in section
504 of Rehabilitation Act); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 744
(C.D. Cal. 1984) ("Section 504's 'Catch 22' aspect appears: the plaintiff must first
show that he or she has some impairment which substantially limits a major life
activity, but this same plaintiff must show that he or she is not so handicapped as to
be unable to perform the job."); Bales, supra note 18, at 239 ("[T]he employee is
put in a catch-22 situation"); Burgdorf, Analysis and Implications, supra note 1, at
448 (noting that claimants may be placed in catch-22 situation because first task is
to prove that he or she has condition that substantially limits one or more major
life activities, and if that hurdle is cleared, then individual must turn around and
prove that condition is not really serious limitation in the context of particular
job).
73. 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983).
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Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed: "The 'Catch 22'
implicit in virtually all section 504 actions is particularly evident in
this case . . . Ms. Doe was required to prove her handicap for
jurisdictional purposes, but simultaneously required to prove that
she was not so handicapped as to be unqualified to perform her
job."74 The National Council has similarly described this catch-22:
"To be a 'handicapped individual' eligible for Section 504 protec-
tion, a person has to show that he or she has a substantial impair-
ment of ability that limits major life activities, but to be qualified, a
person has to show that he or she is not substantially impaired in
ability. 75
The formulation of a protected class in section 504 also leads
to illogical, convoluted outcomes. For instance, in the Supreme
Court's first substantive section 504 decision, Southeastern Community
College v. Davis,76 a clinical registered nurse training program ex-
cluded a woman with a serious hearing disability.77 The Court de-
termined that there were no modifications that the college could
make that would enable Davis to successfully participate in the pro-
gram. 78 The logical conclusion in such a case would seem to be
that Davis had not been discriminated against. But, under the pro-
tected class formulation of section 504, the Court ruled that section
504 did not cover Davis because she was not an "otherwise qualified
handicapped individual." 79 Amazingly, after the case had been liti-
gated through the lower courts and up to the Supreme Court, it
turned out that the plaintiff was not within the protection of the
statute.8 0
Most importantly, the differentiation of a class of people who,
unlike all other Americans, are accorded statutory protection di-
rectly contravenes the central premises of the disability rights move-
74. Id. at 1408 n.6; see also Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir.
1981) (discussing conflicting elements of plaintiff's prima facie case in ADA
claim); Williams v. Avnet, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1124, 1131 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (conclud-
ing that proving one is included in "the ADA's protected class" requires plaintiff to
establish "two conflicting elements," namely that one is substantially limited in
working yet also qualified), affd sub nom. Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys.
Inc., 101 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 1996), and cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1844 (1997). One
federal district court went so far as to characterize it as "impossible" for a plaintiff
to be both substantially limited in regard to working and "qualified." See Everette
v. Runyon, 911 F. Supp. 180, 183-84 (E.D.N.C. 1995).
75. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, supra note 19, at 25.
76. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
77. See id. at 402.
78. See id. at 409-10.
79. See id. at 404.
80. See id.
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ment and the essential purposes of nondiscrimination laws such as
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. These central
premises and the mischief and injustice that have resulted from de-
viations from those premises are described later in this Article.
D. How Did the Language of Section 504 Get That Way?
The obvious question arising from the foregoing discussion of
section 504's defects is why section 504 was formulated with such
problematic and awkward language. There is no legislative history
explaining the differences between the language of section 504 and
that of Title VI. Both Senator Humphrey and Representative Vanik
testified that the intent of their respective bills to amend Title VI
was accomplished by the passage of section 504.81 Why then did
the troublesome phrase "otherwise qualified handicapped individ-
ual" and the requirement that discrimination is prohibited only if it
is "solely" on the basis of disability (neither of which are found in
Title VI or in Humphrey's and Vanik's proposals to amend Title VI)
turn up in the language of section 504?
Two prior pieces of disability rights legislation suggest the an-
swer.8 2 First, the 1948 Act, which prohibited discrimination on the
basis of "physical handicap" in civil service employment stated:
[W]ith respect to any position the duties of which, in the
opinion of the Civil Service Commission, may be effi-
ciently performed by a person with such a physical handi-
cap: And provided further, [t]hat such employment will
not be hazardous to the appointee or endanger the health
or safety of his fellow employees or others. 83
Similarly, Representative Vanik's 1972 bill to amend Title VII would
have made discrimination because of "physical or mental handicap"
an unlawful employment practice, "unless there [was] a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal oper-
ation of that particular business or enterprise."84 Obviously, these
81. See 119 CONG. REc. 7114 (1973); 119 CoNG. REc. 6145 (1973); see also Al-
exander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 n. 13 (1985) ("Given the lack of debate
devoted to § 504 ... when the Rehabilitation Act was passed in 1973, the intent
with which Congressman Vanik and Senator Humphrey crafted the predecessor to
§ 504 is a primary signpost on the road toward interpreting the legislative history
of § 504.").
82. See Act of June 10, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-617, 62 Stat. 351 (prohibiting
discrimination based on handicap in U.S. civil service employment).
83. Id.
84. H.R. 14033, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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two formulations contain additional language not found in Title VI
or Title VII.
The added wording was designed to solve a perceived potential
problem that might result from simply prohibiting discrimination
based on disability. This problem was identified in the discussion
of "otherwise qualified" in the appendix to the HEW regulations of
section 504 quoted above-the "blind bus driver" problem. 85 Be-
cause "discrimination based on disability" was not defined and
prohibiting discrimination based on disability was a novel idea, the
fear arose that proscribing such discrimination would mean that a
person's disability could play no role in eligibility determinations.
For example, a blind person could not be disqualified from a bus
driver job. With regard to race, color, ethnicity or gender, not dis-
criminating often requires treating a person as if he or she did not
possess the characteristic. If not discriminating on the basis of disa-
bility meant treating the individual as if he or she does not have a
disability, serious mischief, such as blind bus drivers, might ensue.
Arguably this problem has always been more perceived than
real. Disqualifying a person from a bus driving job for inability to
drive is not an act of discrimination based on disability. It is an
evenhanded application of a job-related qualification standard.
Not discriminating against people with disabilities does not mean
that employers must hire every applicant with a disability no matter
how unqualified. As long as the application of bona fide, job-re-
lated qualification standards is understood not to constitute dis-
crimination, no problem occurs.
The need to explain that this perceived problem would not be
created by a statutory prohibition against discrimination based on
disability and to reassure potential critics has repeatedly led drafters
to seek to make the statutory language of such legislation explicit.
There are several methods for accomplishing this objective. The
1948 Act provided that its nondiscrimination requirement did not
apply to positions that the person with the disability could not per-
form efficiently and safely.8 6 Vanik's 1972 bill made discrimination
unlawful except in situations involving "bona fide occupational
qualification [s] reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of
the business.87
85. See 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A (1997). The Supreme Court quoted this regula-
tory commentary in one case, characterizing it as emphasizing "that legitimate
physical qualifications may be essential to participation in particular programs."
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407 n.7 (1979).
86. See 62 Stat. at 351.
87. H.R. 14033.
[Vol. 42: p. 409
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss2/3
"SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITED" PROTECTION
Title IX offered an alternative approach for the drafters of sec-
tion 504.88 Section 1681 (a) of Title IX proscribed discrimination
based upon sex in any education program receiving federal finan-
cial assistance. 89 At the end of the nondiscrimination requirement,
section 1681 (a) of Title IX contained the words "except that" fol-
lowed by a list of nine exceptions. 90 Moreover, the next subsection
provided additional limiting language to make clear what Title IX
does not require.91 Thus, the most logical and effective way to pre-
empt concerns that a disability nondiscrimination provision might
prohibit the application of bona fide job or program requirements
to persons with disabilities is simply to state that the exclusion of a
person who cannot perform adequately and safely is not
discrimination. 92
88. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1687 (1994).
89. See id. § 1681(a) ("No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving federal finan-
cial assistance [unless one of the exceptions set forth in § 1681(a)(1)-(9)
applies].").
90. See id. These nine exceptions are: (1) certain educational institutions; (2)
certain single-sex educational institutions commencing planned change in admis-
sions; (3) certain religious institutions; (4) certain military educational institutions;
(5) certain traditionally single-sex public educational institutions; (6) certain social
fraternities or sororities and voluntary youth service organizations; (7) certain boy
or girl conferences; (8) certain father-son or mother-daughter activities; and (9)
certain beauty pageants. See id.
91. See id. § 1681(b). Section 1681(b) states:
Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted
to require any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate
treatment to the members of one sex on account of an imbalance which
may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of
that sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally sup-
ported program or activity, in comparison with the total number or per-
centage of persons of that sex in any community, State, section, or other
area: Provided, That this subsection shall not be construed to prevent the
consideration in any hearing or proceeding under this chapter of statisti-
cal evidence tending to show that such an imbalance exists with respect to
the participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, any such program or
activity by the members of one sex.
Id.
92. A similar approach is taken in Title I of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)
(1994). Section 12113(a) states:
It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this chapter that
an alleged application of qualification standards, tests, or selection crite-
ria that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny ajob or bene-
fit to an individual with a disability has been shown to be job-related and
consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be ac-
complished by reasonable accommodation, as required under this
subchapter.
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The drafters of section 504 followed none of the foregoing ap-
proaches. They rashly concocted their own approach, using the
"otherwise qualified handicapped individual" phrasing with the
cross-reference to the definition of "handicapped individual" used
for other purposes in the Rehabilitation Act.93 It is highly unfortu-
nate that the Senate staffer who ran out to his office to find a legis-
lative model for section 504 returned with only the language of
Title VI, which he and his colleagues then proceeded to adapt
spontaneously. 94 Apparently as pure overkill, they added that dis-
crimination was prohibited only if it was based "solely" on disabil-
ity.95 All of this problematic verbiage was intended to accomplish
the same end that could have been achieved by the other ap-
proaches. Specifically, the drafters intended to mollify the appre-
hension that a ban on discrimination based on disability would
require the hiring, inclusion and retention of nonqualified persons,
such as blind bus drivers.96
The protected-class phrasing of the provision is merely inci-
dental to the primary goal of such wording, which was to make ab-
solutely clear that the statute did not contemplate that exclusions of
unqualified and unsafe persons would constitute unlawful acts of
discrimination. 97 As will become evident, an accurate understand-
ing of the real objectives of the supplementary language in section
504 makes a huge difference in its interpretation and application.
'93. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994) (defining terms under Rehabilitation Act).
This section was amended in 1992 when "handicapped individual" was changed to
"individual with a disability." See id. § 794(a).
94. See SCOTCH, supra note 37, at 51-52 (noting that Ray Millerson of Senator
Javits' staff was involved in developing Title IX and during meeting held to discuss
revising Rehabilitation Act, Millerson ran to his office to retrieve language from
Title VI upon suggestion that language proscribing discrimination against handi-
capped people in federally assisted programs be added to Rehabilitation Act).
This language from Title VI was inserted into the Rehabilitation Act and subse-
quently entered into section 504. Id. at 52.
95. See 29 U.S.C. § 794.
96. Actually, much subsequent misperception and difficulty might have been
avoided if the purpose of the additional language had simply been specified at the
time section 504 was drafted and enacted. In the absence of such explanation, the
extra language has often been viewed as if it had been intended to restrict protec-
tion from discrimination to a protected class. See, e.g., Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 n.6 (referring to class of handicapped persons
covered by section 504 of Rehabilitation Act). Of course, the statutory language is
formulated in terms of protecting "otherwise qualified handicapped persons," and
one cannot reconstruct or ignore the plain language of section 504.
97. See 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A (1997) (discussing problems with coverage of
unqualified, unsafe persons under section 504 of Rehabilitation Act).
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III. ATrEMPTING TO GET BACK ON THE RIGHT TRACK-THE
THREE-PRONG DEFINITION OF DISABILITY
A. The 1974 Amendment
The inattentive drafting of the section 504 language that ap-
pears to embrace a protected-class approach might have been effec-
tively rectified a year after it was enacted. When Congress enacted
the 1974 Amendments, 98 it added a new definition of disability for
purposes of sections 501, 502, 503 and 504 and other provisions.99
The Senate Committee Report accompanying the 1974 Amend-
ments declared that the prior definition had proven to be "trouble-
some" in its application to section 503 and section 504, particularly
because of its focus on employability and vocational rehabilitation
services. 100 Actually, the focus on employability in the prior defini-
tion was not a problem with section 503, because that provision ad-
dressed only employment.1 0 1 The focus upon capability of
benefitting from rehabilitation services, however, was not
applicable. 0 2
In revising the definition, Congress did not simply expand the
focus of the definition from employment and rehabilitation to en-
98. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111(a), 88
Stat. 1617, 1619 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1994)).
99. See id.
100. See S. REP. No. 93-1297 (1974). The Supreme Court described the prin-
cipal reason for the need for a revised definition:
The primary focus of the 1973 Act was to increase federal support for
vocational rehabilitation; the Act's original definition of the term "handi-
capped individual" reflected this focus by including only those whose dis-
ability limited their employability, and those who could be expected to
benefit from vocational rehabilitation .... Congress concluded that the
definition of "handicapped individual," while appropriate for the voca-
tional rehabilitation provisions in Titles I and III of the Act, was too nar-
row to deal with the range of discriminatory practices in housing,
education, and health care programs which stemmed from stereotypical
attitudes and ignorance about the handicapped.
School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 278 n.3 (1987).
101. See 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (discussing employment under federal contracts).
Section 793(a) provides in part:
Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department
or agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal
services (including construction) for the United States shall contain a
provision requiring that, in employing persons to carry out such contract
the party contracting with the United States shall take affirmative action
to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals
as defined in section 706(7) of this title.
Id.
102. This problem was solved in the 1974 amendments. See id. § 706(7) (A)
(defining "handicapped individual" only as to subchapters that contain section 503
and 504 of Rehabilitation Act).
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compass other types of programs and activities. Instead, it made
two other important additions. First, it framed a definition for an
actual disability that required a substantial limitation on a major life
activity. 103 Second, it included two new categories of potentially
protected persons who "may at present have no actual incapacity at
all."'01 4 The Senate Committee stated that the new legislation em-
ployed a three-prong approach to respond to different ways in
which individuals with disabilities are discriminated against. 10 5 Ac-
cordingly, the new three-prong definition accorded protection
under the statute to any person who: "(i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii)
is regarded as having such an impairment."10 6
There is an apparent incongruity between the first prong,
which is worded in restrictive terms, and the second and third
prongs, which are expansive in scope. 10 7 The explanation for this
seeming inconsistency lies in the dual purposes that Congress
framed this definition to serve. The revised definition applies to
affirmative action efforts, barrier removal efforts and nondiscrimi-
nation requirements. 10 8 Congress wanted the definition to be very
broad for nondiscrimination purposes to protect people from be-
ing discriminated against on the basis of a handicap whether they
had any actual impairment or not.10 9 Conversely, the objective of
affirmative action programs would surely be undermined if covered
employers could claim success based upon workers whom the em-
103. See id. § 111(a), 88 Stat. at 1619.
104. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405-06 n.6
(1979) ("Such ... person [s] would be exactly the kind of individual[s] who would
be 'otherwise qualified' to participate in covered programs.").
105. See S. REP. No. 93-1297 (1974) ("First, [plaintiffs] are discriminated
against when they are, in fact handicapped .... Second, they are discriminated
against because they are classified or labeled, correctly or incorrectly, as handi-
capped. Third, they are discriminated against if they are regarded as handi-
capped, regardless of whether they are in fact handicapped.").
106. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (B).
107. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (A) ("[Hiandicapped individual means any
individual who ... has a physical or mental disability which for such individual
constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment."), with id.
§ 706(7)(B) ("[Hlandicapped individual means ... any person who ... has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such per-
son's major life activities.").
108. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B).
109. See S. REP. No. 93-1297 ("The amended definition ... takes cognizance
of the fact that handicapped persons are discriminated against .... [w] hen they
are, in fact, handicapped.... [and] when they are classified or labeled, correctly
or incorrectly, as handicapped, regardless of whether they are in fact
handicapped.").
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ployer merely regarded as being a person with a disability.110 It
does not stretch credulity too far to imagine an employer who says:
"I have a perfect affirmative action program under section 503; I
regard all my employees as impaired." Nor does removing architec-
tural and transportation barriers with reference to people with a
record of disability or who were only regarded as having a disability
make sense.11'
The legislative history explicitly describes the purposes of the
third prong as linked to the nondiscrimination mandates. 112 Call-
ing the prior definition "far too narrow and constricting," the Sen-
ate Committee declared that it had devised a new definition "which
would provide sufficient latitude (but still not be totally open
ended), particularly for the nondiscrimination programs carried
out under sections 501, 503, and 504."113 Furthermore, the Senate
Committee clarified that the definition had other applications fo-
cused on the more restrictive first prong, contrasting the broad
nondiscrimination purpose with the affirmative action obligations
created in the 1973 Act. 114
110. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (enacting broad requirement that "[e]ach
department, agency, and instrumentality . . .in the executive branch shall ...
submit... an affirmative action program plan for the hiring, placement, and ad-
vancement of handicapped individuals in such department, agency, or instrumen-
tality"); id. § 793 (a) (creating broad requirement of inclusion of affirmative action
provision in every federal contract in excess of $2,500).
111. See, e.g., id. § 794(b) (allowing appropriation of funds to persons or enti-
ties operating rehabilitation facilities for "purpose of assisting such persons or enti-
ties in removing architectural, transportation, or communication barriers" in
order to provide facilities equipped for persons with disabilities).
112. See S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 39 (explaining that perceived prong of defini-
tion of disability covers those who are discriminated against on basis of handicap,
even where person is not, in fact, handicapped); see also 120 CONG. REc. 30531
(1974) (expressing view of Senator Cranston that perceived prong of definition
covers those who are not handicapped). For example, the Senate Committee
explained:
Clause [iii] in the new definition clarifies the intention to include those
persons who are discriminated against on the basis of handicap, whether
or not they are in fact handicapped, just as title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the ground of race, whether or not
the person discriminated against is in fact a member of a racial minority.
This subsection includes within the protect of sections 503 and 504 those
persons who do not in fact have the condition which they are perceived
as having, as well as those persons whose mental or physical condition
does not substantially limit their life activities and who thus are not tech-
nically within clause [i] in the new definition. Members of both of these
groups may be subjected to discrimination on the basis of their being
regarded as handicapped.
S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 39.
113. See id. at 63.
114. See id. at 39. Specifically, the Senate Committee stated:
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To whatever extent the original phrasing of section 504 re-
stricted its protection to a select group of people, the second and
third prongs of the revised definition clearly move beyond such
narrow constraints. 115 The second prong includes not only those
who previously had a disability, but also those who never really had
such a condition, but were mistakenly listed or described in some-
one's records as having had a disability. 116 Further, the third prong
of the revised definition clearly can be invoked by anyone who
claims that he or she has been regarded as having a disability. 117
Since 1974, the three-prong definition has formed the basis of
section 504 analysis, and in 1990 the ADA similarly adopted its for-
mulation." 8 The broadened definition, and in particular the "re-
garded as" prong, might have served to correct most of the
problems inherent in the awkward drafting of section 504, but such
has not been the whole course of subsequent analysis.
B. Initial Regulatory Interpretations
Early explanations of section 504, by administrative agencies
charged with enforcing it, emphasized the breadth of the three-
prong definition and gave no indication of any desire to designate a
tightly restricted group of persons who alone would be eligible for
protection from discrimination. 1 9 In 1977, HEW issued the first
regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 120
The new definition applies to section 503, as well as to section 504, in
order to avoid limiting the affirmative action obligation of a Federal con-
tractor to only that class of persons who are eligible for vocational reha-
bilitation services. It should be noted, however, that the affirmative
action obligation cannot be fulfilled by the expediency of hiring or limit-
ing services to persons marginally or previously handicapped or persons
"regarded as" handicapped.
Id.
115. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (B) (ii), (iii) (1994) (providing "record of" and "re-
garded as" prongs of definition of handicapped individual).
116. See id. § 706(7) (B) (ii) (covering those individuals who "have a record of"
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of person's
major life activities).
117. See id. § 706 (7) (B) (iii) (covering those individuals who are "regarded as"
having physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of per-
son's life activities).
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) ("The term 'disability' means, with re-
spect to an individual: (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.").
119. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (2) (iv) (1997) (describing meaning of "regarded
as" prong of definition of "handicapped individual" under Rehabilitation Act).
120. See generally id. §§ 84.1-84.99 (containing HEW's regulations with respect
to Rehabilitation Act). ,
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Noting that "these regulations were drafted with the oversight and
approval of Congress,"' 21 the Supreme Court has recognized the
preeminent influence of the original HEW regulations as "'an im-
portant source of guidance on the meaning of [section] 504."'' 122
HEW defined "regarded as" as follows:
"Is regarded as having an impairment" means (A) has a
physical or mental impairment that does not substantially
limit major life activities but that is treated ... as constitut-
ing such a limitation; (B) has a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits major life activities only as a
result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment;
or (C) has none of the impairments defined [in the actual
impairment paragraph] but is treated . .. as having such
an impairment.123
The lines separating these three situations are not always
sharp, and this formulation may over-complicate an otherwise rela-
tively straightforward statutory concept.124 The common feature of
all three, however, is that a person who does not have a condition
that satisfies the definition of an actual disability is treated as having
such a disability.125 This approach, while framed by the "otherwise
qualified handicapped individual" phrasing of section 504, focuses
on how individuals are treated rather than upon technical distinc-
tions about how much impairment makes a person disabled. Thus,
it focuses on the existence of discrimination, not upon the charac-
teristics of the person upon whom discrimination is visited.
The HEW's three-part definition of the "regarded as" prong
was incorporated in the Department of Justice (DOJ) regulations
coordinating section 504 regulations 126 and subsequently in regula-
tions of other federal agencies.' 27 The Senate and House Commit-
121. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987).
122. Id. at 279 (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 304 n.24 (1985)).
123. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (2) (iv). This definition is adopted, with a few inconse-
quential wording variations, in the EEOC's ADA regulations. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(1) (1997).
124. See BURGDORF, DISABILIrY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAw, supra
note 1, at 152-54.
125. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(0) (2) (iv) (providing explanation of "regarded as"
prong of definition of disability).
126. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b) (4) (1997) (explaining "regarded as" prong of
definition of disability in Department of Justice regulations).
127. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 8b.3(g) (1) (iii) (1997) (defining handicapped person
as "any person who... [ius regarded as having... an impairment in Department
of Commerce regulations"); 29 C.F.R. § 32.3 (defining "regarded as" prong in De-
partment of Labor regulations).
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tee Reports accompanying the ADA directed that analysis of the
term "individual with handicaps" in the HEW regulations interpret-
ing section 504 should be applied to the term "disability" under the
ADA. 128 In 1992, section 504 was amended to substitute the term
"disability" for "handicap." 129
C. The Arline Decision
The leading judicial decision applying the second and third
prongs of the Rehabilitation Act definition of disability is the
Supreme Court's ruling in School Board v. Arline.a30 The plaintiff,
Gene Arline, was discharged from her job as an elementary public
school teacher because she had infectious tuberculosis. 131 She
brought a lawsuit alleging that she had been discriminated against
in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the school
board defended by arguing that she was not a handicapped person
under the definition.'3 2
In examining the three-prong definition, the Court declared
that: "Congress expanded the definition of 'handicapped individ-
ual' so as to preclude discrimination against '[a] person who has a
record of, or is regarded as having, an impairment [but who] may
at present have no actual incapacity at all."' 133 As a preliminary
matter, the Court determined that Arline's tuberculosis constituted
an actual physical impairment that affected one of the principal
body systems-her respiratory system.' 3 4 The Court also reasoned
that "[t] his impairment was serious enough to require hospitaliza-
tion, a fact more than sufficient to establish that one or more of her
In 1976, during the period when HEW regulations were still in proposed
form, the Department of Labor issued its section 503 Regulations, making these
the first final regulations that were promulgated under the three-prong definition
of disability. See 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-741 app. A (1997). Appended to the section 503
regulations were "Guidelines on the Application of the Definition Handicapped
Individual" which provided that the "regarded as having such an impairment"
prong included individuals who, "because of attitudes or for any other reason," are
"perceived" as having a disability, "whether an impairment exists or not." Id.
128. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 21 (1989) (referring courts to HEW regula-
tions for interpretation of meaning of disability); see also H.R. REP. No. 101485, at
27 (1990) (same).
129. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569,
§§ 102(f)(1) (A), (f) (2)(B), (f)(3), (P), 106 Stat. 4344, 4348, 4349, 4356-58 (1992)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (1994)).
130. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
131. See id. at 276.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 279 (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S.
397, 405-06 n.6 (1979)).
134. See id. at 281.
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major life activities were substantially limited by her impair-
ment. "135 Next, the, Court concluded that Arline's hospitalization
for tuberculosis sufficed to establish that she had "'a record of...
impairment"' under the second prong of the statutory definition. 136
The school district argued that the actual impairment and this
record of impairment were not relevant in this case because the
plaintiff was dismissed not because of diminished physical capabili-
ties or her history of hospitalization, but because of the threat
raised by her contagious condition. 137 Rejecting the school dis-
trict's argument, the Court declared that it would be "unfair to al-
low an employer to seize upon the distinction between the effects of
a disease on others and the effects of a disease on a patient and use
that distinction to justify discriminatory treatment."'138 The Court
held that allowing employers to rely upon that distinction was in-
consistent with the legislative history of the definition, because
" [t]hat history demonstrates that Congress was as concerned about
the effect of an impairment on others as it was about its effect on
the individual."'139 The Court underscored that the basic purpose
of section 504 was to ensure that individuals "are not denied jobs or
other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance
of others" or because of "reflexive reactions to actual or perceived
handicaps." 140 Thus, the Court ruled that the plaintiff met the stat-
utory definition of a "handicapped person" and remanded the case
to the district court for determining whether she was "otherwise
qualified" for her position. 141
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 282.
139. Id. In support of this conclusion, the Court particularly examined the
third prong of the statutory definition:
Congress extended coverage ... to those individuals who are simply "re-
garded as having" a physical or mental impairment. The Senate Report
provides as an example of a person who would be covered under this
subsection "a person with some kind of visible physical impairment which
in fact does not substantially limit that person's functioning." Such an
impairment might not diminish a person's physical or mental capabili-
ties, but could nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to work
as a result of the negative reactions of others to the impairment.
Id. at 283-84 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 64 (1974)).
140. Id. at 284-85.
141. See id. at 289. On remand, the United States District Court for the Mid-
dle District of Florida found that the plaintiff was "otherwise qualified" and en-
tered judgment in her favor. See School Bd. v. Arline, 692 F. Supp. 1286, 1291-92
(M.D. Fla. 1988) (finding that plaintiff was "otherwise qualified" for job of elemen-
tary school teacher because plaintiffs tuberculosis was not easily communicated,
duration of risk of infection was slight, severity of risk to third parties was low and
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Apart from the Court's specific holding, the decision in Arline
makes other significant points. The Court expressly recognized the
importance of the Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") regulations (originally issued by HEW) in interpreting the
statutory definition.1 42 Furthermore, the Court accorded consider-
able weight to statements by Representative Vanik, Senators
Humphrey and Mondale and others in the legislative history of sec-
tion 504.143 Finally, the Court established guidelines for the district
court to apply on remand when it addressed the concept of "other-
wise qualified.'" 4 4
The over-arching significance of this ruling, however, lies in its
analysis of the purposes and application of the three-prong statu-
tory definition of handicapped individual. After Arline, it is clear
that individuals can be included under the statutory definition of
disability solely because of the negative reactions, prejudiced atti-
tudes, ignorance, misapprehensions, irrational fears, mythology,
stereotypes or reflexive reactions of others, regardless of whether
an individual does or does not have a mental or physical impair-
ment that satisfies the other prongs of the definition. 145
IV. JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DISORIENTATION
The discussions of the development of section 504, the three-
prong definition of disability, the section 504 regulations and the
Arline decision all point to a single interpretation of the "qualified
individual with a disability" language of the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA.146 First, they suggest that the purpose of that language
was to make crystal clear that it is not unlawful discrimination to
exclude people with disabilities if they are unqualified to perform
safely and efficiently. Thus, the language was intended to solve the
putative blind bus driver problem, rather than to create a highly
restricted protected class. Second, each of the factors discussed
above also suggests that the impetus toward a restrictive interpreta-
probability that plaintiff would transmit disease and cause harm "was so extremely
small as to not exist").
142. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 279 ("In determining whether a particular individ-
ual is handicapped as defined by the Act, the regulations promulgated by the De-
partment of Health and Human Services are of significant assistance.").
143. See id. at 282-83 n.9, 284 n.13.
144. See id. at 287-89.
145. See id. at 278-85 (discussing "stereotypical attitudes and ignorance about
the handicapped").
146. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (B) (1994) (defining handicapped individual
under Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (defining disability under
ADA).
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tion of "individual with a disability" is largely abated by the second
and third prongs of the 1974 Amendments. Finally, these factors
highlight that a person who has no actual disability whatsoever is
nonetheless protected by section 504 and the ADA from discrimina-
tion if he or she is regarded, perceived or treated as having a
disability.
Many court decisions have been consistent with these princi-
ples, as have been, generally, the section 504 regulations and most
of the regulations issued under the ADA.1 47 In a few areas, how-
ever, lines of cases have developed, fueled at times by regulatory
commentary, that take a much more restrictive stance toward the
protection afforded by section 504 and the ADA. This Part analyzes
decisions where courts have taken a more restrictive approach to
the question of coverage under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
A. The Exclusion-from-Only-One-Job Problem
"Major life activities" are defined in section 504 regulations to
mean "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working." 148 This definition is recited verbatim in the Senate and
House Committee Reports on the ADA and in the ADA regula-
tions. 149 If an individual can show a substantial limitation on some
major life activity other than working, he or she is covered by the
statutory definition of disability and does not need to establish a
limitation on the activity of working. a50
In less common situations, where an individual seeks to invoke
statutory protection solely on the basis that the activity of working is
impaired, an issue may arise as to how much impairment of em-
147. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Marsh, 866 F.2d 1182, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1989) (pro-
viding broad interpretation of "regarded as" prong of definition of disability); Doe
v. NewYork Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)
(1997) (discussing "regarded as" prong of definition of disability under ADA and
providing examples for each of three possible ways that employer may regard em-
ployee as disabled).
148. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997).
149. See H.R. REP. No. 101485, at 28 (1990) ("Major life activities include
such things as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hear-
ing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22
(1989) ("A 'major life activity' means functions such as caring for one's self, per-
forming manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working."); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) ("Major Life Activity means functions such
as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working.").
150. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. A § 1630 ("If an individual is substantially
limited in any other major life activity, no determination should be made as to
whether the individual is substantially limited in working.").
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ployability must be shown. Specifically, courts have faced the ques-
tion of whether exclusion from a particularjob because of an actual
or perceived impairment is sufficient by itself to establish that a per-
son was regarded as having a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limited a major life activity.' 51
1. Case Law Under the Rehabilitation Act
With respect to the actual disability prong of the disability defi-
nition, most courts have ruled that in order to be substantially lim-
ited in the major activity of working, a plaintiff must show more
than inability to perform a single specific job for one particular em-
ployer.152 Courts have considered factors such as the number and
type of jobs from which the impaired individual is disqualified, the
geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access and
the individual's job expectations and training. 153 A few courts have
been less demanding regarding the breadth of job limitations that
must be shown to establish a substantial impairment of
"working."154
151. See, e.g,, Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986) (discussing
whether plaintiff may establish disability if he or she only proves disqualification
from one job); Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1248 (6th Cir.
1985) (same); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1099-1100 (D. Haw.
1980) (same).
152. See, e.g., Homemyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir.
1996) (stating that plaintiff must show that her impairment substantially limits em-
ployment generally); Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 723-24 (2d Cir.
1994) (noting that plaintiff was not considered handicapped person under Reha-
bilitation Act because asthmatic condition did not preclude plaintiff's other em-
ployment); Gupton v. Virginia, 14 F.3d 203, 205 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that for
plaintiff to show that allergy to tobacco smoke substantially limited her ability to
work, plaintiff had to prove that allergy precluded her from obtaining otherjobs in
her field of employment);Jasany, 755 F.2d at 1248-50 (stating that, although plain-
tiff's impairment, strabismus or crossed eyes, interfered with his ability to perform
his job, it did not significantly decrease plaintiffs ability to obtain other employ-
ment, and therefore, plaintiffs impairment was not substantially limiting under
statute); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (sus-
taining plaintiff's termination as airline steward because plaintiff exceeded weight
requirements of job); E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1099-1100 (stating that impair-
ment that interferes with individual's ability to do particular job, but does not sig-
nificantly decrease individual's ability to obtain satisfactory employment otherwise,
was not substantially limiting under Rehabilitation Act).
153. See, e.g., Fonrzsi, 794 F.2d at 935 (focusing on fact that plaintiff was seen as
unsuited for "one position in one plant");Jasany, 755 F.2d at 1249-50 (focusing on
type ofjob in case where plaintiff could not operate machinery because of impair-
ment); E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1099-1100 (illustrating several colorful examples
in order to emphasize factors of individual's job expectations and training).
154. See, e.g., Harrison v. Marsh, 691 F. Supp. 1223 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (finding
that plaintiff was substantially limited in her ability to work); Vickers v. Veterans
Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85, 87 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (holding that plaintiff was substan-
tially limited in major life activity).
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In regard to the third prong of the definition of disability
under the Rehabilitation Act, the courts of appeals are split on
whether an employer's rejection of a person with a physical or
mental impairment as incapable of doing a particular job is suffi-
cient to establish that the employer regarded the person as having a
disability.155 The first circuit court decision to rule that exclusion
For example, in Vickers, the court ruled that a plaintiff was a "handicapped
person" under section 504 because he was "unusually sensitive to tobacco smoke."
Id. at 86-87. Rather than insisting on a showing that this would have made the
plaintiff unqualified for other jobs in his field and geographic area, the court sim-
ply inferred "that this hypersensitivity does in fact limit at least one of his major life
activities, that is, his capacity to work in an environment which is not completely
smoke free." Id. at 87.
Similarly, in Harrison, the court declared that it was "quite comfortable" in
ruling that a woman who had a radical mastectomy involving removal of muscle in
one arm and shoulder for treatment of breast cancer had a disability under sec-
tions 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See Harrison, 691 F. Supp. at 1229-30.
The plaintiff challenged the defendants' reassigning her from her regular duties as
a clerk typist to an emergency typing pool and ordering her to perform continuous
typing duties that exacerbated her physical limitations. See id. at 1225-27. The
defendant took the position that it was "merely required to offer her one job and
one job only." Id. at 1226. The court ruled that in such circumstances the plaintiff
had established that she was an individual with a disability within the meaning of
the Rehabilitation Act, without demanding any evidence that she would have been
limited or rejected in connection to any other positions or by any other employers.
See id. at 1229-30. The complaint alleged a violation of section 501, and the court
made its ruling under that provision, but the court discussed section 504 prece-
dents and ruled that it was "appropriate to borrow the § 504 definition of disability
in addressing the case at bar." Id. at 1227. The court explained:
It cannot be seriously disputed that [the plaintiffs] impairment af-
fected her ability to work. That is self-evident. Working is clearly among
one's "major life activities." Ergo, even if one assumes, arguendo, that [the
plaintiff's] condition impairs only her ability to work, then she nonethe-
less clearly qualifies as handicapped within the meaning of the Act.
Id. at 1320.
155. Compare Cook v. Rhode Island Dep't. of Mental Health, Retardation, and
Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that jury could rationally conclude
that defendant's perception of plaintiffs impairment, as exhibited in its refusal to
hire her for particular position, foreclosed wide range of jobs and served as proof
of substantial limitation), Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1126 (11 th Cir.
1993) ("[T]he [plaintiff] firefighters' inability to shave that results from [his im-
pairment], 'substantially limit[ed]' the firefighters' ability to engage in the 'major
life activity' of work on account of the [defendants'] no-beard rule."), and Taylor v.
United States Postal Serv., 946 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 1991) (permitting "appli-
cant to prove he was perceived as being handicapped by pointing to the fact that
he did not possess a so-called job requirement due to physical impairment"), with
Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that em-
ployer's belief that employee was unable to perform one task-driving-was not
sufficient to establish that plaintiffs were "regarded as" substantially limited in
working), Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992) ("[A]n im-
pairment that an employer perceives as limiting an individual's ability to perform
only one job is not a handicap under the Act."), and Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 935 (find-
ing employer's perception that discharged plaintiff was unsuited for one position
in one plant was not sufficient to establish that employer regarded condition as
"substantial limitation" on working).
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from a particularjob because of a physical or mental impairment is
not sufficient to establish that the excluded individual was "re-
garded as" having a disability by the employer was Forrisi v. Bowen.156
Several courts have relied upon the Forrisi decision in reaching a
similar conclusion.15 7
In Forrisi, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that a utility systems repair worker dismissed from his
job because of his acrophobia had not proven that he was "re-
garded as" having a disability. 158 In reaching its conclusion, the
Two other United States Courts of Appeals have made statements in dicta that
seem to support the restrictive view adopted in Chandler, Welsh and Forrisi. For
example, the court found the plaintiff did not have an impairment, nor was re-
garded as having an impairment in Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989).
The court stated in dicta that "[b]eing declared unsuitable for the particular posi-
tion of police officer is not a substantial limitation of a major life activity." Id.
Similarly, in another case, the court found that the plaintiff did not produce
adequate evidence of the existence of an actual disability. Maulding v. Sullivan,
961 F.2d 694, 696 (8th Cir. 1992). Thus, the court did not rely on the "regarded
as" prong, and only discussed it in a parenthetical after citation to Forrisi. Id. at
698. In the parenthetical, the court quoted the following language from Forrisi:
"'[A] n employer does not necessarily regard an employee as handicapped simply
by finding the employee to be incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a
particular job."' Id. (quoting Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 934).
Finally, in a case whose results are more difficult to characterize, the court
asserted (inaccurately) that courts have uniformly agreed with the Forrisi court that
"an employer does not necessarily regard an employee as handicapped simply by
finding the employee to be incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a par-
ticularjob." Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 567 (7th Cir. 1992). The court
then proceeded to rule that proof in the case at bar that a teacher was unable to
teach in two particular classrooms "could allow a jury reasonably to differ about
whether the [defendant] regarded [the plaintiff] as handicapped," and conse-
quently upheld denial of a motion for a directed verdict. Id.
156. 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
157. See, e.g., Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 727-28 (5th Cir.
1995) (stating that plaintiff, who was welder with arm injury, was not regarded as
having disability because employer only precluded plaintiff from welding jobs that
involved climbing, not entire field of welding); Welsh, 977 F.2d at 1419 ("[A]n
impairment that an employer perceives as limiting an individual's ability to per-
form only one job is not a handicap under the Act."); Byrne, 979 F.2d at 565 (stat-
ing that person's inability to perform specific job for particular employer does not
substantially limit that person's ability to work); Daley, 892 F.2d at 214-16 (stating
that being declared unsuitable for specific position of police officer because of
poor judgment and irresponsible behavior is not substantial limitation to major
life activity of working); Smaw v. Virginia Dep't. of State Police, 862 F. Supp 1469,
1475 (noting obesity of former state trooper was not substantial limitation of major
life activities and did not substantially limit ability to work).
Another circuit court decision frequently cited in this context, which was de-
cided more than a year before Forrisi, isJasany v. United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d
1244 (6th Cir. 1985). The Jasany decision, however, considered only the first
prong of the statutory definition and never discussed or even mentioned the "re-
garded as" prong. Id. at 1248-50.
158. See Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 935. The court found that plaintiffs acrophobia
did not substantially limit plaintiff's major activities, including the major life activ-
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court relied on three district court decisions, namely de la Torres v.
Bolger,159 Tudyman v. United Airlines 60 and E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Mar-
shall.161 The court's reliance upon these decisions, however, is
problematic for several reasons. First, the characteristics involved
in de la Torres and Tudyman, left-handedness and body-building
weight gain, respectively, were not actual "impairments."'162 Both
ity of working. See id. The court held that the evidence in the case had shown that
"[f]ar from being regarded as having a 'substantial limitation' in employability,
[plaintiff] was seen as unsuited for one position in one plant-and nothing more."
Id. The court further explained that "[t]he Rehabilitation Act, seeks to remedy
perceived handicaps that, like actual disabilities, extend beyond this isolated mis-
match of employer and employee." Id.
159. 610 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Tex. 1985), affd, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986).
160. 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
161. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
162. See de la Torres, 610 F. Supp. at 596 ("Being lefthanded is a 'physiological
condition ... affecting the neurological and musculoskeletal systems,' but it is no
more so than (and no more of an impairment than) being right handed or ambi-
dextrous."); Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746 ("[P1laintiff's 'unique musculo-skeletal
system and body composition,' are not the result of 'physiological disorders' ....
His weight and low fat content are self-imposed and voluntary.").
In de /a Torres, the plaintiff was a natural born left-handed person who worked
as a part-time flexible letter carrier for the United States postal service. de La
Torres, 610 F. Supp. at 594. Mail casing at the post office where the plaintiff worked
was to be performed with the right hand, regardless of whether the carrier was
ight- or left-handed. See id. at 595. The plaintiff had problems associating the
mail with street addresses using only his right hand and in locating the mailboxes.
See id. at 594. Defendant terminated the plaintiff because the plaintiff took an
"excessive" amount of time to complete his assignments and he showed no signs of
improvement after having undergone training in using only his right hand to per-
form his tasks at work. See id. at 594-95. The plaintiff brought suit under the Reha-
bilitation Act, alleging he was terminated because the defendant was biased against
left-handed people. See id. at 595. The court found that plaintiffs left-handedness
could not be considered a disability under the terms of the Rehabilitation Act. See
id. at 596. The court noted that the plaintiff was in excellent health, had per-
formed a wide array of jobs without apparent difficulty, and was an accomplished
athlete in college. See id. The court also noted that the defendant did not regard
the plaintiff as substantially limited in working. See id.
In Tudyman, the plaintiff applied for a position as a flight attendant, but was
rejected because of the defendant's weight requirements. Tudyman, 608 F. Supp.
at 740. Because of his avid bodybuilding, which resulted in his low percentage of
body fat and high percentage of muscle, the plaintiff exceeded defendant's maxi-
mum weight requirements by 15 pounds. See id. at 740-41. The plaintiff brought
suit under the Rehabilitation Act, alleging that his rejection constituted handi-
capped discrimination. See id. at 740. The court held that the plaintiff did not
have a physical impairment and was not substantially limited in any of his major
life activities. See id. at 746. The court stated that the plaintiffs excessive bulk was
caused by his own voluntary behavior and, therefore, the Rehabilitation Act does
not apply to the plaintiff: "[Section] 504 was not intended to protect those with
voluntary 'impairments' from employment discrimination." Id. at 746. Nor, did
the defendant view the plaintiff as having a physical impairment that limited his
major life activities. See id. As the court noted, "what the plaintiff is really suing for
is his right to be both a body builder and a flight attendant, a right that [section]
504 was not intended to protect." Id.
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courts further recognized that neither employer considered them
to be impairments.1 63
Second, the Forrisi court's use of the E.E. Black decision raises
its own unique problems and has largely obscured the actual ruling
in that case.1 64 E.E. Black was one of the first reported decisions to
examine the definition of disability under the Rehabilitation Act in
any depth.' 65 Prior administrative proceedings in the case squarely
framed the debate over the one-job issue. 166 An administrative law
judge (ALJ) ruled that the plaintiff had not proven that the per-
ceived impairment, a congenital back anomaly, substantially limited
a major life activity because he had not shown that it had "impeded
activities relevant to many or most jobs."167 On appeal, the Assis-
tant Secretary of Labor for the Employment Standards Administra-
163. See de la Torres, 610 F. Supp. at 597 ("Defendants did not regard Plaintiff
as one 'substantially limited' from working .... If he was so regarded, neither he
nor [another left-handed employee] would have been hired in the first place.");
Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746 ("Defendant merely regards plaintiff as not being
under a certain weight .... [R]efusal to hire someone for a singular job does not
in and of itself constitute perceiving the plaintiff as a handicapped individual.").
164. See Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934-35 (stating that employer does not
necessarily regard employee as handicapped merely by finding that employee is
unable to meet specific demands of particular job).
165. See E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1090 ("This case of first impression involves
the construction and interpretation of several sections of the Rehabilitation Act.").
The plaintiff, George Crosby, was an apprentice carpenter, who was referred to the
defendant, E.E. Black, by Crosby's union. See id. at 1091. E.E. Black, a general
construction contractor, required all apprentice carpenters applicants to take pre-
employment physical examinations. See id. Crosby had x-rays taken of his back,
and a surgeon, Dr. Henry, detected a congenital back abnormality. See id. Dr.
Henry informed E.E. Black that Crosby was a poor risk for heavy labor because of
his back, and E.E. Black denied him employment as a result of the preemployment
physical. See id. Subsequently, Crosby was examined by another doctor, an ortho-
pedist, who concluded that Crosby's condition did not prevent him from perform-
ing the job of apprentice carpenter. See id. at 1091-92. Despite the fact that the
orthopedist wrote a letter detailing his findings, E.E. Black refused to hire Crosby
as an apprentice. See id. at 1092.
166. See id. at 1093. Initially, the administrative law judge (ALJ) noted that
the term "impairment" was not defined in the Rehabilitation Act or the Regula-
tions. See id. Accordingly, the ALJ defined impairment as "any condition which
weakens, diminishes, restricts, or otherwise damages an individual's health or phys-
ical or mental activity." See id. The ALJ then found that the employer perceived
Crosby as having an impairment, and that he had difficulty obtaining employment
as a result of this perception. See id. Nevertheless, the ALJ determined that the
employer did not perceive this impairment as "substantially limiting a major life
activity of ... Crosby-in this case, employment." See id. The ALJ explained that
in order to show that the employer perceived Crosby as substantially limited, the
employer would have to perceive Crosby's impairment as "so severe as to limit
employment generally." Id at 1093-94.
167. See id. at 1094. An ALJ initially determined that the plaintiffs condition,
a "congenital back anomaly" discovered by x-rays, was "perceived" by the defend-
ant as constituting an "impairment [that] caused him to experience ... difficulty
in obtaining employment." Id.
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don ruled that coverage under the Rehabilitation Act definition did
not require a showing that the impairment impeded activities rele-
vant to many or most jobs because coverage is "extended to every
individual with an impairment that is a current bar to employment
that the individual is currently capable of performing [and i]t is
sufficient that the impairment is a current bar to the employment
of one's choice . . .which the individual is currently capable of
performing."' 16
8
Later decisions, including the Forrisi ruling, treat the decision
of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii in E.E.
Black as if the court had adopted the position of the ALJ in the
case. 169 In fact, the E.E. Black court settled for neither of the prior
articulated positions, but instead forged its own unique, albeit ques-
tionable, stance. 170 The E.E. Black court rejected the notion that
the statutory definition includes anyone who is refused a particular
job because of a real or perceived impairment, but held that the
plaintiff was regarded as having an impairment by virtue of his hav-
ing been refused an apprentice position because of back abnormali-
ties. 171 In reaching that result, the E.E. Black court reasoned that
the focus cannot be simply on the job criteria or qualifications used
by the individual employer because it should be assumed that all
employers offering the same job or similar jobs would use the same
requirement or screening process. 172 Otherwise, according to the
court, in situations involving "some aberrational type of job qualifi-
cation," an employer "discriminating against a qualified handi-
capped individual would be rewarded if his reason for rejecting the
applicant were ridiculous enough. ' 173 The E.E. Black court's gener-
alization of other employers' hiring criteria undercuts much of the
impact of the "not just one job" principle in this case, and its appli-
168. Id. Administrative procedures applicable to the plaintiff's complaint
under section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act permitted an appeal of the ALJ's deter-
mination to the Assistant Secretary. See id. The Assistant Secretary agreed with the
facts as found by the ALJ. See id.
169. See Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934-35 (citing E.E. Black to support
proposition that "statutory reference to a substantial limitation indicates.., that
an employer regards an employee as handicapped merely by finding the em-
ployee's impairment to foreclose generally the type of employment involved").
170. See E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1100 ("The court believes that the real
focus must be on the individual job seeker and not solely on the impairment or the
perceived impairment. This necessitates a case-by-case determination of whether
the impairment or perceived impairment of a rejected, qualified job seeker, consti-
tutes, for that individual, a substantial handicap to employment.").
171. See id. at 1102.
172. See id. at 1100.
173. Id.
1997]
37
Burgdorf: Substantially Limited Protection from Disability Discrimination:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
cation might have led to an opposite result in Forrisi.174 The Forrisi
decision quoted the discussion of why a single rejection should not
demonstrate a substantial limitation, but ignored the E.E. Black
court's analysis of the need to generalize an employer's screening
standard. 175
Apart from the dubious precedents upon which it relied, the
Forrisi court also seems to have been particularly influenced by con-
crete evidence of the plaintiffs ability to find other jobs. 17 6 The
Fourth Circuit noted the district court's finding that the plaintiff
"'had no difficulty in obtaining other jobs in his field prior to this
one, and defendant's uncontroverted allegation is that plaintiff is
currently employed once again as an engineer.' '1 77 The court also
quoted from the plaintiffs deposition testimony: "My fear of
heights never affected my life at all on any job or anything .... It
never was a problem before I got this job."178 Thus, the facts sug-
gested that the Forrisi court might have been able to find that the
plaintiff did not meet the statutory definition of disability without
its stance on the one-job issue. 1 7 9
In contrast to Forrisi, other courts have been considerably more
expansive in applying the "regarded as" concept. For instance, in
Doe v. New York University,'8" the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit observed that "the legislative history . . . indi-
cates that the definition is not to be construed in a niggardly fash-
ion."'181  The court ruled that a medical student, denied
readmission because of psychiatric problems, was regarded as hav-
174. See Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 934-35 (providing no discussion as to whether
other employers would have regarded plaintiff as handicapped in ability to work as
utility systems repair person because of plaintiffs acrophobia).
175. See id. at 935 (quoting E.E. Black to support proposition that if Rehabilita-
tion Act applied to all persons who have been rejected from particular job because
of perceived inability to perform that job, it would therefore cover individual with
acrophobia "who was offered 10 assistant accountant jobs with a particular com-
pany, but was disqualified from one job because it was on the 37th floor").
176. See id. at 935 (discussing that plaintiff, despite his acrophobia, could
readily find employment in his chosen field of utility systems repair).
177. Id. (quoting Forrisi v. Heckler, 626 F. Supp. 629, 632 (M.D.N.C. 1985)).
178. Id. at 934.
179. Even if the court had ruled that being rejected or dismissed from a sin-
gle job by a single employer because of a physical or mental impairment is suffi-
cient to establish a prima facie case or a presumption (subject to contrary
evidence) that the individual has been regarded as having an impairment under
the third prong of the definition, Forrisi probably would not have qualified under
the third prong of the definition of disability.
180. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
181. Id. at 775.
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ing a disability.18 2 In reaching it conclusion, the court applied the
definition liberally by characterizing the plaintiff as having a "sub-
stantial limitation on a major life activity, the ability to handle stress-
ful situations of the type faced in a medical training milieu. '"1 83
Moreover, in Thornhill v. Marsh,1 8 4 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a man discharged from a
job when the Army Corps of Engineers erroneously interpreted the
consequences of his congenital spine abnormality satisfied the stat-
utory definition of "individual with [a] handicap. 18 5 The court
found that the plaintiff met the "regarded as" criteria because of
"the congenital deformity of his spine which the Corps perceived as
imposing a disqualifying limitation on his ability to lift weight."1 86
Significantly, the court made no suggestion of a need to show that
his perceived impairment would have an impact on his em-
ployability beyond the immediate position from which he had been
discharged.'8 7
A possible explanation of the differing outcomes in Thornhill
and Forrisi is that Thornhill was decided after the Supreme Court's
decision in Arline, while Forrisi was decided before Arline. While the
Arline decision rested upon an interpretation of the second prong
(record of an impairment) of the definition of disability, the
Court's discussion of the third prong was extensive.188 For exam-
ple, in its examination of the purpose and impact of the third
prong, the Court came close, but did not quite address, the one-job
issue.' 8 9 The Court did discuss, however, the major life activity of
working and stated that an impairment that substantially limited
only the activity of working would still constitute a disability under
182. See id. The court stated that because of the plaintiffs lengthy history of
mental impairments requiring hospitalization and her departure from New York
University as a result of her psychiatric problems, the plaintiff "has suffered from a
substantial limitation on a major life activity, the ability to handle stressful situa-
tions of the type faced in a medical training milieu." Id.
183. Id.
184. 866 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
185. See id. at 1184.
186. Id. at 1183-84.
187. See id. (providing no explanation as to whether plaintiff must show that
his perceived impairment would affect his employability in otherjobs in his field of
work).
188. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282-86 (1986) (discussing "re-
garded as" prong and explaining its significance).
189. See id. at 284 (stating that primary purpose of section 504 of Rehabilita-
tion Act was to ensure that individuals "are not denied jobs or other benefits be-
cause of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others," but fails to explain
whether impairment that precludes individual from specific job qualifies as
disability).
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the third prong. 190 Responding to a contention by the United
States at oral argument that a condition could not constitute a disa-
bility if the only major life activity it affects is the ability to work, the
Court declared:
The United States recognized that "working" was one of
the major life activities listed in the regulations, but said
that to argue that a condition that impaired only the ability
to work was a handicapping condition was to make "a to-
tally circular argument which lifts itself by its bootstraps."
The argument is not circular, however, but direct. Con-
gress plainly intended the Act to cover persons with a
physical or mental impairment (whether actual, past, or
perceived) that substantially limited one's ability to
work. 19 1
Furthermore, the Arline Court noted the Senate Report's ex-
ample of a person "regarded as" having a disability as "a person with
some kind of visible physical impairment which in fact does not
substantially limit that person's functioning."'192 The Court de-
clared that: "Such an impairment might not diminish a person's
physical or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially
limit that person's ability to work as a result of the negative reac-
tions of others to the impairment."193 It also quoted a portion of
the legislative history where Senator Mondale described a situation
that was meant to be addressed by the legislation-that of a woman
disabled by arthritis who was denied "a job" not because she could
not do the work, but because "college trustees [thought] 'normal
students shouldn't see her.' 1 9 4 Neither Senator Mondale, nor the
Court, suggested that such a plaintiff would have to show that she
would also be excluded from other positions.
Similar to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Thornhill, several
other post-Arline decisions have been less restrictive than the Forrisi
analysis.' 95 Nevertheless, several circuits have continued to follow
190. See id. at 283 n.10.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 282.
193. Id. at 283.
194. Id. at 283 n.9 (quoting 117 CONG. REc. 36761 (1972)).
195. See, e.g., Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding
jury could rationally conclude that defendant's perception of plaintiff applicant's
impairment, as exhibited in its refusal to hire her for particular position, fore-
closed sufficiently wide range of jobs to serve as proof of substantial limitation);
Fitzpatrickv. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1125-26 (llth Cir. 1993) ("[I]mpairment
[pseudofolliculitis barbae], and the [plaintiff] firefighters' inability to shave that
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the Forrisi reasoning in decisions entered after Arline.196 The signifi-
cance of Forrisi is evidenced by the fact that each of the initial deci-
sions in a circuit that ruled that exclusion-from-one-job is not
enough under the "regarded as" prong of the definition of disabil-
ity relied on Forrisi as controlling precedent.1 97 This line of cases is,
therefore, directly traceable to the decision in Forrisi, which in turn,
is traceable to that court's dubious interpretations of de la Torres,
Tudyman and E.E. Black.198
2. ADA Legislative History
The legislative history of the ADA offers some support for the
notion that exclusion because of a physical or mental impairment
that prevents the individual from performing a single specific job
with unique qualifications is not enough to establish a disability
under the first prong of the definition. 199 Under the "regarded as"
results from it, 'substantially limit' the firefighters' ability to engage in the 'major
life activity' of work on account of the [defendants'] no-beard rule."); Taylor v.
United States Postal Serv., 946 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 1991) (permitting "appli-
cant to prove he was perceived as being handicapped by pointing to the fact that
he did not possess a so called job requirement due to physical impairment"). In
one case, a federal district court showed similar flexibility in applying the "re-
garded as" branch of the definition when it ruled that an individual who had been
excluded from an alcohol and drug treatment program because of human immu-
nodeficiency virus (HIV) infection had thereby been regarded a having an impair-
ment affecting the major life activity of "learning." Doe v. Centinela Hosp., No.
CV87-2514, 1988 WL 81776, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1988).
196. See, e.g., Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1392-93 (5th Cir. 1993)
(following Forrisi line of reasoning); Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419
(10th Cir. 1992) (same).
197. See Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1392 (following Forrisi in dicta); Maulding v. Sulli-
van, 961 F.2d 694, 698 (8th Cir. 1992) (same); Welsh, 977 F.2d at 1417 (same);
Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989) (same).
198. See de la Torres v. Bolger, 610 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (finding
that left-handedness did not constitute disability under Rehabilitation Act);
Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that over-
weight bodybuilder was not person with disability under Rehabilitation Act); E.E.
Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980) (finding that person with
back problems was substantially limited in his ability to work as apprentice
carpenter).
199. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29 (1990). The report of the House
Committee on the Judiciary declared:
A person with an impairment who is discriminated against in employ-
ment is... limited in the major life activity of working. However, a per-
son who is limited in his or her ability to perform only a particular job,
because of circumstances unique to that job site or the materials used,
may not be substantially limited in the major life activity of working. For
example, an applicant whose trade is painting would not be substantially
limited in the major life activity of working if he has a mild allergy to a
specialized paint used by one employer which is not generally used in the
field in which the painter works.
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prong of the definition of disability, however, the legislative history
of the ADA indicates considerable congressional intent to reject the
Forrisi "not just one job" approach. The Senate Committee Report
to the ADA pointedly cites as examples of individuals included
within the "regarded as" concept "people who are rejected for a par-
ticularjob for which they apply because of findings of a back abnor-
mality in an x-ray, notwithstanding the absence of any symptoms, or
people who are rejected for a particular job solely because they wear hear-
ing aids."200 Not only is there no suggestion of a need to show that
the individual is limited in connection with other jobs or participa-
tion in other programs in the Senate Report, but in support, the
report cites Thornhill and Doe v. Centinela Hospital,20 1 both of which
differ from the Forrisi approach. 202
The House Committee on the Judiciary Report on the ADA
used language that differed somewhat from the language found in
the other reports. 203 Nevertheless, the House Report evinced a sim-
ilar intent:
[A] person who is rejected from a job because of the
myths, fears, and stereotypes associated with disabilities
would be covered under this third test, whether or not the
employer's perception was shared by others in the field and
200. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (1989) (emphasis added). The Senate Report
adds:
A person who is excluded from any activity covered under this Act or is
otherwise discriminated against because of a covered entity's negative at-
titudes towards disability is being treated as having a disability which af-
fects a major life activity. For example, if a public accommodation, such
as a restaurant, refused entry to a person with cerebral palsy because of
that person's physical appearance, that person would be covered under
the third prong of the definition. Similarly, if an employer refuses to hire
someone because of a fear of the "negative reactions" of others to the
individual, or because of the employer's perception that the applicant
had a disability which prevented that person from working, that person
would be covered under the third prong.
Id.
201. No. CV87-2514, 1988 WL 81776 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1988).
202. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24. Similar sentiments and the same case
citations were repeated in the Report of the House Committee on Education and
Labor. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 53-54 (1990).
203. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 53 ("[Ifan employer refuses to hire some-
one because of a fear of the 'negative reactions' of others to the individual, or
because of the employer's perception that the applicant has an impairment which
prevents that person from working that person is covered under the third prong of
the definition of disability."); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24 ("[I]f an employer refuses
to hire someone because of a fear of the 'negative reactions' of others to the indi-
vidual, or because of the employer's perception that the applicant had a disability
which prevented that person from working, that person would be covered under
the third prong.").
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whether or not the person's physical or mental condition
would be considered a disability under the first or second
part of the definition.20 4
To manifest its intent even further, the House Committee declared:
In the employment context, if a person is disqualified on
the basis of an actual or perceived physical or mental con-
dition, and the employer can articulate no legitimate job-
related reason for the rejection, a perceived concern
about employing persons with disabilities could be in-
ferred and the plaintiff would qualify for coverage under
the "regarded as" test.20 5
Thus, under the House Report's approach, excluding a person
from ajob or activity because of an actual or perceived physical or
mental impairment would create at least an inference or presump-
tion that the excluded individual has been regarded as having a
disability.206 Under the language of the other committees, exclu-
sion from a single job because of a physical or mental impairment
would establish coverage of the excluded individual as having been
regarded as having a disability. 20 7
3. ADA Regulations
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
regulations implementing the ADA rejected an extremely restrictive
approach that would require a showing of inability to perform an
expansive array of jobs in order to establish a substantial limitation
of the major life activity of working.20 8 Nevertheless, the regula-
tions did not resolve the ambiguity of previous case law as to the
"regarded as" prong of the definition of disability. 20 9
204. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 30 (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 30-31.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 53 ("[I]f an employer refuses to hire someone because of a fear
of the 'negative reactions' of others to the individual, or because of the employer's
perception that the applicant has an impairment which prevents that person from
working, that person is covered under the third prong of the definition of disabil-
ity."); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24.(same).
208. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0) (3) (1997).
209. See, e.g., id. pt. 1630, app. A § 1630.2(j) (commenting on regulation in
section 1630.20)).
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a. Actual Disability Under the ADA Regulations
Under the first prong of the definition, the EEOC clearly indi-
cated that exclusion from a single position is not enough: "The
inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working."210 Fur-
thermore, the Interpretive Guidance promulgated by the EEOC ex-
plained that the inability to perform one job for one employer is
not enough under the first prong of the definition, nor is inability
"to perform a specialized job or profession requiring extraordinary
skill, prowess or talent."2 1' To exemplify this analysis, the EEOC
referred to the following relatively specialized situations: (1) a
(seemingly unlikely) scenario of an individual unable to be a com-
mercial airline pilot because of a minor vision impairment, but who
is able to be a copilot or pilot for a commercial service and (2) a
professional baseball pitcher who develops a bad elbow and is no
longer able to throw a baseball. 212 In each of those situations, the
EEOC concluded that the individual involved does not have a disa-
bility because he or she is only unable to perform either a particular
specialized job or a narrow range of jobs.21 3 These examples sug-
gest that the EEOC viewed as quite limited those situations in which
proof of inability to perform a particular type of job will not estab-
lish a substantial limitation on working.21 4
The regulations make clear that an individual does not have to
be totally unable to work to meet the statutory definition of actual
disability.215 As one example, the EEOC used the situation of a
worker with a back condition that prevents him from performing
210. Id. § 1630.2(0) (3) (i). Regarding the activity of working, "substantially
limits" under the regulations referred to significant restrictions "in the ability to
perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as com-
pared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." Id.
211. Id. pt. 1630, app. A § 1630.2(0).
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. Such an inference is supported by the EEOC's having found it necessary
to delete from the final Interpretive Guidance an example accompanying its pro-
posed rule that concerned a surgeon unable to perform surgery because of a shaky
hand. See Interpretative Guidance on ADA, 56 Fed. Reg. 8593 (1991). In the pro-
posed guidance, the EEOC suggested that such a situation would not establish a
substantial limitation on working because it affected only a narrow range ofjobs.
Id. After the example was challenged, the EEOC agreed that "[it] confused, rather
than clarified, the matter," deleted the example and replaced it with the scenario
involving the commercial airline pilot. See id.
215. See id. ("[A]n individual does not have to be totally unable to work in
order to be considered substantially limited in working if the individual is signifi-
cantly restricted in the ability to perform a class ofjobs or a broad range ofjobs in
various classes.").
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jobs involving heavy labor but does not interfere with other classes
ofjobs (such as semiskilled work).216 Under the EEOC's approach,
such an individual is substantially limited in the life activity of work-
ing.217 Similarly, an individual with a serious allergy to a substance
found in most high-rise buildings would be substantially limited in
the ability to perform the broad range of jobs conducted in such
buildings. 218 Thus, the individual would be substantially limited in
the life activity of working.219
The regulations do not expressly define the terms "class of
jobs" and "broad range of jobs in various classes." 220 In the previ-
ous examples, the EEOC Interpretive Guidance provided "heavy la-
bor" and "semiskilled" work as examples of different classes of
jobs.221 Thus, its discussion of "broad range ofjobs" seems to have
used that phrase to mean several different types of jobs.
Nevertheless, under the regulations, determining limitations
on a class ofjobs or on a broad range ofjobs in various classes must
be done on a case-by-case basis, based on the following factors: (1)
the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable ac-
cess; (2) the job from which the individual has been disqualified
because of an impairment and the number and types of jobs utiliz-
ing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geo-
graphical area, from which the individual is also disqualified
because of the impairment; or (3) the job from which the individ-
ual has been disqualified because of an impairment and the
number and types of otherjobs not utilizing similar training, knowl-
edge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which
the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (broad
range of jobs in various classes).222 The second and third factors,
differing as they do only in the presence of the word "not" before
the words "utilizing similar training, knowledge," are not very en-
lightening. Thus, the meaning of the phrases "a class of jobs" and
"a broad range of jobs in various classes" will presumably have to
await further elucidation by the courts.
To ameliorate the concerns of disability rights advocates who
felt that the EEOC's proposed regulations regarding the phrase
216. See id.
217. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. A § 1630.2(j).
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. (providing no definition of "class ofjobs" or "a broad range ofjobs
in various classes").
221. See id.
222. See id. § 1630.2(j) (3) (ii) (1997).
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"substantially limited in working" unduly limited coverage and
presented potential plaintiffs with onerous burdens of evidence and
proof, the EEOC revised its Interpretive Guidance to expressly indi-
cate the contrary.223 The final Interpretive Guidance states that
standards regarding numbers and types ofjobs that are limited "are
not intended to require an onerous evidentiary showing."224 They
are meant to require only evidence of "general employment
demographics and/or of recognized occupational classifications
that indicate the approximate number of jobs (e.g., 'few,' 'many,;
'most') from which an individual would be excluded."225
b. "Regarded As"
The EEOC's central dictate. about "substantially limited in
working" is that exclusion from a single, unique job because of an
impairment is not sufficient to establish the existence of a disability
under the first prong of the statutory definition. The EEOC's regu-
latory guidance provides, however, that exclusion from a single po-
sition may be sufficient to satisfy the third prong of the definition in
certain circumstances. The Interpretive Guidance declares: "An in-
dividual rejected from ajob because of the 'myths, fears and stereo-
types' associated with disabilities would be covered under this part
of the definition of disability, whether or not the employer's or other cov-
ered entity's perception were shared by others in the field."226
The EEOC considers exclusions based on "common attitudinal
barriers" toward individuals with disabilities-including "concerns
regarding productivity, safety, insurance, liability, attendance, cost
of accommodation and accessibility, workers' compensation costs,
and acceptance by coworkers and customers"-to constitute dis-
crimination based on perceptions of disability.227 Thus, if an indi-
vidual with a physical or mental impairment can show that he or
she was terminated from or not hired for a particularjob because of
that impairment, and the employer took the exclusionary action be-
cause of one of the listed concerns, such a showing may be suffi-
cient to establish that the individual was regarded as having a
substantially limiting impairment. According to the EEOC, unless
the employer can articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployment action in such a situation, "an inference that the em-
223. See Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56
Fed. Reg. 35,728 (1991).
224. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. A § 1630.2(j).
225. Id.
226. Id. pt. 1630, app. A § 1630.2(1) (emphasis added).
227. Id.
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ployer is acting on the basis of 'myth, fear or stereotype' can be
drawn."228
The EEOC's analysis thus affords three avenues for establish-
ing that exclusion from a particular job constitutes regarding an
individual as having a disability: (1) by proving that the exclusion
resulted from myths, fears or stereotypes on the part of the em-
ployer; (2) by demonstrating that the exclusion was caused by one
of the "common attitudinal barriers" toward individuals with disa-
bilities such as an employer's concern about productivity, safety,
insurance, liability, attendance, cost of accommodation and accessi-
bility, workers' compensation costs and acceptance by coworkers
and customers; and (3) by the employer's inability to articulate a
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. In any of
these three situations, the EEOC's analysis permits coverage under
the third prong for exclusion from a'single job, significantly amelio-
rating the impact of the contrary outcome of the EEOC's analysis
under the first prong.
4. Split in ADA Circuit Decisions Under the "Regarded As" Prong
The circuit decisions under the ADA are in agreement with
those under the Rehabilitation Act that proof of actual disability as
to the activity of working requires a showing of more than exclusion
from a single job.2 29 Circuit court decisions applying the "regarded
as" prong under the ADA, however, are sharply divided, as with Re-
habilitation Act decisions, on the exclusion-from-a-single-job
issue. 230
228. Id.
229. See Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding proof of actual disability as to activity of working requires more than
exclusion from single job); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir.
1996) (same); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-Am., Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir.
1996) (same); Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 727 (5th Cir. 1995)
(same); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942-43 (10th Cir. 1994) (same).
230. Compare Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting
that salesman discharged by his employer had presented evidence sufficient for
jury to decide that he had been "regarded as" having disability, even though he
had presented no medical testimony), and Holihan, 87 F.3d at 366 (noting that
evidence that defendant conducted meetings to discuss plaintiff's aberrational be-
havior prior to his termination established genuine issue of material fact whether
discharged employee was "regarded as" having disability), with Ray v. Glidden Co.,
85 F.3d 227, 229-30 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding summary judgment against plain-
tiff who had his shoulders and hips surgically replaced because of avascular necro-
sis on grounds that he was not person with disability, because reasonable juror
could not find that employer "regarded" plaintiff as having impairment), and Woo-
ten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385-86 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding summary
judgment for defendant where evidence showed that employer had regarded
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The Fifth Circuit has been the preeminent leader in rulings
imposing Forrisi-based analysis of the one-job issue under the third
prong of the definition of disability in ADA cases.231 In Dutcher v.
Ingalls Shipbuilding,232 for instance, a welder with an arm injury re-
sulting from a gun accident alleged that her former employer vio-
lated the ADA when it failed to reinstate her in the position she had
previously occupied. 233 Relying upon Forrisi, the Fifth Circuit ruled
that the woman had not been "regarded as" having a disability, be-
cause the employer regarded her as being precluded only from
welding jobs requiring climbing, and thus, she did not qualify as an
individual with a disability under the ADA.23 4
plaintiffs condition as "prevent[ing] him from performing a narrow range of
meatpacking jobs").
231. See Ray, 85 F.3d at 229-30 (holding that employer did not regard plaintiff
as having disability); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 192-93 (5th
Cir. 1996) (finding employer does not necessarily regard employee as having im-
airment because employee is incapable of performing job); Dutcher, 53 F.3d at
27-28 (finding plaintiff failed to provide evidence that she was "regarded as" hav-
ing disability). In 1988, the Fifth Circuit had affirmed without opinion a district
court decision that quoted the Forrisi reasoning under the "regarded as" prong in a
case that was decided solely under the first prong. See Elstner v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 659 F. Supp. 1328, 1342-43 (S.D. Tex. 1987), affd, 863 F.2d 881 (5th Cir.
1988).
232. 53 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995).
233. See id. at 724-25.
234. See id. at 727-28. Similarly, in Ray, a lift truck operator whose shoulders
and hips had been surgically replaced because of avascular necrosis filed an ADA
suit alleging his employer had terminated him because of his disability. See id. at
228. In addressing the plaintiff's contention that the defendant had regarded him
as having a disability, the Ray court ruled it had not. See id. at 229-30. Citing its
holding in Dutcher, the Fifth Circuit upheld summary judgment against the plain-
tiff on the grounds that he was not a person with a disability under the ADA. See id.
Although plaintiff was "significantly restricted" in his capacity to do the heavy lift-
ing required for his job, plaintiff's "inability to perform that discrete task does not
render [plaintiff] substantially limited in a major life activity." Id. at 229. Central
to the court's reasoning was that the employer had presented evidence it had ter-
minated the plaintiff because of the belief that his medical condition precluded
his performance of the job of lift truck operator. See id. Furthermore, the plaintiff
had not presented any evidence that he had been denied any other job or that any
other job of the employer was available. See id. Such a standard of "regarded as"
places a plaintiff at a serious disadvantage if he or she is terminated from a posi-
tion and the employer does not have available any other position for which the
plaintiff is eligible to apply.
In Ellison, a woman with breast cancer for which she underwent a lumpectomy
and radiation treatment alleged that she had been discriminated against when she
received a lowered evaluation rating, a lower pay raise than other employees and
was included among four employees (out of thirty-five in her department) to be
fired. See Ellison, 85 F.3d at 189. Relying upon the Forrisi precedent, the Fifth
Circuit upheld a summary judgment ruling against her on the ground that she was
not a person with a disability under any of the prongs of the statutory definition.
See id. at 192-93. The court ruled that the plaintiff had not shown herself to have
been regarded as having a disability, even though her supervisor had made some
highly insensitive comments about her condition, because her employer had later
[Vol. 42: p. 409456
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In Wooten v. Farmland Foods,235 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit in ruling that
exclusion of an employee from a job because of a physical or
mental impairment is not evidence that the employer regarded the
employee as having an impairment under the ADA.236 In Wooten, a
ham boner was terminated from his job after submitting a note
from his doctor indicating that because of tendinitis, inflammation
and carpal tunnel syndrome affecting his left hand and shoulder,
he should not work in a cold environment or with meat prod-
ucts. 23 7 The employer assigned the man to light duty status tempo-
rarily and later terminated him. 2 38 The Eighth Circuit affirmed
summary judgment against the plaintiff, finding that he had not
been "regarded as" having a substantially limiting impairment, be-
cause the employer only regarded him as having an impairment
that prevented him from "performing a narrow range of meatpack-
ing jobs."2 3 9 The court declared that "'working' does not mean
working at a particular job of that person's choice."2 40
Counterpoised against the Fifth and Eighth Circuits' rulings
that being regarded as unable to perform a single job or a narrow
range of jobs is not sufficient to establish that one is regarded as
having a substantially limiting impairment are rulings by the United
States Courts of Appeals for the First and Ninth Circuits. In Katz v.
City Metal Co.,24 1 the First Circuit reviewed a district court's judg-
ment as a matter of law against the plaintiff, a scrap metal salesman,
who was terminated from his job five weeks after he had a heart
offered her another position at the same salary.' See id. For example, when plaintiff
sought modification of her work schedule to receive daily radiation treatment, her
supervisor "expressed his irritation by suggesting that she get a mastectomy instead
because her breasts were not worth saving." Id. During a power failure that oc-
curred after plaintiff arrived at work after a radiation treatment, the supervisor
told other workers to follow the plaintiff because "[s]he's glowing." Id.
235. 58 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1995).
236. See id. at 386.
237. See id. at 384.
238. See id. The supervisor stated that the plaintiff's "termination was due to
his disability (the extent of which they were skeptical), the unavailability at that
time of light duty jobs that would accommodate [his] restrictions .. .and their
unwillingness to terminate another employee in order to provide the plaintiff with
a job compatible with his physical restrictions." Id.
239. See id. at 386.
240. Id. The court added that "[a]n impairment that disqualifies a person
from only a narrow range of jobs is not considered a substantially limiting one."
Id.
241. 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996).
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attack.242 The First Circuit concluded that it was "a debatable ques-
tion" whether the plaintiff's evidence, which did not include any
medical testimony, was sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that he
had an actual disability, but held that it "need not definitively re-
solve the issue" because the plaintiff had presented sufficient evi-
dence that he was "regarded as" having a disability.243 The Katz
court declared that "the jury certainly did not need medical testi-
mony in making its own judgment as to what the employer may
have perceived, rightly or wrongly, about Katz's condition."2 44 The
court ruled that the plaintiff's testimony regarding his condition
and the circumstances that led up to his employer terminating him
provided "enough evidence to reach the jury on the issue of
perception. "245
In Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,246 the district court ruled that
the plaintiff did not qualify as an individual with a disability under
the first prong of the definition because the evidence showed that
he was not prevented from working at a class or a broad range of
jobs.2 47 The Holihan court reversed the district court, however, be-
cause evidence that the employer had received medical reports
about plaintiff's condition and had meetings to discuss plaintiff's
aberrational behavior prior to his termination established a genu-
ine issue of material fact whether the plaintiff was "regarded as"
having a disability.2 48
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits recognized that, under the first
prong, plaintiffs need to show more than exclusion from a single
242. See id. at 28. The plaintiff had a heart attack on September 27, 1992. See
id. The plaintiff called his employer at the end of October to return to work. See
id. at 29. The employer then informed him that he had been terminated. See id.
The district court ruled that the plaintiff had not presented evidence sufficient to
show that he had a "disability" under the ADA. See id. at 28.
243. See id. at 32. The court stated that even if the plaintiff did not have an
actual disability, "both the language and policy of the statute seem to us to offer
protection as well to one who is not substantially disabled or even disabled at all
but is wrongly perceived to be so." Id. at 33.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. 87 F.3d 362 (9th Cir. 1996).
247. See id. at 366 (discussing that plaintiff did not qualify as individual with
disability). The plaintiff was diagnosed with "Organic Mental Syndrome" with
symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress. See id. at 364. The employer termi-
nated the plaintiff from his job as a store manager. See id.
248. See id. at 366-67 ("From these facts, a reasonable jury could infer that
[the defendant] regarded [the plaintiff] as suffering from a disabling mental con-
dition that substantially limited his ability to work."). The Ninth Circuit made this
ruling even in the face of evidence that the defendant had offered to rehire the
plaintiff as a clerk and to let him reapply for a store manager position as soon as
one became available. See id. at 365.
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job to demonstrate a substantial limitation of working that qualifies
as an actual disability. Nevertheless, the Katz and Holihan rulings
demonstrate that those circuit courts will permit plaintiffs to use a
defendant's conduct toward an employee in regard to a particular
job to show that the defendant regarded the plaintiff as substan-
tially limited. Plaintiffs may, therefore, establish disability under
the third prong of the statutory definition without showing that
they were regarded as impaired for a broad range of jobs.
5. Current State of Law
On the one hand, the federal courts of appeals have generally
agreed with the position taken in the EEOC regulations, that to
establish an actual disability by virtue of a limitation upon the activ-
ity of working, a plaintiff must show that a physical or mental im-
pairment precludes him or her from performing a class or broad
range ofjobs. On the other hand, the courts of appeals are sharply
split as to whether a similar job analysis is more appropriate than a
particular job analysis under the "regarded as" prong of the statu-
tory definition of disability. The EEOC's ADA regulations suggest
that lesser showings may suffice under the third prong.
The split in the federal circuit court decisions, however, does
not tell the complete story. A number of district court decisions
have been influenced by the Forrisi approach and have applied it to
avoid reaching the merits of alleged violations of the ADA or sec-
tions 501 or 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.2 49 The exclusion-from-
one-job approach has been applied mechanically by some courts to
justify dismissal of claims under the "regarded as." prong, often at
the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage. 250 In making
such rulings, courts have often ignored the analysis of the "re-
249. See, e.g., Blouin v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., No. CIV.A.95-0503,
1996 WL 19138, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 18, 1996) (applying approach set forth in
Forrisi), affd, 103 F.3d 127 (5th Cir. 1996), and cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1554 (1997);
Joyce v. Suffolk County, 911 F. Supp. 92, 94-98 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); Venclaus-
kas v. Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Safety, 921 F. Supp. 78, 81-82 (D. Conn. 1995)
(same); Williams v. Avnet, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1124, 1131-33 (E.D.N.C. 1995)
(same), affid sub nom. Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346
(4th Cir. 1996) and cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1844 (1997); Redlich v. Albany Law Sch.
of Union Univ., 899 F. Supp. 100, 107-08 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); Muller v. Auto-
mobile Club, 897 F. Supp. 1289, 1297-98 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (same); Marschand v.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1528, 1538-42 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (same); Smaw
v. Virginia Dep't of State Police, 862 F. Supp. 1469, 1467-75 (E.D. Va. 1994); Part-
low v. Runyon, 826 F. Supp. 40, 43-46 (D.N.H. 1993) (same).
250. See, e.g., Blouin, 1996 WL 19138, at *1-3 (granting summary judgment for
defendants); Venclauskas, 921 F. Supp. at 82 (granting defendant's motion to dis-
miss);Joyce, 911 F. Supp. at 94-98 (same); Williams, 910 F. Supp. at 1131-33 (same);
Redlich, 899 F. Supp. at 108 (same); Muller, 897 F. Supp. at 1298 (same); Marschand,
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garded as" prong suggested by the Arline decision and the means
provided by the EEOC regulations for proving that an employee
was perceived as having a substantial limitation on the activity of
working.
One common thread of the Arline decision and the EEOC reg-
ulations that has been considered in court decisions under the "re-
garded as" prong of the definition involves employees who have
received negative treatment because of stereotypes and prejudice.
The Supreme Court indicated in Arline that individuals can be in-
cluded under the statutory definition of disability solely because of
the negative reactions, 251 prejudiced attitudes, 252 ignorance,253 mis-
apprehensions, 254 irrational fears, 255 mythology, 256 stereotypes25 7 or
reflexive reactions of others. 258 This notion is partially reflected in
the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance which provides that one can
prove a substantial limitation on the activity of working by proving
that exclusion from one's job resulted from myths, fears or stereo-
types on the part of the employer whether or not the employer's
perception was shared by others in the field.2 59
Consistent with Arline and the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, a
few district courts have recognized that plaintiffs may establish the
existence of disability under the "regarded as" prong by demon-
strating that the plaintiff was rejected for or terminated from ajob
because of "myths, fears and stereotypes associated with disabili-
ties." 260 In Wooten, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the "re-
876 F. Supp. at 1540-42 (granting summary judgment for defendant); Smaw, 862 F.
Supp. at 1472 (same); Partlow, 826 F. Supp. at 43, 46 (same).
251. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 (1987) (noting negative reac-
tions of other people to impairment).
252. See id. at 284 (noting "prejudiced attitudes" towards those with
disability).
253. See id. at 274, 278 n.3 (discussing "ignorance" of disabilities).
254. See id. at 284 (discussing "misapprehension" of disabilities).
255. See id. (discussing "irrational fear" and "fears" regarding those with
disabilities).
256. See id. at 285 (discussing "mythology" regarding those with disabilities).
257. See id. at 287 (discussing "stereotypes" of those with disabilities).
258. See id. at 285 (discussing "reflexive reactions" regarding those with
disabilities).
259. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. A § 1630.2(1) (1997) (discussing require-
ments "of being regarded as having a disability").
260. See, e.g., Freund v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 930 F. Supp. 613, 618(S.D. Ga. 1996) (finding defendant's perceptions were not based on speculation,
stereotype or myth); EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965, 975 (S.D. Tex.
1996) (noting that individual rejected from job because of"myth, fears and stereo-
type" associated with disability would be covered under ADA "regarded as" prong);
Howard v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 904 F. Supp. 922, 929-30 (E.D. Wis. 1995)
(stating "regarded as" provision of ADA is designed to combat stereotypes regard-
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garded as" prong of the definition of disability encompasses
"archaic attitudes, erroneous perceptions, and myths."' 261 Ironi-
cally, the court indicated that evidence would have to demonstrate
that such attitudes, perceptions and myths disqualified the plaintiff
from more than a narrow range of jobs.262 This suggestion contra-
dicts the principles announced both in Arline and in the EEOC reg-
ulatory guidance. The Wooten court concluded that the employer's
perception regarding the abilities of the plaintiff "was not based
upon speculation, stereotype, or myth," but was based solely on a
letter from the plaintiff's doctor recommending certain restrictions
upon his job duties. 26 3
The application of a "myths, fears and stereotypes" standard
under the EEOC regulations and in court decisions reflects some
narrowing of the Supreme Court's analysis in Arline that also re-
ferred to negative reactions, prejudiced attitudes, ignorance, misap-
prehensions and reflexive reactions. Moreover, almost completely
lost in the reasoning of the courts in such cases is the additional
analysis contained in the EEOC's regulations which states that one
ing disabled individuals); Lussier v. Runyon, No. CIV.92-397-P-H, 1994 WL 129776,
at *10 (D. Me. March 1, 1994) (noting that employee was terminated because of
employer's "fear" that employee was violent); Scharff v. Frank, 791 F. Supp. 182,
187 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (stating Rehabilitation Act was designed to end stereotypical
treatment of persons with impairments).
261. SeeWooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995) (discuss-
ing "regarded as" prong).
262. See id. at 385-86.
263. See id. at 386. In a case involving the actual disability prong, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit hyperbolized that the similarity
between misperceptions about disability and racial discrimination explains the fo-
cus of the third prong:
"Disability" is broadly defined. It includes not only "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activi-
ties of [the disabled] individual," but also the state of "being regarded as
having such an impairment." The latter definition, although at first
glance peculiar, actually makes a better fit with the elaborate preamble to
the Act, in which people who have physical or mental impairments are
compared to victims of racial and other invidious discrimination. Many
such impairments are not in fact disabling but are believed to be so, and
the people having them may be denied employment or otherwise
shunned as a consequence. Such people, objectively capable of perform-
ing as well as the unimpaired, are analogous to capable workers discrimi-
nated against because of their skin color or some other vocationally
irrelevant characteristic.
Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 1995) (cita-
tions omitted). The naivete of this analysis in its seeming lack of awareness of
blatant discrimination visited upon people with actual disabilities is striking. Ex-
amination of the many analytical shortcomings of the Vande Zande opinion is be-
yond the scope of this Article.
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can demonstrate a substantial limitation in working in two other
ways:
[1] by demonstrating that the exclusion was caused by one
of the "common attitudinal barriers" toward individuals
with disabilities such as an employer's concern about pro-
ductivity, safety, insurance, liability, attendance, cost of ac-
commodation and accessibility, workers' compensation
costs, and acceptance by coworkers and customers; and
[2] by the employer's inability to articulate a nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the employment action.2 64
Only one decision, Rogers v. International Marine Terminals,
Inc.,265 even mentions the first of the two analytical standards estab-
lished by the EEOC.2 66 In Rogers, the plaintiff contended that his
employer regarded him as having a disability as a result of his ankle
problems and his absenteeism. 267 The Fifth Circuit noted the
EEOC Interpretive Guidance language regarding employers' con-
cerns about a variety of issues including productivity, safety, insur-
ance, liability and attendance. 268 The court ruled, however, that
the language applied to unfounded concerns about people with dis-
abilities, while the Rogers plaintiffs unavailability to work was "very
real."269
Likewise, only one decision, EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines,270 men-
tions the second way established by the EEOC to demonstrate a sub-
stantial limitation in working.271 In Texas Bus Lines, the court
considered whether a "morbidly obese" plaintiff had been regarded
as having a disability under the ADA by an employer who refused to
hire her because of her condition. 272 The court quoted the follow-
ing language from the EEOC Interpretive Guidance: "If the em-
ployer cannot articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment action, an inference that the employer is acting on the
basis of 'myth, fear or stereotype' can be drawn." 273 Applying this
standard to the facts in the case, the court ruled that the defendant
264. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. A § 1630.2(1) (1997).
265. 87 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 1996).
266. See id. at 760 n.4.
267. See id. at 760.
268. See id. at 760 n.4.
269. See id. at 760-61.
270. 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
271. See id. at 975.
272. See id.
273. Id.
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had made its decision not to hire the plaintiff "because of a percep-
tion of disability based on 'myth, fear or stereotype,"' 274 and there-
fore, the plaintiff was regarded as having a disability under the ADA
definition.275 Apart from Rogers and Texas Bus Lines, the alternative
EEOC standards for determining "myth, fear or stereotype" seem to
have been overlooked by the courts.
Plaintiffs can use various means to seek to avoid the evidentiary
burdens and harsh impact of the not-just-one-job principle, and var-
ious decisions reflect plaintiffs' successful use of such approaches.
The most obvious method is to establish that the plaintiff qualifies
as an "individual with a disability" under one of the first two prongs
of the statutory definition. Thus, a plaintiff can avoid the issue of
substantial limitation in working by proving that he or she has a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits some other
major life activity and, thus, has an actual disability. 276 In Lowev.
Angelo's Italian Foods, Inc.,277 for example, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that lifting is a major life
activity. 2 7 8 Therefore, evidence that the plaintiffs multiple sclerosis
made her unable to lift more than fifteen pounds was sufficient evi-
dence of disability to survive a motion for summary judgment.279
Similarly, a plaintiff can avoid having to confront the "re-
garded as" prong of the definition by demonstrating a record of
disability under the second prong of the statutory definition. In
Arline, the Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiffs hospitalization
for tuberculosis was sufficient to establish that she had a "record of
impairment" under the statutory definition, and therefore, she
qualified as an individual with a disability.280 Despite the Arline pre-
cedent, three circuit courts have indicated that they are unwilling
to read Arline as mandating that any sort of hospitalization is suffi-
cient to establish a "record of impairment. '" 2 81 At least one district
274. Id. at 979.
275. See id.
276. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. A § 1630.2(j) (1997) ("An individual who
satisfies this first part of the definition of the term 'disability' is not required to
demonstrate that he or she satisfies either of the other parts of the definition.").
277. 87 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 1996).
278. See id. at 1176-78 (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment).
279. See id.
280. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987).
281. See Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating
that single hospital stay for administration of allergy tests does not create "record
of impairment"); Taylor v. United States Postal Serv., 946 F.2d 1214, 1216-17 (6th
Cir. 1991) (declining to read Arline as establishing "nonsensical proposition that
any hospital stay is sufficient to evidence a 'record of impairment'"); cf. Demming
v. Housing & Redev. Auth., 66 F.3d 950, 955 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that hospitali-
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court, however, ruled that plaintiffs affidavits indicating he had
been hospitalized on more than one occasion as a result of diabetes
were sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact that he
had a "record of impairment. '" 282
Plaintiffs may, of course, establish that they have a "record of
impairment" by proof of facts other than hospitalization. A plaintiff
may establish a "record of impairment" by showing that an em-
ployer had access to medical records documenting the existence of
a prior disability.28 3 Existence of a "record of impairment" does
not, however, depend upon whether the employee continues to
have the impairment at the time of the allegedly discriminatory job
action.28 4
Plaintiffs choosing to proceed under the "regarded as" prong
of the definition may sometimes succeed in sidestepping the effects
of the one-job-is-not-enough restriction. One way to do so is by
showing that the employee was regarded as having an impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity other than working. In
Spath v. Berry Plastics Corp.,285 for example, the court found that a
woman with an ankle injury had shown that her employer regarded
her as having an impairment that limited major life activities of
walking and performing manual tasks.28 6 Also, in Milton v. Bob
Maddox Chrysler Plymouth,287 the court ruled that proof that an em-
ployer and coworkers believed that a man whose left lung had been
removed had a physical impairment that substantially limited his
zation fails to establish disability when evidence shows that condition did not pre-
vent plaintiff from performing daily work duties).
282. See Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 814-15 (N.D. Tex. 1994)
("The Supreme Court's recognition in Arline that the plaintiffs hospitalization suf-
ficed to establish a record of impairment seems equally sufficient here.").
283. Cf Keller v. Western S. Life Ins. Co., 881 F. Supp. 1559, 1563 (M.D. Fla.
1995) (holding plaintiff has disability under ADA when employer reviewed medi-
cal records containing physician's diagnosis that plaintiff had severe double vessel
coronary artery disease).
284. SeeJulien v. Louisiana, No. CIV.A.94-32-77, 1995 WL 110632, at *1 (E.D.
La. Nov. 10, 1995) ("The ADA clearly contemplates protecting workers from dis-
crimination if they have a record of physical or mental impairment... irrespective
of whether they are, in fact, disabled.").
285. 900 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
286. See id. at 216 (stating that employer perceived that ankle problem was
ongoing situation and denying defendant's motion for summary judgment).
287. 868 F. Supp. 320 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (denying defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment).
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breathing was sufficient to establish that he was regarded as having
a disability.288
In some circumstances, courts have been willing to assume that
perceptions that employees have certain conditions, such as human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection or mental illness, are suffi-
cient to establish that such persons are regarded as having a disabil-
ity.2 8 9 In other cases, an employer's pejorative language or negative
characterization of a plaintiffs condition has been held sufficient
to establish that the employer regarded the condition as substan-
tially limiting.290
Certain actions by an employer may demonstrate that it re-
garded an employee as having a substantially limiting impair-
ment.29 1 In Derbis v. United States Shoe Cotp.,2 9 2 for example, the
288. See id. at 323, 325-26 (stating that denial of defendant's motion was in
part caused by failure of defendant to address plaintiff's "regarded as" argument
which "cannot be disposed of on the current record").
289. See Biddle v. Ruben, No. 95 C 1505, 1995 WL 382961, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
June 23, 1995) (stating that allegation that Secretary of Treasury perceived plaintiff
as "delusionary" sufficiently alleges that plaintiff was regarded as suffering from
qualifying impairment of mental illness and denying defendant's motion for fail-
ure to state claim); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1322-23 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (stating that managers of law firm perceived that plaintiff was infected with
HIV and denying defendants' motion for summary judgment); see also Dertz v. City
of Chicago, 912 F. Supp. 319, 326 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding city's perception that
police officer was "psychologically disabled" sufficient to qualify him as individual
with disability and denying defendants' motion to dismiss).
290. See Overturfv. Penn Ventilator, Co., 929 F. Supp. 895, 899-900 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (holding that evidence that company officer announced at plant managers'
meeting that plaintiff had brain tumor and "was better off being terminated" was
sufficient to establish genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff was regarded as
having disability); Stradley v. LaFourche Communications, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 442,
443-44 (E.D. La. 1994) (stating that evidence that manager terminated plaintiff
because manager believed he suffered from anxiety and depression that made him
"potentially violent and hostile in the workplace" sufficient to establish genuine
issue of material fact that plaintiff was regarded as having disability); Merrifield v.
Beaven Inter-Am. Cos., No. 89 C 8436, 1991 WL 171376, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30,
1991) (noting that remarks by supervisor that plaintiff was "crazy," "insane" and
"suffered from a nervous breakdown" were sufficient to establish genuine issue of
material fact that she was perceived as having disability under state nondiscrimina-
tion law).
291. See EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. Co., 95 C 4956, 1996 WL 400037, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
July 15, 1996) (holding that employer's refusal to hire plaintiff for particular posi-
tion because of perceived impairment that would have excluded him from seven
other positions with company was sufficient to establish that plaintiff was regarded
as having disability for purposes of motion for summary judgment); EEOC v.
Chrysler Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1164, 1168-69 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (ruling that evidence
that plaintiffs failure on medical examination required by defendant would have
precluded him not only from electrician job he was applying for, but also from
several other positions with company, was sufficient to establish that he had been
regarded as having substantially limiting impairment); Smith v. Kitterman, Inc.,
897 F. Supp. 423, 428-29 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (finding that combination of evidence
that supervisors refused to permit the plaintiff to return to work "without a 100%
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court ruled that the defendant's act of recommending that the
plaintiff apply for long-term disability benefits was sufficient to cre-
ate a genuine issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff had been re-
garded as having a disability.293 Similarly, the court in Stroud v.
Cessna Aircraft Co.294 ruled that evidence that the employer had rec-
ommended the filing of a "Kansas Form 88" to notify the state work-
ers' compensation fund of the employment of a "handicapped
worker," was evidence that the defendant had regarded the plaintiff
as having a disability under the ADA. 29 5
In other situations in which plaintiffs are unable to avoid the
application of the one-job-is-not-enough formula, some courts have
countenanced analytical approaches that diminish the formula's
harshness. In Cook v. Rhode Island,296 the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit cited with apparent approval a princi-
ple regarding perceived disabilities that it derived from prior deci-
sions of other courts: "[F]ailure to qualify for a job possessing
unique qualifications did not constitute a substantial limitation of a
major life activity."297 It rejected, however, the defendant's argu-
ment that the plaintiff could not have demonstrated that she was
regarded as having a disability by the employer she had "applied for
and was rejected from only one job."298 The Cook court explained
why it rejected such a restrictive standard:
The Rehabilitation Act simply does not condition such
claims on either the quantum of a plaintiffs application
efforts or on her prospects of finding other employment.
By way of illustration, suit can be brought against a ware-
house operator who refuses to hire all turquoise-eyed ap-
plicants solely because he believes that people with such
coloring are universally incapable of lifting large crates,
release from her doctor," believed she would never return to work and refused to
allow her to attempt various job duties to determine whether or not she could do
them were sufficient to establish genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff was
regarded as having disability under ADA); Harrison v. Marsh, 691 F. Supp. 1223,
1229-30 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (holding that evidence that EEOC investigator had con-
cluded that plaintiff was "handicapped" and employer acted upon this finding by
promising to accommodate her condition "provided ample reason" for the court
to conclude that employer had regarded plaintiff as having disability).
292. No. CIV.A.MJG-93-130, 1994 WL 631155, at *1 (D. Md. Sept. 7, 1994).
293. See id. at *4 (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment).
294. No. 93-1391-PFK, 1995 WL 333124, at *1 (D. Kan. May 17, 1995).
295. See id. at *7 (holding that genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether plaintiff was disabled under meaning of ADA).
296. 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
297. Id. at 26.
298. Id. at 25.
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notwithstanding that other warehousemen might hire the
applicants-or that the recalcitrant firm might hire them
for other more sedentary posts. 299
On the facts before it, the First Circuit upheld a jury verdict for the
plaintiff on the grounds that the jury had been entitled to conclude
that the defendant had regarded plaintiffs "morbid obesity" as sub-
stantially limiting the major life activity of working.300 The court
declared that "the jury rationally could have concluded that [the
defendant's] perception of what it thought to be plaintiff's impair-
ment, as exhibited in its refusal to hire her for the [particular] posi-
tion, foreclosed a sufficiently wide range ofjobs to serve as proof of
a substantial limitation. '" 30
1
Finally, plaintiffs may tackle the one-job-is-not-enough stan-
dard by satisfying the evidentiary burden of proving that they were
regarded as having an impairment that substantially limited their
ability to perform a class or a broad range of jobs. In doing so, the
testimony of medical and vocational experts may be very helpful. 30 2
The court in Scharff v. Frank,30 3 for example, denied summary judg-
ment on whether the plaintiff had been regarded as having a physi-
299. Id. at 25-26.
300. See id. at 25.
301. See id. at 26. The Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Cook is strongly reminis-
cent of the reasoning in E.E. Black that "it must be assumed that all employers
offering the same job or similar jobs would use the same requirement or screening
process," because otherwise employers rejecting applicants for "aberrational" or
"ridiculous" reasons would be insulated from liability. See E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Mar-
shall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1100 (D. Haw. 1980).
302. See Huber v. Howard County, 849 F. Supp. 407, 412 (D. Md. 1994) (rul-
ing that probationary county firefighter who had been refused full-time position
because he had asthma was person with disability under section 504 of Rehabilita-
tion Act even though he was not precluded from various other jobs including
those related to firefighting, such as cardiac rescue technician). The Huber court
declared:
[Plaintiff's] condition does not substantially limit his employment oppor-
tunities in general. However, because Huber is disqualified from advanc-
ing the firefighting career for which he is well trained, and in which he
has extensive background, his disability is substantially limiting as to be-
ing a career firefighter as such. Although a person's inability to fulfill
one narrow job classification because of a physical or mental impairment
does not constitute a disability ... inability to perform specific job duties
substantially limits a person's employment opportunities as to a job call-
ing for performance of those duties. Such a person may have to seek a
different job, even if that calls upon him to alter his career path and/or
to start at the bottom of the ladder. In that context, [plaintiff] has a
disability which prevents him from performing the duties of a firefighter
and is a disabled person as defined by the Rehabilitation Act.
Id.
303. 791 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
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cal impairment that substantially limited her ability to work.30 4 The
court noted the testimony of the plaintiff's vocational expert that if
the plaintiff had the impairments that the defendant employer re-
garded her as having, she "would be prevented from performing
approximately half of the unskilled jobs in the local economy that
she would otherwise be qualified to perform.
30 5
Similarly, in EEOC v. Joslyn Manufacturing Co.,306 the EEOC re-
lied upon the testimony of "a rehabilitation expert."30 7 The expert
testified that the defendant's perception that the complainant
could not perform repetitive hand motions would exclude him not
just from the position for which he was not hired but also from
several other positions with the defendant employer. 308 The evi-
dence regarding the scope of jobs for which the employee was
trained and capable was an important factor in the successful Joslyn
case.
30 9
Nevertheless, plaintiffs having abilities and qualifications that
make them eligible for a wide range of jobs may find it harder to
show that a perceived limitation constitutes a substantial impair-
ment on working.310 People with stronger resumes will have less
304. See id. at 186-87.
305. Id. Two subsequent decisions discussing the Scharff ruling have expressly
held that the absence of Scharfflike expert testimony is fatal to such an argument.
See Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992) (affirming district
court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment); Partlow v. Runyon,
826 F. Supp. 40, 46 (D.N.H. 1993) (granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment).
306. No. 95 C 4956, 1996 WL 400037, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 1996).
307. See id. at *7 (ruling that evidence based in part on expert testimony was
sufficient to create genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff s perceived
disability substantially limited his ability to work).
308. See id.
309. See id. The court found:
[T]he record indicates that Cruz'[s] access to the job market is limited.
His educational and employment background demonstrate a capacity for
low and semi-skilled work, but not jobs that require a college education
or any type of professional training. Cruz' [s] employment history also
focuses on manual labor of one variety or another. Thus, a perceived
impairment that prevents him from doing any job involving "repetitive
motions of bilateral hands" is particularly damaging to his job prospects.
Id.
310. See, e.g., McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 1012,
1015 (E.D. Ky. 1995) (noting that plaintiff's other skills preclude her from being
substantially limited in major life activity of working), affid, 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir.
1997). The McKay court declared:
McKay was a 24 year old graduate, working on earning her teaching
certificate. Given her educational background and age, she is qualified
for numerous positions "not utilizing" the skills she learned as an auto-
mobile assembler. Merely because she can no longer perform repetitive
factory work does not render her significantly limited under the ADA.
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access to protection against discrimination on the basis of disability.
Some of the unfortunate and harsh results of this uneven and fluc-
tuating state of the law under the "regarded as" prong of the defini-
tion of disability will be examined later in this Article.
B. The Temporary Disability Issue
Although it is a variation on the general theme of the one-job-
is-not-enough difficulty, the temporary disability problem can be ex-
plained more directly and succinctly. This difficulty concerns a
principle imposed by some courts and certain regulations of the
EEOC that an impairment does not constitute a disability under the
ADA or the Rehabilitation Act if its duration is too short. Such a
requirement is an extension of the notion that a condition is not a
disability if it is not sufficiently serious-a principle that is derived
from the statutory requirements that to be a disability an impair-
ment must substantially limit a major life activity.311
1. Origins
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act regulations, as originally
issued by HEW and those published subsequently by other federal
agencies, do not contain any restrictions regarding the duration a
condition must have to constitute a disability. 31 2 Indeed, the regu-
latory guidance accompanying the HEW regulations and current
regulations of HHS indicate that the respective agency "has no flex-
ibility within the statutory definition [of individual with a disability]
to limit the term to persons who have those severe, permanent, or
progressive conditions that are most commonly regarded as
handicaps."31 3
The view that a condition may not qualify as a disability be-
cause it is only temporary or of insufficient duration can be traced
to court decisions that have weaknesses and deficiencies limiting
their value as convincing legal precedent. Arguably, the temporary
disability limitation appears to have originated in Grimard v. Carl-
ston.314 In Grimard, a student in a two-year clinical nursing program
fractured his ankle and the college determined that he would be
Id. While McKay involved an actual disability, its language could be invoked to
apply to a "regarded as" claim as well.
311. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1997).
312. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (1997) (listing no time requirements in definition
section).
313. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A § 84 (1997).
314. 567 F.2d 1171 (1st Cir. 1978).
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unable to fulfill his clinical duties that semester.315 Thus, the col-
lege refused to let him continue and informed him that he would
have to retake the course. 316 He filed suit claiming that the college
officials had denied him due process of law and had discriminated
against him in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
3 17
The district court in Grimard denied the student's request for a pre-
liminary in'junction because it found that he had not shown a likeli-
hood 'that he would succeed on the merits. 318 On appeal, the First
Circuit conducted a very restricted review of the unpublished mem-
orandum opinion of the trial court because the plaintiff had failed
to comply with rules regarding appellate briefs. 319 The First Circuit
did not allude to any evidence or findings as to how long the stu-
dent would be impaired.3 20 The court also never mentioned that
duration of or the temporary nature of a condition was a factor to
be considered, but merely upheld in a summary fashion the district
court's finding "that plaintiff was unlikely to succeed in proving
that his was an incapacity within the statutory meaning of handi-
capped person, so as to invoke the nondiscrimination mandate of
[section 504] ."321
While the authority of the Grimard decision would later be
questioned,3 22 the opinion's various shortcomings did not prevent a
district court, in Saffer v. Town of Whitman,323 from citing Grimard as
315. See id. at 1173.
316. See id. at 1173-74 (stating school's strong interest in protecting patients
from possible injury resulting from plaintiff's physical incapacity warranted its act-
ing prior to granting termination hearing).
317. See id. (holding plaintiff had been afforded considerable notice and suffi-
cient due process).
318. See id. at 1172-74 (stating that district court found that plaintiff's claim
would most likely be unsuccessful).
319. See id. at 1172-73 (stating that issuance of preliminary injunction is dis-
cretionary "and will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of that discre-
tion"). The failure to comply with rules regarding appellate briefs included
requirements of clearly articulating a statement of the issue for review, providing a
statement of the case and ordering a transcript of the proceedings of the lower
court to provide a record for the appellate court. See id. As a result of the failure
to comply, the First Circuit observed that there was "uncertainty as to the precise
basis of his appeal," that it would not review the sufficiency of the district court
proceedings and that it would confine its analysis to reviewing the legal conclu-
sions of the lower court under a "clear error of law" standard. See id.
320. See id. at 1174.
321. Id. To make this rather weak precedent even more dubious, the First
Circuit added that the "[p]laintiff conceded at oral argument that his position on
[his section 504 claim] was not particularly well taken." Id.
322. See Chapsky v. Baxter V. Mueuller Div., No. 93-6524, 1995 WL 103299, at
*3 n.4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 1995) (referring to Grimard as questionable authority in
holding pregnancy is disability).
323. No. CIV.A.85-4470-Z, 1986 WL 14090, at *1 (D. Mass. Dec. 2, 1986).
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authority for the proposition that a temporary condition is not a
disability for purposes of section 504.324 The court ruled that plain-
tiff could not state a claim under section 504, because "a temporary
condition, such as pregnancy, is not a disability under that stat-
ute.' 3 2 5 None of the court's reasoning offers any support for the
324. See id. (citing Grimard to support conclusion that pregnancy is temporary
condition and, therefore, not disability under Rehabilitation Act).
325. See id. The plaintiff, a teacher, entered into a written employment con-
tract with the defendant school board. See id. After signing the agreement, the
plaintiff informed the school superintendent that she was pregnant and she would
need to take a short maternity leave at the beginning of the school year. See id.
Because the plaintiff would require maternity leave, she was not hired. See id. In
considering the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court held that plaintiff could
not base her claim on section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because "a temporary
condition, such as pregnancy, is not a disability under the statute." See id.
The EEOC would later make clear that pregnancy is'excluded under the defi-
nition of disability because it is "not the result of a physiological disorder" and thus
is not an impairment. See [1993-1997 Transfer Binder] EEOC Compl. Man.
(CCH) 6882 (Mar. 15, 1995) [hereinafter EEOC Compl. Man.]; see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630 app. (1997) ("Other conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the result
of a physiological disorder are also not impairments."). The EEOC has recognized
that complications arising from pregnancy are impairments and may constitute
disabilities under the ADA. See id. (noting complications resulting from pregnancy
are impairments). Several courts have agreed with this conclusion. See Patterson v.
Xerox Corp., 901 F. Supp. 274, 278 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (noting that severe back pain
from pregnancy and aggravation of prior back injury may constitute disability); see
also Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 473 (D. Kan.
1996) ("[T]he physiological conditions and changes related to a pregnancy... are
not impairments unless they exceed normal ranges or are attributable to some
disorder."). But seeJohnson v. A.P. Prods., 934 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
("[Piregnancy and related medical conditions are not disabilities under the
ADA."). Such complications are presumably coextensive with or shorter in dura-
tion than pregnancy itself, suggesting that the nine-month duration of pregnancy
is not a reason for its exclusion from the definition of disability. While the EEOC
has refused to establish a bright-line rule for determining when duration of an
impairment is long enough, it has declared that "[a]n impairment is substantially
limiting if it lasts for more than several months and significantly restricts the per-
formance of one or more major life activities during that time." See EEOC Compl.
Man., supra, 6882. Moreover, a condition "is not substantially limiting if it lasts
for only a brief time." Id. In particular circumstances, the EEOC has indicated
that eight weeks of impairment can be too short a period for the impairment to
constitute a disability, but that 11 months of impairment does amount to a disabil-
ity. At least one court has disagreed with the EEOC's underlying premise that
pregnancy by itself is not a disability under the statutory definition. See Chapsky,
1995 WL 103299, at *3 & n.4 ("[P] regnancy is physical impairment which substan-
tially limits major life activity and therefore is a disability."); see also Kindlesparker
v. Metropolitan Life Ins., No. 94 C 7542, 1995 WL 275576, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 8,
1995) ("The Court does not believe that the ADA countenances discharge because
a woman must seek medical attention related to pregnancy."). Several courts have
agreed with the EEOC that pregnancy, per se, is not a disability. See, e.g., Johnson,
934 F. Supp. at 626 (holding plaintiffs pregnancy was not disability under ADA);
Gudenkauf 922 F. Supp. at 473 (noting that term "impairment" does not include
conditions, such as pregnancy, that do not arise from physiological disorder); Vil-
lareal v.J.E. Merit Constructors, 895 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (conclud-
ing pregnancy, absent unusual circumstances, is not physical impairment under
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Saffer court's abrupt statement that pregnancy is not a disability be-
cause it is temporary. In 1995, a district court opinion disagreeing
with the Saffer court's conclusion characterized Saffer as a decision
that "relies on questionable authority."326
The Saffer court did not discuss the 1983 ruling of a federal
district court in Stevens v. Stubbs,327 reached some five years after
Grimard, which also contained language suggesting that temporary
conditions are not disabilities. In Stevens, an employee of the U.S.
Army and Air Force Exchange Service asserted a claim under sec-
tion 501 of the Rehabilitation Act alleging that he had been sub-
jected to discrimination based on disability when his employment
status was downgraded for unsatisfactory performance.3 28  The
plaintiff did not present any evidence of the nature of any disability
and the record showed only that he had missed a lot of work "due
to illness, the exact nature of which is unclear."3 29 Thus, the court
ruled that the plaintiff had not given evidence of an actual disability
and granted summary judgment for the defendant.330 Applying the
Rehabilitation Act definition of "individual with handicap," the
judge commented that he was "unconvinced that it encompasses
transitory illnesses which have no permanent effect on the person's
health."331 As authority for this pronouncement, the Stevens court
ADA); Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype, 893 F. Supp. 109,119 (D.N.H. 1995) (stating
that pregnancy is not physical impairment under ADA). Most of the courts that
have agreed that uncomplicated pregnancy is not covered have premised that con-
clusion in part on the fact that pregnant women who are subjected to discrimina-
tion are protected by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555,
92 Stat. 2076. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994). See, e.g., Johnson, 934 F. Supp. at
627 (stating that pregnancy is not disability under ADA and that PDA covers dis-
crimination based on pregnancy); Gudenkauf 922 F. Supp. at 470-73 (noting that
PDA and Tide VII cover discrimination based on pregnancy); Villarea4 895 F.
Supp. at 152 (referring to plaintiffs ability to claim discrimination based on preg-
nancy under PDA and Title VII as further justification for not defining pregnancy
as impairment under ADA); Tsetseranos, 893 F. Supp. at 119 (finding support for
denying pregnancy status as impairment under ADA, in ability to bring such claim
under Title VII and PDA).
326. See Chapsky, 1995 WL 103299, at *3 & n.4 (questioning line of reasoning
in Grimard).
327. 576 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
328. See id. at 1410-12 (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment
in regard to plaintiffs handicap discrimination claim).
329. See id. at 1413 (" [T] he nature of his 'handicap' is somewhat uncertain.").
The court found that, during the evaluation period leading to the downgrade, the
plaintiff had been certified by his doctor as being fit for duty. See id. ("[ T] he plain-
tiff's physician had certified him as fully able to return to work and handle all the
responsibilities of his job.").
330. See id. at 1414-15 ("Giving all reasonable inference to the plaintiff, the
court concludes that plaintiff has failed to establish that he is a 'handicapped
person.'").
331. Id. at 1414.
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cited two decisions.332 The two precedents offered by the Stevens
court afford no support for the proposition for which they are
cited. Both of these cases were decided under provisions of Illinois
state law that did not include a definition of disability analogous to
the federal definition, 333 and ironically, neither case involved a
transitory condition nor discussed duration of impairment as a rele-
vant factor. 334 The Stevens case reflects more of a deficiency of
proof by the plaintiff than a platform for a new analytical principle,
but upon this slim reed the temporary disability limitation has been
constructed.
Even more insubstantial and problematic was the fourth case,
Evans v. City of Dallas,3 3 5 where the plaintiff had been discharged
from ajob with the city at the end of a probationary period.336 The
plaintiff asserted a section 504 claim on the grounds that "one of
the alleged reasons for his discharge was his excessive absenteeism
resulting from a knee injury which required surgery." 337 The Fifth
Circuit agreed with the district court's determination that Evans's
injury did not bring him within the scope of section 504's protec-
332. See Doss v. General Motors Corp., No. CIV-A.79-0034, 1980 WL 344 (C.D.
Ill. July 31, 1980); Advocates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 385 N.E.2d 39 (Ill. App. Ct.
1978).
333. See Doss, 1980 WL 344, at *1 (deciding case under Illinois Equal Oppor-
tunity for the Handicapped Act); Advocates, 385 N.E.2d at 41 (raising claims under
the Illinois Equal Opportunity for the Handicapped Act and provision of Illinois
Constitution Act that prohibited discrimination based on "handicap" in employ-
ment and housing). The plaintiff in Doss had originally included a claim under
section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, but this claim had been dismissed because
the court ruled that section 503 does not create a private right of action. See Doss,
1980 WL 344, at *3. The Advocates court noted that the state constitution did not
provide any definition of "physical or mental handicap," and that the Illinois Equal
Opportunity for the Handicapped Act only defined handicap in a circular defini-
tion that "is of little use to us." See Advocates, 385 N.E.2d at 42.
334. See Doss, 1980 WL 344, at *3 (finding that plaintiff was refused employ-
ment "because of the chronic otitis externa in both ears and the chronic otitis
media in the left ear together with [a] growth in that ear," and because of "the
chronic condition of ill being existing in his ears"); Advocates, 385 N.E.2d at 41
(involving plaintiff who had undergone kidney transplant and was denied position
because employer deemed him "an uninsurable risk"). No evidence in the Doss
case suggested that the plaintiffs condition was going to improve. See Doss, 1980
WL 344, at *1-3. In Advocates as well, there was no evidence that the plaintiff would
ever cease to be a kidney recipient, and nothing in the court's opinion even re-
motely suggests that a duration of impairment factor is a relevant consideration.
See Advocates, 385 N.E.2d at 39-44.
335. 861 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1988).
336. See id. at 852.
337. See id. The record showed that progress reports regarding Evans's per-
formance indicated not just excessive absenteeism, but also "poor attitude, public
criticism of his department, bad language, and alienation of co-workers." Id. at
851 n.29.
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tion. 33 8 The Fifth Circuit offered no explanation for its analysis and
conclusion other than reciting that the district court had noted
"the transitory nature of the injury. '339
The Fifth Circuit supplemented this dubious support by ap-
pending a footnote that stated: "Additionally, we note that the dis-
trict court found nothing in the legislative history of the Act to
indicate that Congress contemplated including an injury such as
plaintiff's within the [Rehabilitation] Act's scope."340 Given the al-
most total absence of legislative history of section 504 and the other
provisions of the Rehabilitation Act, a reference to knee injuries
requiring surgery would be surprising indeed. In fact, there are no
references to any specific conditions in the legislative history of sec-
tion 504. According to the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, amputations,
paraplegia, blindness, deafness and numerous other particular con-
ditions, whether permanent or not, would be excluded from the
statutory definition of disability.34 1
338. See id. at 852 (noting transitory nature of injury did not bring plaintiff
within Rehabilitation Act).
339. See id. at 852-53. The Fifth Circuit quoted the following language from
the district court's opinion:
Although the injury may have limited Plaintiffs life activities during his
recuperation, Plaintiff does not allege that it continues to do so; nor does
he contend that others regard him as having an impairment that contin-
ues to do so. At first glance Plaintiff might be supposed to have a record
of such impairment. However, subsections (i) and (iii) [of section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act], cast in the present tense.., contemplate an im-
pairment of a continuing nature.
Id. To this reasoning the district court affixed a mystifying citation to footnote six
in the Supreme Court's decision in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S.
397, 405-06 n.6 (1979). The referenced footnote quotes the three-prong statutory
definition and then points out that the definition includes "a person who has a
record of, or is regarded as having, an impairment [who] may at present have no
actual incapacity at all." Id. This is a principle that seems not only not to support
but to fly directly in the face of the decisions of the district court and Fifth Circuit
in Evans.
340. See Evans, 576 F. Supp. at 853 n.39.
341. Compounding this illogic, the Fifth Circuit cites the 1973 volume of the
U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News as the source of its conclusion re-
garding legislative history. This volume discusses the original Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which did not contain the three-prong definition of disability that Congress
added in 1974. The only particular conditions mentioned in the legislative history
of the amended definition are "mental retardation," "mental illness," "neurologi-
cal illness," "heart attack" and "cancer." See S. REP. No. 1297, 93 Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6388-91. If it had referred to the legis-
lative history of the correct piece of legislation, presumably the Fifth Circuit would
nonetheless not have maintained that these are the only conditions Congress in-
tended the definition to cover. The 1974 legislative history also contains a descrip-
tion of the ',regarded as" branch of the definition, which indicates that people who
have no impairment at all or one that does not substantially limit their activities
may still be included in the definition, thus making the Fifth Circuit's search for a
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These four dubious decisions constituted the only sources of
judicial or administrative articulation of anything resembling a du-
ration limitation on disabilities under federal nondiscrimination
laws at the time the 101st Congress began considering the enact-
ment of the ADA in 1989.
2. ADA Legislative History
The legislative history of the ADA does not contain a single
reference to any duration limits on disabilities, nor any suggestion
that "temporary" conditions are not .covered.342 The only discus-
sion of impairments that do not substantially limit a major life activ-
ity occurs in a nearly identical sentence found in the Senate and the
House Education and Labor Committee Reports on the ADA.
34 3
The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Re-
sources declared: "Persons with minor, trivial impairments, such as
a simple infected finger are not impaired in a major life activity." 344
The report of the House Committee on Education and Labor
echoed in singular form: "A person with a minor, trivial impair-
ment, such as a simple infected finger is not impaired in a major
life activity."3 45 These references provide a modicum of support for
not including "minor" or "trivial" impairments, but do not' in any
way suggest that otherwise substantial impairments should be ex-
cluded because they do not last long enough.
Neither supporters nor opponents of the legislation claimed
that an impairment had to have some degree of duration in order
to constitute a disability.3 4 6 Nor were there any references in the
listing of conditions "that Congress contemplated including" virtually irrelevant.
See id. at 6389-90.
342. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 53 (1990) (addressing certain injuries
as minor and trivial, and thus, not covered by ADA, but not referencing duration
requirements); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989) (discussing impairments that are
and are not covered with no mention of duration limits).
343. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 ("The term 'physical or mental' does not
include simple physical characteristics such as blue eyes or.black hair. Further,
because only physical or mental impairments are included, environmental, cul-
tural, and economic disadvantages are not in themselves covered."); H. REP. No.
101-485, at 52 ("A person with a minor, trivial impairment, such as a simple in-
fected finger is not impaired in a major life activity.").
344. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22.
345. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 52.
346. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (1997) (suggesting Rehabilitation Act pre-
cluded ruling that only permanent handicaps were covered); Thomas H. Christo-
pher & Charles M. Rice, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview of the
Employment Provisions, 33 S. TEX. L. REv. 759, 769 n.77 (1992) ("[N]either the
ADA's legislative history nor the EEOC's interpretive regulations suggest any
bright-line test or general standard for determining when an illness or condition
that is not of permanent duration ceases to be a transitory illness and becomes a
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committee reports or the floor debates to any of the four court
cases discussed in the prior section that had hinted or alluded to a
duration limitation.3 47 All in all, the ADA legislative history offers
not a trace of support for ousting temporary impairments from the
coverage of the ADA.
Neither the original ADA bill as proposed by the National
Council in 1988,348 the language of the ADA as finally enacted
349
nor any of the versions in between 350 contained a limitation or ex-
clusion for "temporary" conditions or any other language imposing
or suggesting a duration of impairment restriction upon conditions
that might constitute disabilities under the legislation.
3. Federal Agency Interpretations
Despite the absence of any basis in statutory language or prior
regulatory interpretation, and with only the flimsiest of foundations
in case law, the EEOC decided to impose, in its ADA Title I regula-
tions, a new requirement that conditions might be excluded from
the definition unless their duration was sufficiently long.35 1 This
requirement is all the more surprising because deliberations about
the ADA legislation were conducted under a uniform understand-
ing by proponents and opponents of the ADA alike, that the ADA
definition of disability would generally be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the section 504 statutory language and regulations
from which it was borrowed. 352 Additionally, the members of Con-
gress were very specific in crafting statutory language indicating cir-
substantially limiting impairment."); Colette U. Matzzie, Substantive Equality and
Anti-discrimination: Accommodating Pregnancy Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
82 GEO. L.J. 193, 220 (1993) (noting that nothing in ADA suggests Congress in-
tended to limit "definition of impairment to permanent disabilities").
347. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 52 (noting that there was no discussion of
duration limits); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (same).
348. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, ON THE THRESHOLD OF IN-
DEPENDENCE 27-39 (1988).
349. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) (failing to establish duration limita-
tions on impairments).
350. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (discussing ADA without reference to
whether disability need be permanent or temporary).
351. See EEOC, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL FOR THE AMERICANS WITH DISA-
BILrrIEs ACT II-5 (1992) [hereinafter EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL]
("Temporary, nonchronic impairments that do not last for a long time and that
have little or no long term impact usually are not disabilities.").
352. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 21 (defining "disability" in manner consistent
with similar terms in section 7(8)(B) of Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and section
802(h) of Fair Housing Act); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 50 (noting definition
of term "disability" in ADA is comparable to definition of "individual with handi-
caps" in Rehabilitation Act).
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cumstances in which they wished to deviate from section 504 and its
implementing regulations.353
While regulations under the Rehabilitation Act had not de-
fined the phrase "substantially limits," 354 EEOC's ADA Title I for-
mulated a definition. 35 5 In addition, the regulation indicates that
the following factors are to be considered in determining whether
an individual's major life activity is substantially limited:
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impair-
ment; and
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected
permanent or long term impact of or resulting from
the impairment.35 6
The delineation of these factors marks the first, and still the only,
adoption of explicit regulatory language indicating that duration is
a criterion for determining whether an impairment is substantially
limiting.
In its Interpretive Guidance, the EEOC has elaborated on its
view of the duration factor by declaring that "temporary, non-
chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term
or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities. Such impair-
ments may include, but are not limited to, broken limbs, sprained
joints, concussions, appendicitis, and influenza."3 57 The EEOC's
353. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (b) (excluding 11 particular kinds of mental disor-
ders from definition of "individual with a disability").
354. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A § 84 (1997). In the regulatory analysis accom-
panying its final section 504 regulation, HEW stated: "Several comments observed
the lack of any definition in the proposed regulation of the phrase 'substantially
limits.' The Department does not believe that a definition of this term is possible
at this time." Id.
355. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1) (1997) (defining "substantially limits"). The
regulations provide:
The term substantially limits means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in
the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the aver-
age person in the general population can perform that same major life
activity.
Id.
356. Id. § 1630.20) (2).
357. Id. pt. 1630, app. A § 16300).
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Technical Assistance Manual adds "common colds" to this list of
examples. 358
The EEOC illustrates its analysis of the duration factor by pro-
viding an example of a broken leg and suggests that "a broken leg
that takes eight weeks to heal is an impairment of fairly brief dura-
tion"3 59 and, thus, would not be a disability under the ADA.3 60 If,
however, a broken leg takes "a significantly longer time than the
normal healing period to heal," or if "the leg did not heal properly,
and resulted in a permanent impairment," then the condition
would constitute a disability.36' Specifically, the EEOC has indi-
cated that a broken leg that requires eleven months to heal is a
disability. 362
While eight weeks is too short and eleven months is sufficiently
long a period of impairment for a broken leg to constitute a disabil-
ity, the EEOC has refused to establish any bright line for determin-
ing when duration of an impairment is sufficiently long for it to
constitute a disability. Instead, it declared that "[tihere are no set
time limits for determining whether an impairment is of sufficient
duration to be considered substantially limiting."363 It has de-
clared, however, that "[a] n impairment is substantially limiting if it
lasts for more than several months and significantly restricts the
performance of one or more major life activities during that
time."3 64 And the EEOC has indicated that a mood disorder condi-
tion requiring ten months hospitalization and two months intensive
outpatient treatment is a disability.3 6 5
At the other end, the EEOC has indicated "relatively brief and
transitory illnesses or injuries that have no permanent or long-term
effects" are not disabilities. 366 Illustrating an impairment of too
358. See EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 351, at 14 (listing
numerous ailments not considered disabilities).
359. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. A § 1630(j).
360. See EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 351, at 11-5 ("A bro-
ken leg that heals normally within a few months would not be a disability under
the ADA.").
361. See id. ("[I]f the broken leg heals improperly, the 'impact' of the impair-
ment would be the resulting permanent limp.").
362. See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 325, 6884 (noting that impairment
which substantially limits ability to walk is disability).
363. Id. ("[T]he duration of an impairment does not, by itself, determine
whether the impairment substantially limits an individual's major life activities. It
is just one factor to be considered with all of the other relevant information.").
364. Id.
365. See id. (noting that duration and impact of impairment should be deter-
mined on case-by-case basis).
366. Id.
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brief a duration, the EEOC opines that a temporary illness ex-
pected to require "six to eight weeks" for complete recovery is not a
disability.3 67
The EEOC concedes that "[h] ow long an impairment lasts...
does not by itself determine whether a person has a disability under
the ADA."3 68 The EEOC indicates that "[t] emporary impairments
may be disabilities if they take significantly longer than normal to
heal and significantly restrict the performance of major life activi-
ties during the healing period. '369 A flaw in the logic of this
"longer than normal to heal" consideration can be easily exposed.
Suppose that two persons each have a broken bone in the knee area
that requires a cast to be put on so that neither is able to walk. If
one of them has a type of break that is only supposed to take six
weeks to heal, but because of complications or idiosyncratic factors,
actually takes six months to heal, how is that person any more sub-
stantially limited in the major life activity of walking than the indi-
vidual whose break was expected to take six months to heal from
the outset? Comparisons with "normal" healing periods seem to
have little or nothing to do with the question whether the condition
substantially limits the performance of major life activities.
Again, none of the EEOC's gloss on temporary impairments
has any basis in regulations issued under the Rehabilitation Act, nor
in the legislative history of the ADA, which suggests only that "triv-
ial" impairments having a minor impact on major life activities,
such as an infected finger, should not be considered disabilities.3 70
Nowhere does the legislative history suggest that an otherwise sub-
stantially limiting condition should not be considered so because it
does not last long enough.
In inserting a general duration of impairment factor and se-
lecting an eight weeks of impairment example, the EEOC reinter-
prets the statutory formulation that an impairment must
substantially limit a major life activity in order to constitute a disa-
bility; the statutory concept of "substantial limitation of a major life
activity" imports quality and quantity considerations-which life ac-
367. Id.; see also Stevens v. Stubbs, 576 F. Supp. 1409, 1414 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(holding that transitory illness that may require periods of sick leave is not suffi-
cient to establish that party is "handicapped individual").
368. EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 351, at II-5 ("This
question is answered by looking at the extent, duration, and impact of the
impairment.").
369. EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 325, 6884.
370. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) (stating that persons with minor
trivial impairments are not impaired in major life activity).
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tivity is limited and how seriously.37 1 Nevertheless, neither of these
factors involve temporal considerations. If a person has a condition
that substantially limits a major life activity of that individual at the
time that some actor covered by the ADA discriminates against the
individual because of the condition, it seems irrelevant how long
thereafter the condition will continue. In addition, if Congress be-
lieved that "temporariness" was a disqualifying factor, it could cer-
tainly have imposed a duration factor or even a minimum time limit
for duration.
In deciding that temporary conditions should not be consid-
ered disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act, the EEOC went out
on a limb which the other federal agencies that implement the
ADA expressly declined to follow. In their proposed regulations for
implementation of Titles II and III of the ADA, both the DOJ and
the Department of Transportation (DOT) took positions diametri-
cally opposed to the EEOC on this issue.3 72 In its proposed regula-
tions for the implementation of Titles II and III of the ADA, the
DOJ defined "disability" as "a permanent or temporary physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the ma-
jor life activities of such individual."3 73 The identical definition was
included by the DOT in its proposed regulation to implement the
transportation requirements of the ADA.374 In the interest of inter-
agency harmony, the DOJ dropped the words "temporary or perma-
nent," from both sets of its final regulations.375 The DOT also
371. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (2) (1997) (discussing factors that are consid-
ered when determining whether person is "substantially limited in a major life
activity").
372. See 56 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7482 (1991) (reproducing proposed regulation
with no duration limits); 56 Fed. Reg. 8538, 8551 (1991) (reproducing proposed
regulation of Title II); 56 Fed. Reg. 13856, 13879 (1991) (implementing subtitle A
of Title II); see also 29 C.F.R. § 33.3 (1997) (defining "disability" under Title II with
no exclusions based on duration); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1997) (providing definition
of "disability" under Title III with no impairments excluded based on duration).
373. 56 Fed. Reg. at 7483 (proposing regulation of Title III) (emphasis ad-
ded); 56 Fed. Reg. at 8551 (proposing regulation of Title II) (emphasis added).
374. See 56 Fed. Reg. at 13879.
375. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (defining "disability" without reference to "perma-
nent or temporary" impairment); id. § 36.104 (1997) (same).
The DOJ explained that critics had objected to the inclusion of this language
"both because it is not in the statute and because it is not contained in the defini-
tion of 'disability' set forth in the Tide I regulations of the [EEOC]." Id. pt. 35,
app. A § 35; id. pt. 36, app. A § 36. The DOJ decided to delete the phrase from the
final rule "to conform with the statutory language." Id. pt. 35, app. A § 35; id. pt.
36, app. A § 36. It indicated that "impairments are not necessarily excluded from
the definition of 'disability' simply because they are temporary," but that the "ques-
tion of whether a temporary impairment is a disability must be resolved on a case-
by-case basis, taking into consideration both the duration ... of the impairment
and the extent to which it actually limits the major life activity of the affected indi-
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agreed to delete the words "temporary or permanent" from its reg-
ulation in the interest of uniformity, but strongly rejected the exclu-
sion of impairments that only limit activities temporarily. 376
Even the EEOC might consider a short-term physical or mental
impairment on which an employer predicates an adverse action as
constituting a disability. The EEOC offers the following guidance
to individuals investigating charges of discrimination:
If the charging party does not have an impairment that
substantially limits his or her ability to work (or to perform
any other major life activity), then the investigator should
determine whether the charging party has a record of
such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an
impairment.3 77
Thus, the EEOC may view its temporary disability restriction as ap-
plying only under the first prong of the statutory definition, leaving
open the possibility that a very short-lived impairment may consti-
vidual." Id. pt. 35, app. A § 35; id. pt. 36, app. A § 36. The DOJ did not go any
further in following the EEOC's lead as by adopting a definition of "substantially
limits" or otherwise inserting a duration limitation into the actual language of the
regulations. The DOJ explicitly rejected the EEOC's rationale. See EEOC TECHNI-
CAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 351, at 11-5.
376. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.3 (1997) (defining "disability" without reference to
"temporary or permanent"). In the section-by-section analysis accompanying its
final regulation, the DOT declared:
A few comments addressed "disability." Some suggested removing "per-
manent or temporary," suggesting that this language is unnecessary. The
DOJ definition does not include these words, so we have deleted them for
consistency. In our view, the terms are unnecessary because any condi-
tion that meets the criteria of the definition, regardless of its duration, is a
disability.
49 C.F.R. pt. 37, app. D § 37 (emphasis added). The logic of the DOT's viewpoint
is readily apparent. In imposing an obligation to make stations and vehicles acces-
sible to and usable by people with disabilities and prohibiting transportation prov-
iders from otherwise discriminating against individuals because of their disabilities,
DOT recognizes that it makes no difference whatsoever whether a person who was
denied equal transportation services today does or does not have the condition
tomorrow or the next day or eight months later or ten years later. Whether the
traveler's cast comes off next week or two years from now, he or she needed acces-
sible and nondiscriminatory transportation today.
The cogency of DOT's reasoning is not restricted, however, to the context of
transportation. If a person is excluded from a public accommodation today, kept
from using a service provided by a state or local government agency today or fired
from a job today because of a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits major life activities today, then it does not matter whether the individual's
limitation will go away in the near future, the distant future or never. If discrimi-
nation takes place on a specific day, the existence or discontinuance of disability at
a later date is totally irrelevant for purposes of a law that prohibits such discrimina-
tion and is in effect on the day the discriminatory acts occurred.
377. EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 325, 1 6884 n.21.
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tute a disability if the employer treats it as substantially limiting.
Under this analysis, if an employer bases a drastic job action, such
as forced retirement or termination, on such a temporary impair-
ment, the employer's action would manifestly put the employee in
the status of "regarded as" having a disability, under the third
prong of the definition.
4. Case Law Subsequent to ADA's Enactment
Whatever ameliorative comments and concessions the EEOC
may have made regarding its initiative to exclude most short-term
impairments from the definition of disability, and whatever alterna-
tives the third prong of the definition may offer, many courts have
not heeded such nuances and have expanded the EEOC's stan-
dards and commentary into a virtual rule that plaintiffs having tem-
porary physical or mental impairments cannot avail themselves of
the protection of the ADA. The first such decision was in Vande
Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration.378 In Vande Zande,
the Seventh Circuit considered an ADA employment discrimination
claim filed by a woman "paralyzed from the waist down as a result of
a tumor of the spinal cord."379 The temporary disability issue arose
because the plaintiff sought a reasonable accommodation for pres-
sure ulcers that she was prone to develop periodically, and the de-
fendants argued that they did not have to accommodate the
pressure ulcers because they did not fit the statutory definition of a
disability.380 The Vande Zande court declared that "[i] ntermittent,
episodic impairments are not disabilities, the standard example be-
ing a broken leg."38 1
Some three months after its decision in Vande Zande, the Sev-
enth Circuit decided Hamm v. Runyon,38 2 a case involving a proba-
378. 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
379. Id. at 543.
380. See id. at 543-44 ("The defendant and the amici curia argue that there is
no duty of reasonable accommodation of pressure ulcers because they do not fit
the statutory definition of disability.").
381. Id. at 544. As authority for this proposition, the Seventh Circuit cited the
EEOC's ADA Title I regulatory guidance and the Fifth Circuit's 1988 decision. See
id. In the factual situation of the case, however, the Vande Zande court ruled that
the plaintiffs pressure ulcers were "a characteristic manifestation of an admitted
disability" and, as a part of the underlying disability, were a condition that the
employer must reasonably accommodate even though in themselves they were only
"intermittent." Id. ("Often the disabling aspect of a disability is, precisely, an inter-
mittent manifestation of the disability, rather than the underlying impairment.").
The court concluded that an intermittent impairment that is a "characteristic man-
ifestation of a disability is part of the underlying disability and thus, the employer
must reasonably accommodate." Id.
382. 51 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 1995).
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tionary postal service employee who claimed that he was fired from
his job because of his arthritic condition which, he alleged, his su-
pervisors regarded as a disability.383 The employee filed suit charg-
ing a violation of sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act,
and the district court granted summary judgment for the defend-
ants on the grounds that Hamm presented insufficient evidence
that he had a disability.3 84 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision. 385 In its opinion, the appellate court discussed evi-
dence that the employee's supervisors regarded his condition and
resulting problems as "temporary" and "short-term. '" 386 The Hamm
court quoted its statement in Vande Zande that "[i] ntermittent, epi-
sodic impairments are not disabilities," and ruled that the plaintiff
had not shown that the defendants regarded him as having a sub-
stantially limiting impairment.387
Similarly, in McDonald v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Wel-
fare,388 the Third Circuit discussed duration of impairments as a fac-
tor in determining whether a condition constituted a disability.38 9
McDonald involved a woman who had to undergo surgery because
of severe abdominal pain.390 She was terminated from herjob as a
383. See id. at 724 (addressing postal service's perception that employee's ar-
thritis substantially limited his ability to walk).
384. See id. at 722 ("The district court found that Hamm had presented insuf-
ficient evidence that he was disabled within the meaning of the Act and granted
summary judgment in favor of the Postal Service."). The employee in Hamm
worked as an electronic technician at the Rock Island, Illinois Post Office. See id. at
723. He was supposed to begin work on February 27, 1988. See id. The first 90
days were a probationary period during which the post office could monitor his
habits and attendance. See id. Hamm's supervisor was very strict concerning at-
tendance. See id. About three weeks after he began working, he began having
problems with his arthritis. See id. Around this time, his fellow employees began to
notice that there was a difference in his physical condition. See id. On March 21,
1988, he reported 11 minutes late to work. See id. Two days later, he and his
supervisor had an' official discussion concerning this tardiness. See id. On April 14,
1988, he was 44 minutes late for work. See id. Both times he explained that he had
overslept. See id. Finally, on April 18, he requested and was granted an immediate
leave of absence in order to see his doctor. See id. On April 27, 1988, he com-
pleted his probationary period. See id. His supervisors agreed to terminate him
because of dissatisfactory attendance. See id.
385. See id. at 722 (affirming summary judgment because of insufficient
evidence).
386. See id. at 725 (discussing supervisor's belief that employee's condition
was temporary).
387. Id. at 725-26.
388. 62 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1995).
389. See id. at 93.
390. See id. at 94 (stating that plaintiff underwent surgery because of disabling
abdominal pain). On September 8, 1992, the plaintiff began working as a nurse at
the Polk Center in Venago County. See id. at 93. Polk Center, operated by the
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, is an institution that provides services
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nurse at a state residential facility for people with mental retarda-
tion as of the day of her surgery on grounds that "she was unable to
attend to her duties."39 1 She brought suit under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.39 2 In affirming the district court's
decision, the Third Circuit stated that the definition of disability
"contemplates an impairment of a permanent nature. "39  In addi-
tion, the court quoted the Vande Zande language about "intermit-
tent, episodic impairments" not constituting disabilities, and
recited the EEOC regulatory provision directing that the "duration
or expected duration of the impairment" is to be considered in de-
termining whether an impairment is substantially limiting.394
Against this precedential and regulatory backdrop, the Third Cir-
cuit ruled that McDonald could not qualify for relief under the
ADA or section 504.3
9 5
Subsequent federal circuit court decisions indicate that impair-
ments may not qualify as disabilities unless their duration is suffi-
ciently long.396 For instance, in Rogers, the Fifth Circuit ruled that
ankle problems necessitating surgery did not qualify a terminated
employee for protection under the ADA because the "ankle afflic-
tions were temporary and did not constitute a permanent disabil-
for people with mental retardation. See id. at 93-94. On December 24, 1992, the
plaintiff began to suffer from severe abdominal pain. See id. at 94. She was hospi-
talized and underwent surgery. See id. She then requested a sick leave from work.
See id. Because she was unable to complete her duties, she was terminated. See id.
391. See id. ("Because she was unable to attend her duties the Center dis-
charged plaintiff.").
392. See id. (discussing plaintiffs complaint that defendant violated ADA and
Rehabilitation Act of 1973). The district court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss on the ground that the protection of the ADA and section 504 do not apply
to "the transitory disability that plaintiff had suffered." Id.
393. Id. at 93.
394. Id. at 95-96.
395. See id. at 96. Specifically, the court stated:
As the complaint reveals, her inability to work caused by the surgery was
of limited duration. She entered the hospital on December 25, 1992, and
would have been able to return to her duties.., on February 15, 1993, a
period of less than two months. Although she was incapacitated for these
weeks, her inability to work was not permanent, nor for such an extended
time as to be of the type contemplated by the statutes she cites.
Id.
396. See, e.g., Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding
that, because plaintiffs kidney condition was temporary, it was not disability under
ADA); Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1355 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting
that plaintiffs temporary psychological impairment was not of sufficient duration
to fall within ADA); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 193 (5th Cir.
1996) (finding plaintiff was not covered by ADA when evidence showed she was
"back to normal in three or four months" following radiation treatment).
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ity." 3 9 7 In support 'of its decision, the court cited the EEOC
regulatory guidance regarding "temporary, non-chronic impair-
ments of short duration. '398
In Sanders v. Arneson Products, Inc.,399 a production manager
who had undergone surgical treatment for bladder cancer and sub-
sequently required psychiatric treatment for a psychological reac-
tion to his cancer was terminated while he was on medical leave. 40
0
The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the de-
fendant on the issue of whether the plaintiffs psychological impair-
ment was a disability under the ADA.40 1 The court declared that
"Sanders' temporary psychological impairment, from December 19,
1992 to April 5, 1993, with no residual effects after April 5, 1993,
was not of sufficient duration to fall within the protections of the
ADA as a disability."40 2
In Roush v. Weastec, Inc.,40 3 the plaintiff had two conditions that
she alleged were disabilities under the ADA-one was a kidney ob-
struction for which she had two surgeries and various other medical
treatments, and the other was a chronic bladder inflammation that
resulted in periodic bladder infections accompanied by sharp pains
and fever. 40 4 Because of these two conditions and treatments for
them, the plaintiff worked less than ten weeks per year in 1991 and
1992 and missed three months of work in 1993 after her second
kidney operation. 40 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the
397. Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th
Cir. 1996). In 1992, Rogers took paid sick leave from his employment as a
mechanic at International Marine Terminals (IMT). See id. He suffered from per-
sistent pain, swelling and other problems with his right ankle. See id. After his sick
leave, he received a year of disability benefits. See id. In 1993, while Rogers was
unavailable for work, IMT implemented a layoff plan. See id. Rogers and five
others were terminated. See id.
398. Id.
399. 91 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1996).
400. See id. at 1352 ("Sanders sought relief under the ... ADA . .. for his
termination while he was on leave for a cancer-related psychological disorder.").
401. See id. at 1355.
402. Id. at 1354.
403. 96 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 1996).
404. See id. at 842 (discussing plaintiffs numerous surgeries regarding re-
moval of obstruction from her kidney). The plaintiff also began experiencing re-
curring bladder inflammation, which was diagnosed as interstitial cystitis, a chronic
bladder inflammation that results in pain and intermittent bladder infections. See
id. "She alleges that this condition causes sharp pains in her bladder, extreme
tenderness in her pelvic area, a constant feeling of needing to urinate, an inability
to control urination, and a fever." Id.
405. See id. ("Due to this condition and other medical problems, she worked
less than ten weeks during 1991 and less than ten weeks in 1992."). In addition, in
1993, the plaintiff was unable to work for a period of three months following her
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Sixth Circuit relied upon the Vande Zande decision in reversing the
district court's granting of summary judgment. The court re-
manded the case on the issue of the bladder condition qualifying as
a disability, ruling that "It]he bladder infections, though intermit-
tent and temporary, are a characteristic manifestation of this physi-
cal impairment [the bladder condition] and, thus, are a part of the
underlying impairment. '40 6 At the same time, the Sixth Circuit
ruled that the district court was correct in its determination that the
kidney condition did not constitute a disability because "plaintiff's
kidney is no longer obstructed and no longer affects her ability to
work. '40 7 Relying on Hamm v. Runyon and the EEOC Title I regula-
tion, the court reasoned that because "plaintiff's kidney condition
was temporary, it [was] not substantially limiting and, therefore, not
a disability under the ADA. '40 8
In Gordon v. E.L. Hamm &Assoc., Inc.,40 9 a maintenance worker
was discharged while undergoing treatment, including a bone mar-
row test and a series of chemotherapy treatments, for a cancerous
growth on his shoulder.410 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit overturned a jury verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff on his ADA claim, and ruled that reasonable persons could not
conclude that the plaintiff had an impairment that substantially
limited his ability to work.411 The court observed that except for a
couple of days of medical testing and a ten-day leave of absence for
the bone marrow test, "the plaintiff was fully capable of working,"
and that, even though he experienced some side effects from the
chemotherapy, he "tolerated the treatments 'quite well."' 41 2 The
court also ruled that the plaintiff's evidence that the defendant had
restricted his assignments and otherwise treated him differently
from other employees was insufficient to demonstrate that he had
been "regarded as" having a disability.4i3
second operation. See id. The district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, ruling that neither of the conditions constituted a disability-
the kidney condition because it had ultimately been corrected and the bladder
condition because it was only intermittent and not chronic. See id.
406. Id. at 844.
407:, Id.
408. Id.
409. 100 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 1996).
410. See id. at 909.
411. See id. at 912 (determining that extent, duration and impact of plaintiffs
chemotherapy did not substantially impair ability to care for himself or work).
412. Id.
413. See id. at 913-14 (noting that employer adjusted work assignments to
meet deadlines during plaintiff's absence and that employer continued to pay
plaintiff same compensation and benefits).
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These cases represent a strong consensus in post-ADA enact-
ment cases at the circuit level that impairments of too short a dura-
tion are not disabilities under the first prong of the statutory
definition, and that such claims should not be allowed to proceed
to trial. The Seventh Circuit's decision in Hamm v. Runyon ex-
pressly ruled, and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Gordon sug-
gested, that such claims could also not succeed under the third,
"regarded as," prong of the definition.
In Katz, the First Circuit agreed that impairments of short du-
ration are not disabilities under the first prong of the statutory defi-
nition, but disagreed that impairments of short duration cannot be
a disability under the "regarded as" prong.414 The appellate court
concluded that the district court erroneously granted judgment as a
matter of law against the plaintiff who had been terminated from
his job five weeks after a heart attack.415 The district court ruled at
the end of the plaintiffs case that he had not presented evidence
sufficient to show that he had a "disability" under the ADA.
4 16
The First Circuit held that whe'ther the plaintiff's evidence,
which did not include any medical testimony, was sufficient to allow
a jury to conclude that he had an actual disability was "a debatable
question."417 The Katz court suggested that, to find in his favor, the
jury would have to conclude that plaintiffs heart condition and its
surgical treatment by angioplasty caused "limitations [that] were
permanent or persiste [nt] on a long-term basis, or that their dura-
tion was indefinite and unknowable or expected to be at least sev-
eral months. '418
The First Circuit ruled that it did not need to resolve this issue
because the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence under the
"regarded as" prong of the ADA definition of disability.419 After
reviewing the evidence in the record, the court ruled that the cir-
414. See Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Although
short term, temporary restrictions generally are not substantially limiting... the
evidence permitted Katz to reach the jury under one of the alternative definitions
of disability, that City Metal regarded [Katz] as having such an impairment.").
415. See id. at 33-34 (concluding that reasonable jury could have found that
plaintiffs employer regarded plaintiff as having impairment because of heart
attack).
416. See id. at 29-30.
417. See id. at 31 ("[I t is a very close question whether Katz offered sufficient
evidence to prove that the impairment 'substantially limited' his major life activi-
ties within the meaning of the ADA.").
418. Id. at 32.
419. See id. (discussing employer's perception that employee was disabled).
The court stated that even if the plaintiff did not have an actual disability, "both
the language and policy of the statute seem to us to offer protection as well to one
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cumstances surrounding the plaintiff's termination provided
enough evidence to reach the jury on the "regarded as" issue. 420
Having reversed and remanded on the "regarded as" prong of the
definition, the court decided, in the circumstances of the case, to
expressly direct the district court on retrial to allow the plaintiff to
present expert testimony to show actual disability as well. 421 Katz is
the exception, however, to the strong consensus at the federal cir-
cuit level that plaintiffs with impairments of short duration are not
covered by the definition of disability under the ADA and the Reha-
bilitation Act.422
who is not substantially disabled or even disabled at all but is wrongly perceived to
be so." Id. at 33.
420. See id. The court specifically held:
Even if medical expert testimony were required here to permit the jury to
find that Katz was suffering from a continuing serious heart condition,
the jury certainly did not need medical testimony in making its own judg-
ment as to what the employer may have perceived, rightly or wrongly,
about Katz's condition.
Id.
421. See id. at 34 (allowing expert testimony to establish disability under stat-
ute). The First Circuit's final resolution actually went even further and directed
that on retrial the plaintiff could present evidence "under any or all of the three
theories of disability under the statute." Id.
422. A few district court decisions straying from the majority position are wor-
thy of note. In one case, a plant foreman, who suffered a fractured spinal verte-
brae that required some three months to heal and was terminated by his employer
after he had missed 49 days of work, brought an ADA action. See Muller v. Hotsy
Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1389, 1396, 1398-99 (N.D. Iowa 1996). The court did not
expressly deviate from the standard view that a temporary impairment is not a
disability, but ruled instead that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case and
could proceed on his theory that his employer had regarded him as having a sub-
stantially limiting impairment. See id. at 1412. Although the supervisor who dis-
charged Muller claimed that he regarded his condition as temporary, the court
noted that there was evidence of the supervisor's reasons for terminating Muller
and comments he made regarding Muller's condition that were sufficient to raise a
material question of fact as to whether the supervisor "regarded Muller as having
more than a temporary impairment under the ADA." Id. at 1411.
In another case, the court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment
and granted a preliminary injunction to the plaintiff, who had developed symp-
toms of anxiety and depression after a hostile encounter with a subordinate. See
Wood v. County of Alameda, No. C 94 1557 THE, 1995 WL 705139, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 17, 1995). The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence that
plaintiff had a mental impairment that rendered her unable to work for about a
year and declared that it "readily" concluded that "a mental impairment which
renders an individual unable to work for a full year constitutes a disability under
the ADA." Id. at *8. In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly ruled that the
factor of "permanent or long-term impact of the individual's impairment" con-
tained in the EEOC ADA Title I regulation is not meant to be dispositive. Id. at *9
(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1997)). The court ultimately found that the plaintiff
had established probable success on the merits of her claim, including a "strong
showing that she is disabled, under the ADA, by virtue of the fact that she has a
record of a mental impairment which substantially limited her in the major life
activity of working." Id. at *15.
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C. Other Restrictive Interpretations of Statutory Protection
The one-job-is-not-enough rulings and the temporary disability
rulings are only two blatant examples of ways in which some courts
have narrowly confined the protection afforded by the ADA and
sections 501, 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Similar parsi-
mony is present in various other clusters of decisions.
1. Judicial Estoppel
While the two aforementioned grounds for restricting the
scope of protection afforded under federal disability nondiscrimi-
nation laws focus on the definition of the term "disability," other
lines of cases have focused on the "qualified" criterion. One group
of decisions has rejected plaintiffs' claims of statutory protection by
applying the doctrine of 'Judicial estoppel." Although the doctrine
In reaching its conclusion that an impairment does not have to be permanent
to constitute a disability, the court in Wood relied on the decision of another fed-
eral district court in Patterson v. Downtown Medical & Diagnostic Ctr., Inc., 866 F.
Supp. 1379 (M.D. Fla. 1994). Wood, 1995 WL 705139, at *9 (citing Patterson, 866 F.
Supp. at 1379). In Patterson, the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiffs ADA
claim on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to allege that her disability was
permanent. Patterson, 866 F. Supp. at 1381. The court ruled, however, that "the
definition of 'disability' does not require permanency." Id. Therefore, the court
ruled that a plaintiff is not required to allege a permanent disability to establish a
prima facie case. See id.; see also Abbasi v. Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., No. 94 Civ. 2809
(RLC), 1995 WL 303603, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 1995). In Abbasi, the plaintiff
stated in his complaint that he "suffered a minor stroke which disabled him for two
weeks," and the defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that "the duration of
the plaintiff's disability is allegedly temporary;" the court rejected the motion to
dismiss and reasoned that elsewhere in his complaint the plaintiff had made suffi-
cient allegations that "the disabilities that affected his ability to work are ongoing."
Abbasi, 1995 WL 303603 at *2.
In another decision, a district court examined the interrelationship between a
temporary, treatable disability and the employer's obligation under the ADA to
make a reasonable accommodation to an employee's impairment. See Schmidt v.
Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 996-98 (D. Or. 1994). The plaintiff was a truck
driver who had been discharged because he was allegedly intoxicated on the job.
See id. at 998. The court ruled that if he were shown to be suffering from alcohol-
ism, the plaintiff should be afforded the reasonable accommodation of time to
undergo treatment for the condition and granted partial summary judgment on
this issue. See id. at 966-97. The court concluded that the ADA prohibits an em-
ployer from terminating a current employee "who was initially qualified for the
position but subsequently developed a disqualifying condition that could be con-
trolled with reasonable accommodation." Id. at 998. The court elaborated as
follows:
The employer would have to first give the employee a reasonable oppor-
tunity to obtain treatment for the condition before terminating him. A
comparable situation would be a driver who develops high blood pressure
that can be controlled with medication. The employer cannot terminate
the employee because he is temporarily unqualified if that condition can
be alleviated through reasonable accommodation.
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has not been uniformly adopted by the federal courts, 423 it is a mat-
ter of judicial discretion in those circuits where it has been
adopted. 424 The doctrine of judicial estoppel, or the "doctrine
against the assertion of inconsistent positions,"425 seeks to prevent a
litigant from asserting a position that contradicts one that he or she
previously asserted in the same or a previous proceeding.426 Usu-
ally a plaintiff is precluded from asserting a position inconsistent
with a position previously advanced only if the plaintiff succeeded
in the earlier litigation.427
A number of courts have ruled that an employee who has al-
leged that he or she is totally disabled in order to receive disability
423. See Bennett v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. CIV.A.H-94-3270, 1995 WL
819035, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 1995) (applying judicial estoppel doctrine and
stating thai use of this doctrine is matter ofjudicial discretion); see also Britton v.
Co-Op Banking Group, 4 F.3d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging majority
and minority views on judicial estoppel, but refusing to adopt either view); Bates v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1037 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that judicial
estoppel has never been uniformly adopted by federal courts); United States v.
49.01 Acres of Land, 802 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1986) (recognizing adoption of
judicial estoppel by several courts, but stating that Tenth Circuit has rejected
doctrine).
424. See Bennett, 1995 WL 819035, at *2; Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037
(9th Cir. 1990).
425. Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358
(3d Cir. 1996).
426. See id. ('judicial estoppel ... is a judge-made doctrine that seeks to pre-
vent a litigant from asserting a position inconsistent with one that she has previ-
ously asserted in the same or in a previous procedure."); Bates, 997 F.2d at 1037
("The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a factual posi-
tion in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position previously taken by him in a
legal proceeding."); Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 452-53 (9th Cir. 1991) ("As
a general principle, the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars a party from taking in-
consistent positions in the same litigation."); American Nat'l Bank v. Federal Dep.
Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d 1528, 1536 (lth Cir. 1983) ('judicial estoppel is applied to
the calculated assertion of divergent sworn positions.").
As one court noted: "It is intended to protect the integrity of the judicial
process, avoid inconsistent results, and prevent litigants from playing fast and loose
in order to secure an advantage." Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1994).
427. See, e.g, Britton, 4 F.3d at 744 (describing majority view on judicial estop-
pel and finding 'Judicial estoppel does not apply unless the assertion inconsistent
with the claim made in the subsequent litigation 'was adopted in some manner by
the court in the prior litigation'" (quoting In re Corey, 892 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir.
1989))); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1351, 1360 (D. Kan. 1995)
(establishing that criteria for judicial estoppel included prevailing in previous
litigation).
A minority of the circuits, however, have ruled that the party's earlier position
need not have been adopted by the court in the earlier proceeding. See Britton, 4
F.3d at 744 (describing minority view on judicial estoppel as not requiring success
in previous litigation and requiring finding by court that "alleged offending party
engaged in 'fast and loose' behavior which undermined the integrity of the
court").
82
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss2/3
"SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITED" PROTECTION
or other types of benefits is estopped from claiming or proving that
he or she can perform the essential functions of the job under the
ADA or sections 501, 503 or 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 428 In
making such rulings most courts have blithely assumed that judicial
428. See Bollenbacher v. Helena Chem. Co., 934 F. Supp. 1015, 1027-28 (N.D.
Ind. 1996) (deciding plaintiff who claims total disability in one count of his com-
plaint addressing denial of long-term disability benefits estopped from asserting
ADA claim); Miller v. United States Bancorp, 926 F. Supp. 994, 999 (D. Or. 1996)
(determining recipient of disability benefits from social security and employer's
disability insurance policy not "qualified" under ADA); Cline v. Western Horse-
man, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 442, 448 (D. Colo. 1996) (deciding that plaintiff was es-
topped from claiming that she is "qualified" where she made representations that
she is totally disabled in seeking social security and other long-term disability bene-
fits); Pegues v. Emerson Elec. Co., 913 F. Supp. 976, 980-81 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (de-
ciding plaintiffs applications for workers' compensation and social security
disability benefits do not in themselves foreclose ADA claim, but plaintiffs state-
ments in proceedings to obtain such benefits and findings in her favor make it
"legally improper" for her to claim she is "qualified"); Bennett, 1995 WL 819035, at
*2 (determining plaintiff who had testified to ALJ that he was unable "to even try
to comprehend doing anything" estopped from asserting that he was "qualified"
under ADA); Baker v. Asarco, Inc., No. CIV-94-1045-PHX-ROS, 1995 WL 795663,
at *7 (D. Ariz. Nov. 9, 1995) (deciding that in opposing defendant's motion for
summary judgement, plaintiffs deposition or affidavit testimony could not contra-
dict former sworn statements made while applying for employer's disability bene-
fits programs and social security program that he was totally disabled), affd, No.
95-17226, 1995 WL 429178, at *1 (9th Cir. July 31, 1997); Lamury v. Boeing Co.,
No. 94-1225-PFK, 1995 WL 643835, at *6 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 1995) (deciding plaintiff
was estopped from contending that at time of layoff she could perform essential
functions because she sought and received workers' compensation benefits);
Lewis v. Zilog, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 931, 945 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (determining plaintiff
who applied for and received disability benefits from her former employer "is pre-
cluded or estopped as a matter of law from claiming" that she is "qualified" under
ADA); Reiff v. Interim Personnel, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 1280, 1289 (D. Minn. 1995)
(stating that weight of authority favors summary judgment when plaintiff has re-
ceived disability benefits because "estoppel argument is a persuasive one, and it
has convinced a number of courts to decide in [d]efendants' favor"); Nguyen v.
IBP, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 1471, 1484 (D. Kan. 1995) (determining plaintiff was es-
topped because of Social Security representations and stating "[f]ederal courts
facing similar situations have ruled as a matter of law that the plaintiff was not a
'qualified individual with a disability."'); McNemar v. Disney Stores, Inc., No.
CIV.A.94-6997, 1995 WL 390051, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1995) (deciding that
plaintiff who stated on his applications for Social Security disability benefits and
state disability benefits that he was "totally and permanently disabled" was es-
topped from arguing that he was "qualified" under the ADA), affd, 91 F.3d 610
(3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 958 (1997); Berry v. Norfolk S. Corp., No.
CIV.A.94-0075-R, 1995 WL 465819, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 23, 1995) (deciding plain-
tiff's representations of total and permanent disability estop him from asserting
ADA claim); Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 547, 555 n.5 (D. Kan.
1995) (determining plaintiff, who certified on long-term disability benefits applica-
tion that she was "unable to perform material duties of work," was estopped from
arguing that she was "qualified" under ADA); Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan,
859 F. Supp. 963, 970-71 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (deciding woman who certified that she
was "wholly unable to work" to her disability insurer was estopped from establish-
ing that she was qualified under ADA); Peoples v. City of Salina, No. CIV.A.88-
4280-S, 1990 WL 47436, at *4 (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 1990) (determining plaintiff who
claimed he was completely disabled to obtain disability retirement benefits es-
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estoppel is not limited to statements made under oath in judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings, but applies to any statement made
under oath, including disability benefits applications. 429 Some of
the courts ruling in favor of judicial estoppel have recognized the
inherent unfairness of "forcing individuals to choose between seek-
ing disability benefits and suing under the ADA,"430 but have held
that it is the province of the legislature, not the courts, to remedy
this dilemma.431 Application of estoppel while recognizing its ineq-
uity is highly surprising because judicial estoppel is often regarded
as an equitable doctrine within the discretion of the court.432
Some courts invoking judicial estoppel use harsh language in
characterizing attempts by plaintiffs to pursue nondiscrimination
actions while receiving disability payments or pursuing other bene-
fits or compensation for impairment of their ability to work. In Mc-
Neill v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railroad Co.,433 the plaintiff
sought to return to his formerjob eight days after he had won ajury
verdict of $305,000 against his employer, under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act,4 3 4 for an on-the-job injury.4 3 5 The employer
refused to let the plaintiff return to work, and nearly two years later,
the plaintiff filed an ADA action. 436 The court noted that, prior to
the current damages action, the plaintiff had testified that he was
"permanently disabled. '437 The court declared that it was "seriously
topped from later claiming he was qualified under section 504 of Rehabilitation
Act).
429. See Dockery v. North Shore Med. Ctr., 909 F. Supp. 1550, 1557 (S.D. Fla.
1995) (calling interpretation of judicial estoppel that applies to any statement
made under oath "a misapplication of theories of estoppel").
430. See, e.g., Garcia-Paz, 873 F. Supp. at 556 ("Plaintiff argues that... to allow
an employer to terminate an employee for unlawful reasons, and then attempt to
defend that action after the fact by asserting a partial or temporary handicap,
would subvert the meaning and intent of [the ADA]. The Court, however, is
unconvinced.").
431. See McNemar, 1995 WL 390051, at *4 ("[I]t is the province of the legisla-
ture rather than this court to authorize such double recovery.").
432. See, e.g., Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 453 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding
that judicial estoppel is equitable doctrine based on its purpose to protect integrity
ofjudicial process); Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990) (recogniz-
ingjudicial estoppel as equitable doctrine based on its intent to "protect the integ-
rity of the judicial process"); Baker, 1995 WL 795663, at *4 ("The general rule in
the Ninth Circuit is that a party cannot establish the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact by submitting deposition or affidavit testimony contradicting his or
her former sworn statements.").
433. 878 F. Supp. 986 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
434. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).
435. See McNeill 878 F. Supp at 988.
436. See id.
437. See id.
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disturbed by the obvious bad faith exhibited by the [plaintiff] and
his counsel" in pursuing the ADA claim. 438 The court concluded
that the factual basis for the ADA action was "either blatantly fraud-
ulent or utterly ridiculous."439 While McNeill represents a rather ex-
treme set of circumstances, other courts have been only slightly less
condemnatory of plaintiffs who allege that they are "qualified"
under federal disability nondiscrimination laws after they have ap-
plied for disability benefits-the most common characterization be-
ing that such plaintiffs are "talking out of both sides of their
mouths."440 Plaintiffs in such situations have also been described as
taking positions that are "logically impossible,"44 1 "mutually exclu-
sive ,"442 "not legally proper,"443 "disingenuous" 444 and "incredi-
ble"44 5 and that "belie" one another.446
Not all courts, however, have applied judicial estoppel to invali-
date the discrimination claims of plaintiffs who have applied for
and received disability benefits. For example, in Overton v. Reilly,4 4 7
the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendants. 448 In Overton, the plaintiff brought
an action under sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to
challenge his termination, which was allegedly in response to his
disabling emotional illness and depression. 449 The court observed
438. Id. at 990. The court also said that it was "astonished by the audacity of
the [p]laintiff," and added that "absent a representation of outright divine inter-
vention, which has not been proffered, the Court is left with an uncomfortable
inference of outright fraud." Id.
439. See id. at 991. Not having spent its ire, the court characterized the plain-
tiff's ADA claim as "a blatant attempt to extort additional money from the Defend-
ant" and declared that it was not the ADA's objective "to facilitate and ensure
double recoveries for the exclusive benefit of a duplicitous Plaintiff or his misled
or over-eager counsel." Id.
440. See Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963, 970 (E.D.N.C.
1994) ("Plaintiff... cannot speak out of both sides of her mouth with equal vigor
and credibility before this court."); see also Nguyen v. IBP, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 1471,
1485 (D. Kan. 1995) ("It is impossible for Nguyen to have been both disabled
under social security law and able to perform the essential functions of his work
under the ADA."); Cheatwood v. Roanoke Indus., 891 F. Supp. 1528, 1538 (N.D.
Ala. 1995) (stating that no rational trier of fact could find in plaintiffs favor after
he provided affidavit controverting his prior sworn statements).
441. Cline v. Western Horseman, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 442, 446 (D. Colo. 1996).
442. Reiff v. Interim Personnel, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 1280, 1291 (D. Minn.
1995).
443. Pegues v. Emerson Elec. Co., 913 F. Supp. 976, 981 (N.D. Miss. 1996).
444. Harden v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 493, 496 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
445. Reigel, 859 F. Supp. at 974.
446. Ricks v. Xerox Corp., 877 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 n.9 (D. Kan. 1995).
447. 977 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1992).
448. See id. at 1195.
449. See id.
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that "[t]he district court was greatly impressed by the finding of the
Social Security Administration (SSA) that Overton was entitled to
disability benefits."450 The Seventh Circuit ruled, however, that re-
ceipt of such funds should not be accorded a preclusive effect on
plaintiffs claim that he had been discriminatorily terminated. 451
Both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have cited Overton, in
slightly different circumstances, for the principle that social security
disability determinations are not dispositive findings for purposes
of the ADA.452
Even if courts are inclined to apply judicial estoppel, plaintiffs
and their counsel may sometimes be able to avoid or sidestep its
application. For example, in Ward v. Westvaco Corp.,45 3 the defend-
ant, who was alleged to have discriminatorily discharged a worker
with a visual disability, invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel be-
cause the plaintiff was receiving disability benefits from the defend-
ant and from social security.4 54 The plaintiff stated in his benefits
application that he was "totally and permanently disabled by bodily
injury or disease so as to be prevented from engaging in any occu-
pation or employment for wage or profit whatever."455 The court
450. Id.
451. See id. at 1196. Specifically, the court noted:
[E]ven if a finding of disability could have preclusive effect in a private
lawsuit, such a finding is consistent with a claim that the disabled person
is "qualified" to do his job under the Rehabilitation Act. First, the SSA
may award disability benefits on a finding that the claimant meets the
criteria for a listed disability, without inquiring into his ability to find
work within the economy. As it turns out, the SSA granted benefits to
Overton on this basis. Second, even if the SSA had looked into Overton's
ability to work in the national economy, its inquiry would necessarily be
generalized. The-SSA may determine that a claimant is unlikely to find a
job, but that does not mean that there is no work the claimant can do. In
sum, the determination of disability may be relevant evidence of the se-
verity of Overton's handicap, but it can hardly be construed as a judg-
ment that Overton could not do his job at the EPA.
Id.
452. See Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 523-24 (7th Cir. 1996)
("Because the ADA's determination of disability and a determination under the
Social Security disability system diverge significantly in their respective legal stan-
dards and statutory intent, determinations made by the Social Security Administra-
tion concerning disability are not dispositive findings for claims arising under the
ADA."); Robinson v. Neodata Serv., Inc., 94 F.3d 499, 502 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996) ("So-
cial Security determinations . . . are not synonymous with a determination of
whether a plaintiff is a 'qualified person' for purposes of the ADA."); see also Smith
v. Dovenmeuhle Mortgage, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1138, 1141 (N.D. Ill. 1994) ("[A]
finding of disability by the Social Security Administration cannot be construed as a
judgment that the plaintiff is unable to do his job.").
453. 859 F. Supp. 608 (D. Mass. 1994).
454. See id. at 614.
455. Id. at 614-15.
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decided, however, that Ward was not precluded from showing that
he was "qualified" because (1) he had explicitly stated in his disabil-
ity benefits application that he would have been able to perform his
former job if his employer had made reasonable accommodations
and (2) he had notified Westvaco in writing that his application for
disability benefits was not a waiver of his rights against the employer
for failing to afford him reasonable accommodations. 456 The court
noted that "Ward's clear and deliberate qualification of his handi-
cap status in his application for disability benefits takes his case
outside the framework of" estoppel precedent. 457
Another avenue for skirting the estoppel trap involves precise
consideration of the relevant time periods for the employer's chal-
lenged discriminatory actions and the eligibility period for disability
benefits. Though courts have not always been careful or precise
about these matters, the relevant time for an ADA or section 501,
503 or 504 action is the time when the alleged discriminatory act by
the employer occurred. In Cheatwood v. Roanoke Industries,458 a
plaintiff made representations in a workers' compensation trial that
he could not work during the same time period when the employer
refused to let him return to work.459 Therefore, "[h] e cannot now
assert a claim for damages against defendant claiming that he could
perform the essential functions of his job during the time in ques-
456. Id. at 615.
457. Id. The Ward court contrasted the plaintiff's situation with that of the,
plaintiff in August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 581-83 (1st Cir. 1992)
(granting summary judgment for defendant on "qualified" issue). The court
noted that in August the plaintiff in no way renounced his statements in his bene-
fits application forms that he was totally and completely disabled, nor had he
pointed to any fact which suggested that he was not totally disabled or given any
indication that his inability to work resulted from his employer's discrimination
toward him or that he had any intention of returning to work. See id. at 615. The
Ward ruling suggests that plaintiffs and their counsel may want to carefully word
the documents they submit in applying for disability benefits, in the hope of pre-
serving their rights to pursue nondiscrimination remedies against the employer.
458. 891 F. Supp. 1528 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
459. See id. Specifically, the court found:
"Significantly, these provisions contain no reference to an individual's fu-
ture ability to perform the essential functions of his position. To the con-
trary, they are formulated entirely in the present tense, framing the
precise issue as whether an individual 'can' (not 'will be able to') perform
the job with reasonable accommodation." The question therefore be-
comes whether plaintiff could perform the essential functions of his pre-
vious job or any job at defendant's plant as of February 8, 1994. It is
irrelevant for purposes of this action whether plaintiff could perform the
essential functions at some later date.
Id. (quoting Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995)).
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tion."460 In Dockery v. North Shore Medical Center,46 1 the court
declared:
Dockery's mere admitted incapacitation at the time of her
termination, however, does not, as North Shore contends,
automatically lead to the legal conclusion that she is not a
qualified individual under the ADA .... [A] person, to-
tally disabled at one point, may be considered a qualified
individual if the allowance of a leave of absence or possi-
ble reassignment would provide them [sic] the opportu-
nity to resume working at a later date. 462
It is perfectly possible, therefore, for a plaintiff to allege that he or
she was fully qualified for a job from which he or she was discrimi-
natorily terminated on date A, and that he or she was completely
unable to work on some later date B. Conversely, a plaintiff may
apply for benefits at a particular time during which he or she is not
able to work and later seek to return to a former job claiming that
he or she is now "qualified" by producing evidence of improvement
in the condition that had impaired his or her ability to work.4 63
Plaintiffs and their counsel should give careful consideration to the
460. See id. at 1538 (emphasis added). On the other hand, another court
denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on an ADA claim by a plaintiff
who was receiving both Social Security disability benefits and disability retirement
benefits from his employer. See Heise v. Genuine Parts Co., 900 F. Supp. 1137,
1152 (D. Minn. 1995). The Heise court denied the summary judgment motion
because the plaintiff's ADA claim related to a particular period, the plaintiff
claimed his condition had improved and the record did not show conclusively
"that Heise was totally disabled during the relevant time period." Id.
461. 909 F. Supp. 1550 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
462. Id. at 1555-56.
463. See Marvello v. Chemical Bank, 923 F. Supp. 487, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(denying motion to dismiss and ordering additional discovery as to changes in
plaintiffs condition after he made disability benefits representations); Heise, 900 F.
Supp. at 1152 (denying summary judgment in light of plaintiffs and his doctor's
testimony that "his condition had improved sufficiently to perform the essential
functions of the job"); Smith v. Dovenmeuhle Mortgage, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1138,
1142 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (denying summary judgment based on doctor's testimony
that plaintiff had recovered); see also Harden v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 900 F. Supp.
493, 497 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (granting summary judgment for defendant because of
plaintiff's representations that he was unable to work in connection with disability
benefits claim). In Harden, the plaintiff contended that he should be permitted to
return to work because "you get better over a period of time." See id. at 497. The
court concluded that the problem with plaintiffs argument was "that plaintiff
ha[d] offered no evidence that his condition ha[d] improved." See id. He did "not
introduce any doctor reports indicating that his disability ha(d] lessened," and
"[iln fact, at least one of his physicians opined that his condition would continue
to worsen." See id. The court ruled that the plaintiff could not maintain an argu-
ment that he had become able to work "without offering any evidence whatsoever
that his condition has changed." See id.
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applicable time periods in applying for disability benefits in the
hope of preserving their rights to pursue relief against the em-
ployer under the ADA and sections 501, 503 and 504.464
Another way to evade the damaging effects of judicial estoppel
is through precise analysis of the criteria imposed by the benefits
program and of the exact wording of assertions made by the plain-
tiff in trying to obtain these benefits. The court in Fussell v. Georgia
Ports Authority,465 for example, employed this approach. 466 The
court indicated that it was "inclined to grant [the defendant] sum-
mary judgment" on the issue of the plaintiff being "qualified" be-
cause he was receiving social security disability benefits based on
the SSA finding that he had a "100% disability."467 Nonetheless,
the court ordered further discovery to determine whether the SSA
granted disability benefits to the plaintiff without his having actually
represented himself as "permanently disabled" and unable to
work.468 The court directed the plaintiff to provide promptly
whatever waivers and other paperwork the defendant needed to ob-
tain the plaintiffs disability benefits application papers to see ex-
actly what representations were made.469 Thus, meticulous analysis
464. See D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs. Corp., 92 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1996) (ruling,
under state nondiscrimination statue, that estoppel was not applicable when plain-
tiff never claimed to be totally disabled during time she requested accommodation
and denial of accommodation was basis of discrimination claim).
465. 906 F. Supp. 1561 (S.D. Ga. 1995), affd, 106 F.3d 417 (11th Cir. 1997).
466. See id. at 1576; see also Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190, 1196 (7th Cir.
1992) (examining particular criterion under which plaintiff was awarded social
security disability benefits and holding that requisite finding was not inconsistent
with plaintiff being "qualified" under section 504 of Rehabilitation Act).
467. See Fussell, 906 F. Supp. at 1576.
468. See id. The court observed:
There is no direct evidence in the record showing that Fussell swore to
this fact. There is every reasonable inference that he did, given the work-
ing framework of the SSI program, but there is no dispositive evidence
.... It is conceivable, though not probable, that he made no such repre-
sentation to the SSA but the SSA for some reason granted him perma-
nent disability benefits anyway. Errors happen.
Id.
469. See id. Likewise, another court ruled that "[i]n order to apply the doc-
trine of judicial estoppel, the Court must have before it a prior sworn inconsistent
statement by the plaintiff" and noted that "in every case [applying judicial estoppel
to an ADA claim], there was evidence of plaintiffs inconsistent testimony before
the Social Security Administration or similar agency, or plaintiffs statement in a
disability application, that he or she was 'totally disabled.'" Marvello v. Chemical
Bank, 923 F. Supp. 487, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The Marvello court denied the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss because "[t]he Court has no evidence as to what state-
ment [the plaintiff] might have made to the Social Security Administration about
his condition." Id. at 490.
Additionally, SeniorJudge Pettine warned in his dissent in August, that courts
should not rely too heavily upon certain prior inconsistent statements. August v.
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of the benefits eligibility criteria and the statements and representa-
tions made by' the plaintiff may suggest grounds for not applying
judicial estoppel to preclude the plaintiff from proving that he or
she was not "qualified" for employment in a nondiscrimination
lawsuit.
Nevertheless, neither the cases ruling against such estoppel
nor the theories for evading it fully address the central issue. The
markedly different purposes of and the small degree of intersection
between the criteria imposed under disability benefits programs
and the concept of being "qualified" under federal nondiscrimina-
tion laws suggest that there should be little extrapolation from one
to the other.
Section 504 regulations define "qualified" as meaning, with re-
spect to employment, that the individual "can perform the essential
functions of the job in question. '470 The statutory language of the
ADA defines "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual
with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires." 4 71 All definitions focus upon
the ability of the individual to perform the essential functions of the
particular job he or she holds or seeks.
Social security programs have much different and much more
complicated concerns.4 72 The two principal federal social security
Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 586 (1st Cir. 1992) (PettineJ., dissenting).
Judge Pettine argued that the majority had accorded too much weight to the plain-
tiff's characterization of himself as "totally disabled," made to obtain temporary
disability benefits under the defendant's insurance plan:
For one thing, the disability insurance forms are not legally or medically
precise. As the majority acknowledges, it is not clear how "total disability"
is defined in August's insurance policy. The insurance forms simply de-
scribe "total disability" as an "inability to work." On its face, this defini-
tion would not preclude an individual from concurrently claiming
"qualified handicapped person" status under Massachusetts (or federal)
law.
Id. at 491.
470. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1997).
471. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
472. There are a number of other federal programs that provide disability-
related income benefits. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1994) (providing for benefits
for black lung); 38 U.S.C. §§ 310-311 (1994) (providing for compensation for vet-
erans for service-connected disabilities); 38 U.S.C. §§ 511-521 (providing for pen-
sions for nonservice-connected disabilities); 45 U.S.C. §§ 351-367 (1994)
(providing for social insurance for railroad workers).
The vagaries of various disability retirement and benefits programs offered by
the states, individual employers and private insurers are, however, beyond the
scope of this Article. Therefore, this Article will focus primarily on social security
disability programs, but many of the observations made herein are applicable to
those other types of programs as well.
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programs that provide monetary benefits to persons in connection
with their disabilities are (1) Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI), for which eligibility requires proof of insured status (by hav-
ing paid into the system through taxes on earned income) 473 and
(2) Supplemental Security Income, which requires proof of limited
income and resources. 474 The two programs employ identical statu-
tory standards for disability; claimants must prove that they are
unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by rea-
son of any medically determinable physical or mental im-
pairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continu-
ous period of not less than twelve months (or, in the case
of a child under the age of 18, if he suffers from any medi-
cally determinable physical or mental impairment of com-
parable severity) .475
The perspectives of the two formulations are quite different.
The disability nondiscrimination laws focus upon ability to perform
essential functions of one particular job, while the disability bene-
fits programs look at a bigger picture of ability to perform any gain-
ful activity. In the words of the Seventh Circuit, the disability
benefits programs have a more "generalized" focus. 4 76 While the
focuses of the nondiscrimination and the benefits programs are dif-
ferent, courts that have applied judicial estoppel have concluded
that a worker who cannot engage in any gainful activity certainly
cannot do the particularjob. In so doing, they exhibit a superficial
and uninformed view of the criteria applied under disability bene-
fits programs, how the criteria are applied and their purposes and
objectives.
Disability benefits programs deal with people who do not cur-
rently have ajob, but they do not operate ajob bank for applicants.
Consequently, they operate in a somewhat speculative realm, trying
to determine what types of physical or mental limitations a particu-
lar individual has and how those limitations will affect a person's
present and future ability to obtain employment. Unless the per-
son processing the application happens to know of a particular job
for the applicant, the process must be somewhat abstract and con-
473. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 420-425.
474. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383.
475. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a) (3) (A); see 42 U.S.C. § 416(i); see also Sullivan v. Zeb-
ley, 493 U.S. 521, 525 n.3 (1990) (discussing standard for adult disability claims).
476. Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1992).
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jectural. The SSA does'not have a litmus test to determine whether
applicants are employable or unemployable. Indeed, there are very
few, if any, individuals who can do no task at all and, thus, can be
said to be unable to work in all imaginable circumstances. So, while
disability determinations are inevitably conjectural, they must oper-
ate in a real world context where actual availability of work is as
important as some abstract concept of ability to work.
Social security disability benefits programs seek to deal with
these difficulties by applying a series of sequential steps for deter-
mining an applicant's eligibility 477 The SSA's processes for deter-
mining eligibility for disability benefits certainly have their
shortcomings. 478 One central flaw has been that the initial determi-
nation of benefits eligibility and the reviews conducted by ALJs do
477. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (1997); see also Sullivan, 493 U.S. at
524-26 (delineating and discussing steps for determining applicant for benefits eli-
gibility); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (same); Gay Gellhorn, Dis-
ability and Welfare Reform: Keep the Supplemental Security Income Program but Reengineer
the Disability Determination Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 961, 993 (1995) (same).
The SSA first determines whether the applicant is currently "engaged in sub-
stantial gainful activity," that is, has a job. See Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 525; 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(a)-(c). If not, the SSA looks to see whether the applicant's physical or
mental impairment is "severe." See Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 525; 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If it is severe, the SSA evaluates the applicant's medi-
cal records and compares them to a listing of impairments maintained by the SSA
to see if they demonstrate a condition that is included on the listing or one that is
"equal" to the listed conditions. See Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 525; 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
subpt. P, app. 1 (1997). If so, the SSA can make a finding that the applicant has a
"disability" and is eligible for benefits. See Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 525; 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). Thus, a person who does not currently have ajob and
has a type of severe physical or mental impairment that is listed in or commensu-
rate with a condition on the listing can be awarded social security disability
benefits.
If the SSA finds that an applicant's impairments are severe, but do not meet
or equal a listed condition, then the SSA considers whether the applicant has the
residual functional capacity to return to past relevant work. See Sullivan, 493 U.S.
at 525-26; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f) (1997). If not, then the SSA must
find the applicant has a disability entitling him or her to benefits, unless the SSA
can show, in light of the applicant's age, education, work, experience and residual
functional capacity, there is work in the national economy that the applicant can
perform. See id. The placement of the burden of proof on the SSA regarding this
last determination is quite significant. See Gellhorn, supra, at 993. If an applicant
for benefits has a severe impairment, does not now have ajob, cannot do the type
of work he or she did in the past and the SSA is unsure whether there is other work
that the individual can do, the SSA must find the individual eligible for benefits.
See id.
478. For a critical analysis and proposals for reform, see Gellhorn, supra note
477, at 993. Although the article occasionally makes use of terminology that is not
wholly up to date, e.g., "the disabled," it provides an excellent critique of the disa-
bility determination process and constructive suggestions for improving it, particu-
larly procedurally. See also NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, supra note 19,
at 27-31 (discussing disincentives to work under social security laws). A particularly
disquieting statistic about the benefits determination process is that ALJs reverse
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not use the same standards. 479 The staff making the initial determi-
nations do not consider themselves bound by codified regulations,
court decisions or SSA rulings.480 As a result, two persons who have
obtained benefits at different review levels may have been approved
under different standards. 481
The wording of the statutory eligibility standard-"unable to
engage in any substantial gainful activity"-is perhaps misleading to
some degree and should be revised to make it more clear because
the SSA does not consider the standard to be total inability to do
any kind of work.4 82 As the Seventh Circuit observed, "[t]he SSA
may determine that a claimant is unlikely to find a job, but that
does not mean that there is no work the claimant can do."48 3 Fed-
eral social security benefits laws authorize recipients to work for a
"period of trial work" of up to nine months while receiving SSI ben-
efits.484 One court characterizes the statutory provision as "clearly
intended to encourage recipients to seek work even while receiving
SSI support" and discusses the SSA's program pursuant to it.485 If
the SSA considers working and receiving its disability benefits to
not be inconsistent, how can courts say that they are?
If a finding that a person has a "total and permanent disability"
does not mean that a person is totally unable to do any kind of work,
the finding also does not mean that the individual is permanently
precluded from working. Disability benefits recipients are not enti-
tled to lifelong continuation of their benefits. 486 SSA conducts pe-
riodic case reviews to redetermine continuing eligibility,487
promotes rehabilitation and encourages recipient participation in
its Plan to Achieve Self Support (PASS) program, which seeks to
help participants achieve economic self-sufficiency. 488 SSA regula-
about three-quarters of the denials of benefits by the determining offices that
reach decision on appeal. See Gelihorn, supra note 477, at 973-74.
479. See Gellhorn, supra note 477, at 976-78, 987-89.
480. See id. at 976-77, 987 n.130.
481. See id. at 987 n.130 (referring to differing standards as "one of the Alice
in Wonderland aspects of social security practice").
482. Perhaps the statutory eligibility standard for benefits should be framed
in wording such as the following: "[1]s unlikely, in light of the claimant's physical
or mental impairment and the reasonable availability of relevant work opportuni-
ties, to obtain paid employment in the near future."
483. Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1992).
484. See 42 U.S.C. § 422(c)(3) (1994).
485. See Marvello v. Chemical Bank, 923 F. Supp. 487, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
486. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1701-416.1715 (1997).
487. See id. §§ 416.989, 416.204.
488. See id. §§ 416.1180.
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tions contain provisions dealing with determinations that disability
has "stopped," "ended" or "changed."489
These observations about disability determinations also apply
to the representations applicants make in seeking to obtain bene-
fits. As the unemployed individual with a disability applies for disa-
bility benefits, he or she quickly learns that the magic words for
receiving benefits are "permanently and totally disabled."490 Using
those words may mean no more to the benefits claimant than "I
think I deserve these benefits" or "I have a permanent disability."
After all, the claimant is quickly made aware that the SSA will review
all of the medical records and other evidence and make its own
determination of whether the claimant satisfies the benefits criteria.
The SSA itself has admitted that its intake and processing is a
"complex, confusing process. ' 491 A commentator has observed that
" [i] t is extraordinarily difficult under the current process for claim-
ants to understand what information is needed to prove disabil-
ity."4 9 2 Claimants arrive at the benefits office to be confronted by "a
vast array of forms" and may discover that they do not have all of
the factual information they need. Nonetheless, the data and state-
ments provided at the initial application are the critical basis for the
agency's evidentiary development of the claim.493 The pressure is
on the applicant to "say the right things" to satisfy the benefits rep-
resentative and give the claimant a shot at getting the benefits. Per-
haps the claimant acted under the advice of an attorney who
suggested applying for disability benefits, with the implication that
the claimant met the legal standards and was entitled to such
benefits.
4 9 4
489. See id. §§ 416.988 (1997) ("After we find that you are disabled, we must
evaluate your impairments from time to time to determine if you are still eligible
for payments based on disability. We call this evaluation a continuing disability
review.").
490. See, e.g., Bennett v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. CIV.A.H-94-3270, 1995
WL 819035, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 1995) (referring to cases that found "prior
statements of total or permanent disability barred a claim for discrimination under
the ADA").
491. Disability Reengineering Project Plan, 59 Fed. Reg. 47,877, 47,904
(1994).
492. Gellhorn, supra note 477, at 983.
493. See id. ("Further, claimants are rarely provided with a clear framework to
understand how the information requested by the agency drives the determination
process.").
494. See, e.g., Fussell v. Georgia Ports Auth., 906 F. Supp. 1561, 1576 (S.D. Ga.
1995) ("When [the plaintiff] applied for Social Security benefits ... he was advised
by Counsel to apply.").
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The simplistic reasoning of the courts that have made too fac-
ile a leap from eligibility for disability benefits to inability to work
precluding a plaintiff from being "qualified" has some other appar-
ent shortcomings. One shortcoming is ignoring the impact of los-
ing a job upon the employability of a worker with a disability.
Workers who consider themselves competent to do their jobs and
fully able to engage in "substantial gainful activity" while they are
employed may find themselves unemployable after they are dis-
charged. For example, if a middle-aged worker with cerebral palsy
loses herjob inspecting beer-bottle labels at the only brewery in her
small town, she may be unable to find another job. Statistics sug-
gest that, for individuals with disabilities, the chance of getting ajob
is always something of a longshot. 4 95 Even if some potential for
finding other work exists, the recently discharged individual may
not know or believe it. For most people, losing one's job is a strong
psychological blow. People in such circumstances may have diffi-
culty seeing any light at the end of the tunnel of unemployment,
particularly when former fellow workers, friends, physicians, lawyers
and sometimes even the former employer 496 are saying "you can
always just go on disability. '497
Finally, and critically, criteria and representations regarding
ability to do ajob in the disability benefits context do not consider
495. See Burgdorf, Analysis and Implications, supra note 1, at 420-22.
496. See, e.g., Heise v. Genuine Parts Co., 900 F. Supp. 1137, 1143 (D. Minn.
1995) (noting that employer called meeting to discuss plaintiffs absences from
work because of severe headaches and hospitalization and invited its personnel
manager to explain application process for disability retirement process, including
estimate of amount of such benefits plaintiff could receive); Derbis v. U.S. Shoe
Corp., No. CIV.A.MJG-93-130, 1994 WL 631155, at *1 (D. Md. Sept. 7,1994) (not-
ing that employer allegedly suggested that plaintiff apply for long-term disability
benefits instead of returning to work), aff'd, 67 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 1995); see also
August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 579 (1st Cir. 1982) (noting that
supervisor suggested that plaintiff "should consider applying for disability
benefits").
497. See, e.g., Daffron v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 874 S.W.2d 482, 486-87
(Mo. Cf. App. 1994) (discussing facts of case). The plaintiff's deposition testimony
indicated that, after his discharge from his job, he met with his doctor "who told
him that he could not go out in the labor field and get another job because of his
limitations and advised appellant to take full disability." Id. at 487. Plaintiff also
stated that he "went into.., a very deep depression" after he was terminated. Id.
This example illustrates that a person who is "qualified" one day may become
unable to find substantial gainful activity, or sincerely believe this to be true, after
he or she is terminated because of a disability. In addition, for many conditions, as
for example, multiple sclerosis and some emotional illnesses, the very stress of be-
ing fired from a job or treated unfairly can exacerbate the individual's disability.
These various plaintiffs ought to be able to obtain disability benefits without losing
their rights to pursue legal remedies against the employers who discriminated
against them on the basis of their disability.
1997]
95
Burgdorf: Substantially Limited Protection from Disability Discrimination:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
a key component of disability nondiscrimination laws-employers'
obligation to make "reasonable accommodations" to enable work-
ers with disabilities to perform the essential functions of their jobs.
In disability discrimination cases brought by plaintiffs who receive
disability benefits, some courts consider the plaintiffs' claims that,
with reasonable accommodation by their former employers, the
plaintiffs could have returned to work. The social security dis-
ability benefits process explicitly does not consider employers' rea-
sonable accommodation obligations in making its disability
determinations. 49
If an employer does not make the adjustments to the work en-
vironment called for by the reasonable accommodation mandate,
the worker may be legally "qualified," but rendered unable to do
the job.499 Moreover, based upon his or her experiences with a re-
calcitrant employer and other employers in the industry or field,
the former worker with a disability may believe it unrealistic to ex-
pect that future employers will comply with their legal obligations
to afford reasonable accommodations. Thus, the individual may
498. In 1994, the SSA proposed that reasonable accommodations that might
be made by employers as required under the ADA should be considered in decid-
ing whether a claimant's disabilities were disabling and whether jobs exist in the
national economy that might be performed by the claimant. See Disability Reen-
gineering Project Proposal, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,188, 18,264 (1994). After commenta-
tors pointed out that this inclusion of reasonable accommodations would work
against the interests of persons with disabilities whom the ADA was intended to
protect, by presuming that employers were complying with the ADA and making
reasonable accommodations when in fact they might or might not actually do so,
the SSA deleted the ADA reasonable accommodation references from the revised
reengineering plan. See 59 Fed. Reg. 47,887, 47,940 (1994).
499. In Heise, for example, the defendant's motion for summary judgment on
an ADA claim by a plaintiff who was receiving both Social Security disability bene-
fits and disability retirement benefits from his employer was denied, in part be-
cause the plaintiff claimed the employer had failed to make reasonable
accommodations required under the ADA and the court found that "[o] n the rec-
ord presented, there exist numerous questions of fact regarding the existence and
reasonableness of possible accommodations." Heise v. Genuine Parts Co., 900 F.
Supp. 1137, 1145 (D. Minn. 1995). And in Dockeyy, the plaintiff contended that
with certain reasonable accommodations she would have been able to return to
work at a later time. SeeDockeryv. North Shore Med. Ctr., 909 F. Supp. 1550, 1553
(S.D. Fla. 1995). In response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
the court declared that "[i] f the record can support an inference that North Shore
should have provided these accommodations, and that with their provision Dock-
ery would have been able to return to work, then this motion for summary judg-
ment would have to be denied." Id. at 1555. On the record before it, the court
ruled that the accommodation requested by the plaintiff-an extended leave of
absence for at least a year-was not reasonable, and it granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendant. See id.; see also August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981
F.2d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1982) (Pettine,J., dissenting) (arguing in dissent that plain-
tiff might be unable to work without some accommodation from employer, but
that did not mean he was unable to work if those accommodations were provided).
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quite honestly, and often correctly, believe that he or she was "qual-
ified" to do the former job (if only the employer would have made
reasonable accommodations) and yet will not be able to find an-
other job. The two positions are not inconsistent, and the latter
should manifestly not result in preclusion of the ability to demon-
strate the former.
In Anzalone v. Allstate Insurance Co.,500 the court was faced with
precisely these considerations.50 1 The plaintiff had suffered a back
injury in an accident. 50 2 When he sought to return to his job doing
field work as an insurance claims adjuster, his employer refused his
request and restricted him to office duty, which he and his physi-
cian both found unacceptable because it involved too much sit-
ting.503 When the plaintiff learned that the employer permitted
other employee claims adjusters to work from their homes, he re-
quested that his employer permit him to do so as a reasonable ac-
commodation for his disability.50 4 In his application for disability
benefits, the plaintiff stated: "Due to the fact that I've had three
prior back operations-and now another herniated disc in the
neck-and further lower back problems of unknown severity with
nerve damage-I do not believe I'll be able to work for anyone
else-who'd hire a person in this condition."50 5 The court ruled
that, in these circumstances, plaintiff's claims of eligibility for disa-
bility benefits and his claim to be "qualified" were not inconsis-
tent.50 6 The court determined that " [p] laintiff is not 'talking out of
both sides of his mouth,"' and refused to preclude the plaintiff
from proving that he was "qualified. '"5 0 7
The lack of clarity in disability benefits criteria and the defi-
ciencies of the administrative and judicial processes for determin-
500. No. CIV.A.93-2248, 1995 WL 35613, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 30, 1995).
501. See id. at *4.
502. See id. at *1.
503. See id.
504. See id. at *2. Both plaintiff and physician agreed that he could perform
the essential function of his job as an insurance claims adjuster from his home. See
id.
505. Id.
506. See id. at *2 (finding that plaintiff never "unambiguously characterized
himself as totally and completely disabled").
507. Id. But see Harden v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 493, 497 (S.D. Ga.
1995) (finding it "incredible" that plaintiff "would claim that he was discriminated
against by his employer for failing to make reasonable accommodations while rep-
resenting to various entities that he was unable to work" without offering any evi-
dence that his condition had changed, and concluding that there is "no
reasonable accommodation that can be given to allow a totally disabled person, as
plaintiff claims he was, to perform the essential functions of any job").
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ing whether such criteria have been met should certainly not be
visited on the heads of out-of-work applicants for desperately
needed benefits acting in good faith. Additionally, these deficien-
cies should not provide a justification for insulating employers who
have allegedly committed acts of discrimination on the basis of disa-
bility with the result that the applicant was thrown out of work and
forced to seek disability benefits.
2. Preclusion of Former Employees from Pursuing Actions to Challenge
Discrimination Regarding Employer-Provided Benefits
A related, but more bizarre, limitation upon the protections
afforded by federal disability nondiscrimination laws has been cre-
ated by another line of cases holding that people who must stop
working because of their disabilities, and thereby become eligible
for disability and other types of benefits provided by their employ-
ers, are no longer "qualified individuals with disabilities." Thus,
these employees cannot challenge discriminatory denials of their
benefits.
Both the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of disability in regard to various
kinds of employer-provided fringe benefits, including pension
plans, disability insurance, life insurance and health insurance. 508
This prohibition has been nullified to some extent as to those bene-
fits for which eligibility presupposes discontinuance of employment
by a line of cases holding that one must continue to be employed by
the employer or continue to be able to perform the job in order to
be accorded the protection of the nondiscrimination statutes. For
many types of disability benefits, disability retirement benefits and
similar programs, a person is not eligible until he or she is unable,
because of a disabling condition, to continue in the job.
This line of cases has its origin in a 1987 decision by the Eighth
Circuit in Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home.509 In Beauford,
the Eighth Circuit determined that section 504 does not "pro-
hibit[ ] discrimination in the handling of an employee salary con-
tinuation program and employee health and dental benefits when
the handicapped employee is no longer able to perform the essen-
tial functions of his or her job."510 The court affirmed the district
508. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.11 (b) (6) (1997) (prohibiting discrimination with re-
gards to "fringe benefits available by virtue of employment"). See generally
BURGDORF, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 1, at 463-71
(discussing discrimination in employment fringe benefits).
509. 831 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1987).
510. Id. at 769.
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court's decision that the plaintiff could not maintain a claim under
section 504 for salary continuation and health and dental bene-
fits. 511 The decision was based on the statutory language affording
protection to "otherwise qualified handicapped individuals," i.e., in-
dividuals with disabilities who can perform the essential functions
of the job.5 12 Because the plaintiff was on disability leave and af-
firmatively asserted that she was totally unable to perform her job,
the court found her to be not otherwise qualified and, thus, to be
outside the protection of section 504.513
Citing the section 504 regulation of the HHS,5 14 ' the district
court had ruled that "the Rehabilitation Act's statutory protection
reached fringe benefits available by virtue of employment," a prop-
osition with which the Eighth Circuit expressed no disagree-
ment.515 The circuit court's determination that Beauford could not
pursue her section 504 claim for denial of the particular benefits at
issue was based upon a technical reading of the same regulation.
The court pointed out that the HHS regulation is divided into four
subparts: (1) employment; .(2) preschool, elementary, secondary or
adult education; (3) postsecondary and vocational educational serv-
ices; and (4) other services. 516 With respect to employment, the
regulation defines "qualified" to mean "with reasonable accommo-
dation, can perform the essential functions of the job in ques-
tion."51 7 Because Beauford admitted that she could not and would
not be able to perform the essential functions of her former job in
the near future, the court concluded that she was not "qualified"
and could not pursue her action to challenge the allegedly discrimi-
natory denial of her benefits.518
The Beauford court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that
she should be considered "qualified" under the "other services" cat-
egory in the regulation.519 The court viewed this category as ad-
dressing discrimination by entities that are "providers of health,
welfare, and other social services.1520 The court deemed it "appar-
ent that this subpart is concerned not with the discriminatory han-
511. See id. at 773.
512. See id. at 771 (defining statutory language of "otherwise qualified handi-
capped individuals").
513. See id. (holding plaintiff did not fall within statutory definition).
514. 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(b) (6) (1997).
515. See Beauford, 831 F.2d at 770.
1516. See id. at 771; see also 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1997).
517. Beauford, 831 F.2d at 771.
518. See id. (stating plaintiff was not "qualified" as defined).
519. See id. at 771-72.
520. See id. at 772.
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dling of benefits due a recipient's employees, but rather with
prohibiting discrimination by certain recipients who provide cer-
tain types of health, welfare and social services toward applicants
applying for these services." 521 Thus, the court's view was that even
if the employer is covered under the fourth subpart, only its clients,
not its employees, are protected under that section. 522
The court offered no explanation as to why a recipient agency
could not be covered as an employer under the first subpart and
simultaneously as a provider of employment benefits to its workers
under the fourth subpart. There is no obvious reason why such an
interpretation, more consistent with the statutory purposes of sec-
tion 504, would be an impermissible construction. Nor is there an
obvious reason why the HHS four-part categorization should re-
strict the scope of the very broad statutory language, particularly as
the Beauford court recognizes that "[d]iscrimination in the han-
dling of salary continuation and health and dental benefits due
handicapped employees unable to perform the essential functions
of their jobs is an undesirable thing."523 Ironically, the plaintiff in
Beauford received her full disability insurance benefits and her law-
suit did not raise any claim regarding those benefits. 524 The gen-
eral reasoning of Beauford is that a person who is unable to work
cannot be a "qualified" individual with a disability entitled to pro-
tection from discrimination in regard to benefits.
The Sixth Circuit in Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,525
and the Seventh Circuit in EEOC v. CNA Insurance COS., 5 2 6 have de-
nied former employees the right to pursue ADA actions to chal-
lenge allegedly discriminatory denials of long-term disability
benefits provided by their employers. 527 In Gonzales v. Garner Food
521. Id.
522. See id. The court views such coverage as appropriate for "a patient or
other applicant... denied treatment or access" in regard to the services provided.
Id.
523. Id. at 773. The Eighth Circuit noted that the plaintiff in Beauford had
filed an action in state court claiming that the defendant had violated its contract
of employment with her by failing to provide her with salary continuation and
health and dental benefits, and that she "can still pursue" that claim. Id. The
court does not acknowledge, however, that the contract action cannot address dis-
crimination countenanced in the terms of the contracts-the details of which
workers often are unaware and about which they usually have no opportunity to
negotiate with the employer.
524. See id. at 770 (noting that plaintiff received full benefit of disability in-
surance, but later claims were denied).
525. 99 F.3d 181 (6th Cir. 1996).
526. 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996).
527. See Parker, 99 F.3d at 183; CNA Insurance, 96 F.3d at 1040.
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Services, Inc.,528 the Eleventh Circuit made a similar ruling, relying
on Beauford to preclude a former employee from pursuing an ADA
action to challenge an allegedly discriminatory cap on medical in-
surance benefits. 529
The Parker and CNA Insurance decisions followed the Beauford
approach in finding the plaintiffs to be not qualified because they
were unable to perform their former jobs.530 The Gonzales decision,
however, proceeded on a different but related theory that Title I of
the ADA protects only "employees" and "applicants," not former
employees. 531 The Parker court also concurred with the Beauford
suggestion that permitting discrimination against former employ-
ees in regard to fringe benefits is "undesirable," but that the courts
are constrained not to rewrite the statutes. 532 In Gonzales, however,
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the clearly expressed congressional
intent was "to limit the scope of the Act to only job applicants and
current employees capable of performing essential functions of
available jobs" and that "excluding former employees from protec-
tion under the Act is not inconsistent with the policies underlying
the statute."533
The EEOC, the federal agency charged with implementing the
employment nondiscrimination requirements of the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act, has disagreed with the notion that former em-
ployees unable to continue in theirjobs because of their disabilities
528. 89 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996).
529. See id. at 1530-31 (holding former employee was not "qualified individ-
ual" with disability).
530. See Parker, 99 F.3d at 183; CNA Insurance, 96 F.3d at 1040.
531. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1526-31 (holding former employee not within
protection of ADA). Former employees of state and local government entities
have an easier time pursuing employment benefits claims under Title II of the
ADA, because the Title II definition of "qualified individual with a disability" is
framed in terms of "an individual who ... meets the essential eligibility require-
ments for ... participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity."
42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1994); see Castellano v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 5014
(SHS), 1996 WL 361547, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 28, 1996) (finding that Title II and
Section 504 standards for being "qualified" for challenging discrimination in re-
gard to benefits differ from standard under Title I).
532. See Parker, 99 F.3d at 187. Discussing legislative intent and statutory lan-
guage, the Parker court stated that
[p]erhaps the drafters of the statute intended that Ms. Parker's situation
bring her within the coverage of the [ADA]. If that is the case, they failed
to provide definitions that lend themselves to doing so. Unfortunately,
Congress may not have taken this situation into account. Such an over-
sight, however, is for Congress to remedy. We should not try to rewrite
the statute in a way that conflicts with what appears to be fairly clear
language.
Id.
533. Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1528-29.
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are precluded from pursuing ADA actions to challenge discrimina-
tion in regard to fringe benefits. The EEOC has asserted that
Beauford and Parker were wrongly decided 53 4 and appeared as ami-
cus curiae to argue against the position the Eleventh Circuit eventu-
ally adopted in Gonzales.535 Additionally, the EEOC was itself the
plaintiff in the CNA Insurance case. The EEOC has offered a variety
of arguments in opposition to the reasoning and conclusions of the
circuit courts in these four cases.53 6 One argument is that these
rulings undermine the ADA's express prohibition against discrimi-
nation in fringe benefits. 53 7 Another argument is that former em-
ployees occupy the "employment position" of "benefit recipient"
and can be "qualified" for that position even though unable to per-
form their former jobs.538 A further argument expressed by the
EEOC is that the status as a former employee is sufficient to confer
authority to sue for wrongs occurring in the employment
context.539
As many good arguments as the EEOC and creative plaintiffs'
attorneys may propound, the fact is that four circuits have pre-
cluded persons whose disabilities prevent them from continuing to
534. See Parker, 99 F.3d at 186 (noting that EEOC asserted in amicus brief that
Beauford was wrongly decided and should not be followed).
535. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1530.
536. See Parker, 99 F.3d at 186-87; CNA Insurance, 96 F.3d 1039, 1043-45 (7th
Cir. 1996); Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1529-30.
537. See Parker, 99 F.3d at 186 (explaining that ADA "explicitly prohibits dis-
crimination in fringe benefits").
538. See id. (asserting plaintiff is "invoking the [ADA] in an effort to retain the
'employment position' of 'benefit recipient"'); CNA Insurance, 96 F.3d at 1043-44
(asserting plaintiff's new "employment position" is that of "disability benefit recipi-
ent," a position imposing no job related duties, so plaintiff can, by definition, per-
form essential functions of her position, so she is a "qualified individual");
Leonard F. v. Israel Discount Bank, No. 95-6964, 1996 WL 634860, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 24, 1996) (noting statement in amicus brief that "relevant 'employment posi-
tion' in any case involving post-employment fringe benefits" is that of "benefit re-
cipient," occupied by plaintiff, and "as long as the plaintiff satisfies any non-
discriminatory eligibility criteria for receipt of benefits, he is a 'qualified individ-
ual' within the meaning of the ADA").
539. See CNA Insurance, 96 F.3d at 1045. The EEOC has proffered other argu-
ments. One is that the ADA language of "employment position" in defining "quali-
fied individual with a disability" is broader than the Rehabilitation Act reference to
'job." See id. Another EEOC argument is that there are prior precedents permit-
ting ADA actions challenging health and disability insurance limitations by plain-
tiffs who were qualified for the benefit but not able to work. See id. Another is that
"qualified" in the context of benefits means qualified to meet the requirements of
the plan. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1529. Finally, the EEOC has argued that interpre-
tations of the term "employee" under Title VII allowing former employees to bring
suit should apply to the use of the same terms under the ADA. See CNA Insurance,
96 F.3d at 1043-45 (discussing right of former employee to bring Title VII post-
termination retaliation charges).
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do their jobs and other former employees from challenging dis-
crimination they encounter in regard to the benefits they obtained
as part of the terms and conditions of their employment.540 This
surely is not what Congress and the EEOC expected when they pro-
vided that the ADA was to cover fringe benefits and outlaw discrimi-
nation in regard to them.
3. Other Examples
The foregoing are only some of the ways in which courts have
restricted the coverage of protection against discrimination pro-
vided under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.54 1 Another judicially
created pitfall is derived from several decisions in which courts have
granted summary judgment for defendants based upon the plain-
tiffs' failure to satisfy "medical clearance" requirements. These re-
quirements are imposed by employers as a prerequisite for rehiring
or return to work after an absence caused by a physical or mental
condition, even when the medical clearance process probes more
deeply into the nature and extent of the person's disability than
would be permitted at the preemployment stage before a condi-
tional job offer has been made. 542 Additionally, without a founda-
540. See CNA Insurance, 96 F.3d at 1039-40 (holding totally disabled former
employee lacked standing to challenge former employer's long-term disability plan
as discriminatory); Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1529 (affirming district court's grant of for-
mer employer's motion to dismiss because plaintiff was not "qualified individual"
with disability within the meaning of ADA); see also Parker, 99 F.3d at 193 (holding
former employee was not qualified individual with disability for standing to chal-
lenge denial of benefits under ADA); Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys Home,
831 F.2d 768, 773 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding Rehabilitation Act did not prohibit
discrimination by employer in handling of employee fringe benefits).
541. For a discussion of court decisions imposing other constrictive interpre-
tations of the definition of "disability," see James G. Frierson, Heads You Lose, Tails
You Lose: A Disturbing Judicial Trend in Defining Disability, LAB. LJ.,July 1997, at 419-
30.
542. See, e.g., Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 670 (1st Cir.
1995) (granting summary judgment for employer when employee was terminated
at conclusion of two-year disability leave because of psychological problems, and
employer refused to consider rehiring former employee until employee provided
medical certification that he could return to work without restrictions or that iden-
tified reasonable accommodations); Brumley v. Pena, 62 F.3d 277, 279-80 (8th Cir.
1995) (granting summary judgment for defendants when former employee pursu-
ing statutory right to priority consideration for reemployment upon recovery chal-
lenged employer's insistence that he undergo physical examination prior to being
allowed to return to work and in absence of conditional job offer); see also Williams
v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 348 (4th Cir. 1996) (granting
summary judgment for defendants where plaintiff was not permitted to return to
work until her doctor released her from "any and all restrictions"); Reigel v. Kaiser
Found. Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963, 974-77 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (granting summary
judgment for defendants in ADA action in which plaintiff challenged employer's
requirement of mental fitness evaluation prior to returning to work).
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tion in the statutes, regulations or legislative history, a few decisions
have suggested that prison inmates seeking or holding prison em-
ployment are not employees or applicants under the ADA or the
Rehabilitation Act.543 Some courts have ruled that these federal
laws also do not cover other aspects of prison life and the programs
and activities conducted there. 544 An analogous, though arguably
more well-founded, judicially created exception to the coverage of
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA has thwarted uniformed mem-
bers of the military from challenging discrimination by their superi-
ors and the branches and departments of the military hierarchy.545
543. See, e.g., White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364, 367 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he
ADA does not apply to prison employment situations."); Williams v. Meese, 926
F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991) (determining inmate not "employee" under Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973); Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932, 938 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (stat-
ing ADA "does not create a cause of action for state inmates displeased with their
prison work assignments"); see also Haston v. Tatham, 842 F. Supp. 483, 487 (D.
Utah 1994) (suggesting that "it is doubtful that the ADA applies in the case of a
disabled prisoner who seeks prison employment").
544. See Little v. Lycoming County, 912 F. Supp. 809, 819 (M.D. Pa. 1996)
(determining ADA not applicable to facilities provided for prisoners in state pris-
ons); Staples v. Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 904 F. Supp. 487, 490 (E.D. Va.
1995) (stating ADA is inapplicable in state prison context); see also Bryant v. Madi-
gan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (doubting that ADA has any applicability to
prisons); Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1346 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that at
time of alleged violations, it was not "clearly established" that ADA and Rehabilita-
tion Act applied to state prisons). There is, however, a considerable body of con-
trary precedent holding that the ADA and section 504 are applicable to
discrimination against inmates with disabilities. See, e.g., Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d
447, 453-56 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying ADA and section 504 in prison context with-
out discussion); Lue v. Moore, 43 F.3d 1203, 1205 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying sec-
tion 504); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1521-27 (lth Cir. 1991) (applying
section 504); Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying section
504); Bullock v. Gomez, 929 F. Supp. 1299, 1302 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (applying ADA
Title II and section 504); Niece v. Fitzner, 922 F. Supp. 1208, 1216-18 (E.D. Mich.
1996) (applying ADA Title II); Smith v. Indiana, 904 F. Supp. 877, 879 (N.D. Ind.
1995) (applying ADA Title II); Rewolinski v. Morgan, 896 F. Supp. 879, 881 (E.D.
Wis. 1995) (applying ADA Title II); Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019, 1032
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying section 504 and ADA Title II); Timmons v. New York
State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 887 F. Supp. 576, 582-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (apply-
ing section 504); Love v. McBride, 896 F. Supp. 808, 810-11 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (ap-
plying ADA Title II); Austin v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 876 F. Supp.
1437, 1465 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (applying section 504); Harrelson v. Elmore County,
859 F. Supp. 1465, 1468-69 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (applying ADA Title II); Donnell v.
Illinois Bd. of Educ., 829 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (applying section504); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (N.D. W. Va. 1976) (applying
section 504); Outlaw v. City of Dothan, No. CV-92-A-1219-S, 1993 WL 735802, *3-5
(M.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 1993) (applying ADA Title II and section 504). For a discus-
sion of the impact of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act on incarcerated individu-
als, see Ira P. Robbins, George Bush's America Meets Dante's Inferno: The Americans with
Disabilities Act in Prison, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 49 (1996).
545. See, e.g., Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1462 (l1th Cir. 1990) (holding
that section 504 does not afford naval reservist avenue for challenging exclusion
from reenlisting because he tested positive for HIV); Smith v. Christian, 763 F.2d
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V. REORIENTING PRINCIPLES
To understand fully the extent to which the restrictive, pre-
ferred group approach represents a substantial and portentous mis-
reading of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, it is necessary to
examine the implications of such an approach in the context of
some basic, but often overlooked concepts underlying disability
nondiscrimination statutes. This Part attempts to outline the prin-
cipal underlying conceptual premises of federal disability nondis-
crimination laws that have not been understood by those courts,
administrators and commentators who have spawned the confining
interpretations described in the prior Parts of this Article. Though
most' of these concepts have been described and explained else-
where in the legal literature, they have not been assimilated into
the mainstream of legal analysis and have largely been ignored by
the courts. This Part will present their general contours and major
implications and provide references for additional commentary. 546
A. The Goals-Integration and Full Participation
There has been no ambiguity about the overall objectives of
federal laws regarding people with disabilities. Federal statutes on
disability have consistently opted for integration over alternative ap-
proaches of custodialism and segregation. In 1966, Jacobus S. ten-
Broek, a blind professor and distinguished legal commentator,
published a pair of law review articles. In the first of these, The
Disabled and the Law of Welfare, tenBroek outlined two basic ap-
proaches that a society can take in regard to its citizens with disabili-
ties, custodialism or integration. 547 He wrote:
The older custodial attitude is typically expressed in poli-
cies of segregation and shelter, of special treatment and
1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 1985) (determining that physical standards promulgated by
Secretary of the Navy take precedence over requirements of section 504 of Reha-
bilitation Act); Coffman v. Michigan, 914 F. Supp. 172, 175-76 (W.D. Mich. 1995)
(refusing to consider charge by member of Michigan national guard that army
failed to provide "reasonable accommodation" as required under ADA and Reha-
bilitation Act); Doe v. Ball, 725 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (holding
Rehabilitation Act affords no remedy for navy reservist released from active duty
after he tested positive for HIV).
546. See generally ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 18, at 67-101.
For a prior version of some of the materials in this Part, see BURGDORF, DISABILITY
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 1, at 2-9, 12-15.
547. Jacobus S. tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law
of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REv. 841, 849-50 (1966) [hereinafter tenBroek, The Right to Live
in the World]; Jacobus S. tenBroek and Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of
Welfare, 54 CAL. L. REv. 809, 816 (1966) [hereinafter tenBroek, The Disabled and the
Law of Welfare].
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separate institutions. The newer integrative approach fo-
cuses attention upon the needs of the disabled as those of
normal and ordinary people caught at a physical and so-
cial disadvantage. The effect of custodialism is to magnify
physical differences into qualitative distinctions; the effect
of integrationism is to maximize similarity, normality, and
equality as between the disabled and the able-bodied. 548
Noting that integration emphasizes people with disabilities "poten-
tial for full participation as equals in the social and economic life of
the community," tenBroek concluded that integration was both the
more equitable and the more practical option. 549
In the second article, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled
in the Law of Torts, tenBroek posited that people with disabilities
have a constitutional right to freedom of movement and argued
that artificial barriers that keep such individuals from moving
throughout society are illegal.550 His ideas of the choice between
custodialism and integration and of the legal system's role in pro-
tecting the legal rights of individuals with disabilities accurately
framed the issues that would later be addressed by the Disability
Rights Movement. 55'
Congress and other governmental bodies have come down sol-
idly on the integration side of tenBroek's two alternatives. 552 In
1974, Congress officially embraced the goal of integration of peo-
ple with disabilities when it declared: "[I] t is essential ... that the
complete integration of all individuals with handicaps into normal
community living, working, and service patterns be held as the final
objective. '553 In a related statutory finding, Congress stated that "it
is of critical importance to this Nation that equality of opportunity,
equal access to all aspects of society and equal rights guaranteed by
548. tenBroek, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, supra note 547, at 816.
549. Id. at 815.
550. See tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World, supra note 547, at 849-50 (not-
ing denial of equal access to public places is unconstitutional as well as socially and
morally wrong).
551. See, e.g.,JOsEPH P. SHAPIRO, No Prr. PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIEs FORGING A
NEW CIvIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 5, 11 (1993) (noting background of disability rights
movement).
552. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 701(a) (6) (B) (1994) ("[T]he goals of the Nation
properly include the goal of providing individuals with disabilities with the tools
necessary to... achieve equality of opportunity, full inclusion and integration into
society, employment, independent living, and economic and social self-suffi-
ciency."); 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (8) (1994) ("[T]he Nation's proper goals regarding
individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation,
independent living, and economic self sufficiency for [disabled] individuals.").
553. S.REP. No. 93-1297, at 34 (1974).
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the Constitution of the United States be provided to all individuals
with handicaps. '" 554 The Senate Committee report accompanying
this legislation expressed its understanding that people with disabil-
ities have a "basic human right of full participation in life and
society." 555
Subsequently, Congress has repeatedly endorsed integration as
the national policy regarding individuals with disabilities. 556 In
amending section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in 1978, the Senate
report described the statute as representing a commitment by Con-
gress to people with disabilities that "to the maximum extent possi-
ble, they shall be fully integrated into the mainstream of life in
America." 557 In the ADA, Congress identified "full participation" as
a component of "the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals
554. Id. at 56.
555. Id.
556. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (6) (stating national goals include "full inclu-
sion and integration in society"); 29 U.S.C. § 760(1) (stating purpose of rehabilita-
tion research, demonstration and training projects is to "maximize the full
inclusion and integration into society"); 29 U.S.C. § 796 (stating that purpose of
independent living services to promote "integration and full inclusion of individu-
als with disabilities into the mainstream of American society").
In establishing and funding programs and services for people with develop-
mental disabilities, Congress has established a goal of integration and inclusion
into the community. The national goals established by the legislation include:
[P]roviding individuals with developmental disabilities with the opportu-
nities and support to-
(A) make informed choices and decisions;
(B) live in homes and communities in which such individuals can
exercise their full rights and responsibilities as citizens;
(C) pursue meaningful and productive lives;
(D) contribute to their family, community, State, and Nation;
(E) have interdependent friendships and relationships with others;
and
(F) achieve full integration and inclusion in society, in an individual-
ized manner, consistent with unique strengths, resources, priorities, con-
cerns, abilities, and capabilities of each individual.
42 U.S.C. § 6000(a)(10) (1994). Integration and inclusion into the community is
defined as:
(A) the use by individuals with developmental disabilities of the same
community resources that are used by and available to other citizens;
(B) living in homes close to community resources, with regular con-
tact with citizens without disabilities in their communities;
(C) the full and active participation by individuals with developmen-
tal disabilities in the same community activities and types of employment
as citizens without disabilities, and utilization of the same community re-
sources as citizens without disabilities, living, learning, working, and en-
joying life in regular contact with citizens without disabilities; and
(D) having friendships and relationships with individuals and fami-
lies of their own choosing.
Id. § 6001(15).
557. S. REP. No. 95-890, at 39 (1978).
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with disabilities. '558 A federal district court has declared that "in
enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Congress af-
firmed that section 504 prohibits unnecessary segregation and re-
quires reasonable accommodations to provide opportunities for
integration."5 5 9 In 1992, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act
to expressly endorse the full participation, inclusion and integra-
tion approach. 5 60
Regulations under both section 504 and the ADA have consist-
ently endorsed the integrative approach. The original regulations
of HEW under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibited the
provision of "different or separate" aids, benefits or services, and
provided that such aids, benefits and services were to be provided
"in the most integrated setting appropriate to the person's
needs."56 1 Covered employers were directed not to "segregate ...
applicants or employees in any way that adversely affects their op-
portunities or status" because of disability.5 6 2 These provisions of
the section 504 regulations were adopted and elaborated on in the
statutory language of the ADA and the regulations issued to imple-
ment it.563
B. The Problem-Social Differentiation
Opposing the societal goals of integration and full participa-
tion are the problems of widespread prejudice and discrimination
against people with disabilities. Discrimination on the basis of disa-
558. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (8) (1994); see, e.g., Anderson v. Little League
Baseball, 794 F. Supp. 342, 344 (D. Ariz. 1992) (referring to "full participation"
policy under ADA and stating "we must bring Americans with disabilities into the
mainstream of society, 'in other words, full participation in and access to all as-
pects of society"' (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 35 (1990))). For a thorough
discussion of congressional mandates of integration for people with disabilities in
the ADA and prior legislation, and of the implications of the integration approach,
see Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64
TEMPLE L.Q. 393 (1991).
559. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 784 F. Supp. 215, 224 (E.D.
Pa. 1992).
560. The 1992 amendments incorporate a finding that individuals with disa-
bilities have a right to "enjoy full inclusion and integration in the economic, polit-
ical, social, cultural, and educational mainstream of American society." 29 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(3)(F) (1994).
561. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b) (1) (iv) (1997).
562. Id. § 84.11(a) (3).
563. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(B) (1994) ("Goods, services, facilities, privi-
leges, advantages, and accommodations shall be afforded to an individual with a
disability in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individ-
ual."); 28 C.F.R. § 36.203 (1997) ("A public accommodation shall afford goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations to an individual
with a disability in the most integrated setting appropriate.").
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bility takes two different basic forms, each of which results in peo-
ple with disabilities being thrust into a position that is unnecessarily
different from that of other people, i.e., "socially differentiated. '" 564
In the first type of discrimination, people with disabilities are
singled out and identified as having a characteristic that makes
them significantly different from other people. 565 Others may react
with discomfort, patronization and pity, stereotyping, blame or
other negative attitudes. As a result, individuals with disabilities
find themselves shunned, excluded, overprotected, segregated and
otherwise channeled away from equal participation with their fel-
low citizens in the mainstream of society. This type of discrimina-
tion is reminiscent of race, gender and religious discrimination in
that it involves an overreaction by others to a particular characteris-
tic of an individual, i.e., prejudice.
The second type of discrimination on the basis of disability re-
sults from ignoring the actual differences in mental and physical
attributes and structuring services, facilities, programs and opportu-
nities as if everyone were an "ideal user ... in the prime of the life
cycle and... [with] maximum physical and mental capabilities." 566
This form of discrimination often stems, not so much from preju-
dice or antipathy, but from "simple thoughtlessness" and "over-
sight."567 This is an approach that the U.S. Civil Rights Commission
has called "an out-of-sight, out-of-mind attitude" toward people with
disabilities that "has led to their being overlooked in the planning
564. See PRUDENCE M. RAINS ET AL., THE LABELING APPROACH To DEVIANCE 88,
94 (Nicholas Hobbs ed., 1975). The authors wrote:
The distinction [between having a disability and not having a disabil-
ity] is not "given," so to speak, by reality. Instead, salient and socially
meaningful differences among persons (and acts) are a product of our
ways of looking, our schemes for seeing and dealing with people. Thus,
people are made different-that is, socially differentiated-by the process
of being seen and treated as different in a system of social practices that
crystallizes distinctions between deviant and conventional behavior and
persons. For example, the legal definition of blindness is clear-cut, but it
includes poorly sighted persons as well as persons who are totally im-
paired visually. The legal definition therefore serves to crystallize blind-
ness as both a social status and an experience of self for those persons
who might not otherwise have defined themselves as blind.
Id. at 94.
565. See NETTIE BARTEL & SAMUEL GUSKIN, A HANDICAP AS A SOCIAL PHENOME-
NON 75, 76 (William Cruickshank ed., 1971) ("It is an imputation of difference
from others; more particularly, imputation of an undesirable difference.").
566. Michael Morgan, Beyond Disability: A Broader Definition of Architectural Bar-
riers, AM. INST. ARCH. J. 50, 50-51 (1976).
567. See KENT HULL, THE RIGHTS OF PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED PEOPLE 67
(1979).
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process and has resulted in the creation of barriers to their
integration."56 8
Such disregard for the existence and individual characteristics
of people with disabilities, perhaps based on an assumption that
there are "normal" people who can participate and people with
physical and mental disabilities who cannot, ultimately operates as
another mechanism by which such individuals are made unnecessa-
rily different. Consider a group of people attending a conference
who decide to go out together for lunch. The person who uses a
wheelchair may be just "another member of the gang" until they
arrive at the restaurant and find that the dining room is down a
flight of stairs and there is no elevator. Suddenly, the person who
uses a wheelchair is made very different from the others. Similarly,
the members of a board of directors may operate as equals and col-
leagues, but the delivery of a key, last-minute report in written
form, without a tape recorded or braille version, suddenly puts the
member who is blind at a severe disadvantage and makes him or
her very different from all the rest. Like the first form of discrimi-
nation, the second results in the individual with a disability being
singled out as different and denied an opportunity to participate on
equal terms with everyone else.
In analysis that roughly identifies these two different dynamics
of discrimination, the United States Supreme Court recognized
"well-catalogued instances of invidious discrimination against the
handicapped" that exist alongside discrimination that is the prod-
uct "of thoughtlessness and indifference-of benign neglect. '569
The Court also quoted congressional declarations that discrimina-
tion against people with disabilities is one of America's "shameful
oversights" that causes individuals with disabilities "to live among
society 'shunted aside, hidden, and ignored"' and that such dis-
crimination constitutes "glaring neglect" by our society.570
568. See S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 56 (1974). The Civil Rights Commission also
quotes from the Senate report accompanying the 1974 amendment to the Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973 (that added the three-prong definition of disability) as follows:
Until this Nation has the foresight to include in all of its planning
the need to make all areas of society accessible and usable to individuals
with handicaps, they will continue to be excluded and will have little or
no opportunity to achieve their basic human right of full participation in
life and society.
Id.
569. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 n.12 (1995).
570. Id. at 295-96.
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C. The Solutions
1. Recognizing the Spectrum of Abilities
The first prerequisite for addressing disability discrimination is
to come to grips with the underlying reality of human abilities and
disabilities. Though we are conditioned to think otherwise, human
beings do not really exist in two sharply distinct groups, people with
disabilities and those without disabilities. The "spectrum of abili-
ties" concept seeks to describe how things really are and recognizes
that some arbitrariness inheres in the determination that'a certain
degree of impairment of particular functions constitutes disability.
The spectrum of abilities concept received its most compre-
hensive articulation in and entered disability rights legal analysis
through the U.S. Civil Rights Commission.571 In a chapter devoted
to "Orienting Principles" in disability nondiscrimination law, the
U.S. Civil Rights Commission included a section titled "The Spec-
trum of Physical and Mental Abilities."572 It noted that while our
laws and the general public usually assume that people with disabili-
ties are significantly impaired in ways that make them sharply distin-
guishable from nondisabled people, the underlying reality is not so
easily categorized; instead of two separate and distinct classes,
"there are spectrums of physical and mental abilities that range
from superlative to minimal or nonfunctional."573
To illustrate this spectrum phenomenon, the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission examined the faculty of sight:
The simplistic categorization of "blind" and "sighted;" for
example, actually covers infinite gradations and variations
of the ability to see. Vision is not one-dimensional, but
rather involves a number of component functions, such as
seeing at a distance, distinguishing colors, focusing on
nearby objects, seeing in bright light, seeing in shade or
darkness, seeing to the side and so on. For each such vis-
ual function there is a range of abilities. For example, at
one end of the visual acuity spectrum are the few people
with unusually sharp eyesight-those who can read finer
print than that on the bottom of a doctor's eye chart. At
571. See ROBERT L. BURGDORF JR., THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED PER-
SONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT 11 (1980) ("From the broad spectrum of
human characteristics and capabilities certain traits have been singled out and
called handicaps. The fine line between handicapped and normal has been arbitrar-
ily drawn by the 'normal' majority."):
572. See ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 18, at 87-89.
573. Id. at 87.
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the other end are the tiny proportion with no vision what-
soever. The vast majority of people fall somewhere be-
tween these two extremes. A similar continuum occurs in
other component functions of the ability to see. 574
The U.S. Civil Rights Commission noted examples of the range
of ability in regard to other visual functions-differences in visual
fields varying from tunnel vision to excellent peripheral vision, and
variations in the way the eyes focus, including at one extreme, con-
ditions such as amblyopia, so-called "lazy eye. '575 It also observed
that there are great variations in the parity or disparity of an indi-
vidual's eyes, with some having almost equal vision in both eyes,
others having clearly superior vision in one eye and inferior vision
in the other eye and some having vision in only one eye. 576
A similar spectrum or continuum occurs with each other
human function, whether it is intelligence, mental health and emo-
tional stability, ability to walk, ability to perform manual functions,
hearing or speech. Regarding so-called intelligence quotient (IQ)
measurements, the Civil Rights Commission quoted an authority on
psychological assessment:
One level of intelligence merges into the next, just as col-
ors do when seen through a refracting prism. Levels of
behavior that present certain patterns are called defective,
still others dull-normal, and so on until the other end of
the scale is reached, at which point they are labeled as
"very superior" or "genius." In the general population this
spread of intelligence follows what is usually referred to as
a normal distribution curve.5 77
In regard to mental health, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission
noted that "mental health and emotional stability occur as a contin-
574. Id.
575. See id. at 87 n.2.
576. See id.
577. Id. at 88 n.3 (quoting KARL FISHLER, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CHILD AND
His FAMILY 176 (Richard Koch &James C. Dobson eds., 1976)). The Civil Rights
Commission added that even this picture of intelligence is too simplistic:
[E]ven those with identical IQ scores differ widely in their ability to deal
with various aspects of daily life.
Intellectual ability also varies with regard to different subject matters:
Some people are better at mathematical concepts than literature, some
do well at history but not science, and so on. Thus intelligence is a spec-
trum of relative degrees, not composed of distinct groups or susceptible
to the drawing of sharp lines.
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uum, and people exhibit every imaginable degree of being in touch
with reality and ability to cope with the demands of life. '578 The
United States Supreme Court has observed: "At one time or an-
other every person exhibits some abnormal behavior which might
be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional dis-
order, but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is gener-
ally acceptable." 579 The U.S. Civil Rights Commission elaborated:
"From this hazy standard of relative normality, the mental health
spectrum continues through an overlapping range of conditions la-
beled personality disorders, psychosomatic reactions, neuroses, and
psychoses. Within each of these categories of psychiatric labels,
there are endless variations and degrees."580 The American Psychi-
atric Association (APA) has recognized that the boundaries be-
tween mental health and a mental disorder, and between various
particular mental disorders, are blurry. In explaining its list of
mental disorders, the APA has observed: "There is no assumption
that each mental disorder is a discrete entity with sharp boundaries
(discontinuity) between it and other mental disorders, or between
it and no mental disorder."58'
Various other conditions considered disabilities, including epi-
lepsy, cosmetic disfigurements and learning disabilities, though
commonly thought of as distinct and homogenous conditions, actu-
ally consist of a wide range of conditions with infinite gradations
and variations.5 82
578. Id. at 88.
579. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426-27 (1979).
580. ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 18, at 88 n.4.
581. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MAN-
UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-IV) xxii (4th ed. 1994).
582. See ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 18, at 88-89 (discussing
range of conditions associated with disabilities). The U.S. Civil Rights Commission
noted that epilepsy consists of a range of seizure disorders and explained:
A seizure is an abnormal electrical discharge by nerve cells in the brain.
The effects of these discharges range from the dramatic to the relatively
inconsequential, depending upon the number of cells involved, the area
in which they are located, and the duration and frequency of the dis-
charges. Seizures range from the petit mal, an almost unnoticeable loss
of consciousness for a few seconds, to the grand mal, which may last 2 or
3 minutes or more and involve a sudden loss of consciousness, falling to
the ground, temporary interruption of breathing, and general convulsive
or shaking movements. There are all sorts of variations in the manner of
onset, the parts of the body affected, the individual's awareness of the
occurrence, the severity of the seizure, and its aftereffects. The effective-
ness of medication also varies among individuals, eliminating seizures for
some, reducing the frequency for others, and failing completely for some
others. The end result is a wide range of seizure conditions.
Id. at 88 n.5.
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In one case involving the education rights of children with dis-
abilities, the United States Supreme Court characterized the disabil-
ities of children as a "spectrum" varying greatly at the extremes
"with infinite variations in between. ' 58 3 Such differences in the
scope and degree of various impairments and limitations are fur-
ther complicated by wide variations in the applicability and efficacy
of equipment, devices and techniques for dealing with such limita-
tions. "Wheelchairs, braces, walkers, crutches, prosthetic devices,
canes, hearing aids, eyeglasses, and other devices may enhance the
abilities of different persons to different degrees." 58 4 Techniques,
such as signing, speech reading and braille may be easy to master
and very beneficial for one individual, moderately helpful for a sec-
ond person and nearly impossible or frustrating for a third
individual.
The result of such complexities and nuances is that for each
human function, some individuals excel, some perform minimally
or not at all and others perform at all levels and gradations in be-
tween. 585 Regarding this spectrum notion of human abilities, the
U.S. Civil Rights Commission noted: "This simple concept's rele-
vance to discrimination lies in the frequency with which it is ig-
nored. Instead of discerning the range of individual abilities,
society categorizes people as either blind or sighted, either epileptic
or not epileptic, either handicapped or normal. '58 6
2. Flexibility in Structuring Tasks and Programs
The inaptness of sharp distinctions based upon degrees of im-
pairment of mental and physical abilities is underscored by recogni-
tion of the important role that context plays in conceptions of
disability and "normality." A person may perform some mental or
physical function in a way that falls short of most other people, but
the limitations imposed upon that individual frequently result as
much from the social context as from the impaired function it-
self.587 This idea of relativity of impairments was perhaps described
most explicitly in the decision of a federal district court:
583. See Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202
(1982).
584. ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 18, at 89.
585. See id.
586. Id.
587. See id. at 89, 90 ("Concepts of normality and abnormality and of ability
and disability have no real meaning unless they are considered in the context of
the nature and purpose of a particular task or activity.").
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Human talent takes many forms, and within each talent is
a continuum of achievement. While one individual might
be on the high end of the scale of achievement in one
area, that same individual might rank very low in another
area .... In sum, the identification of various gradations
of handicap is not an easy task, especially if such is at-
tempted in a vacuum. Assessing the capability of various
individuals to perform without knowledge of the particu-
lar task under consideration and its various requirements,
or without an individualized determination of their
strengths and weaknesses would appear to be
impossible.5 8
Under this approach, an accurate assessment of a person's suit-
ability for a particular job slot must entail an individualized ap-
praisal of that person's strengths and weaknesses in the particular
tasks the job entails. To the notion that disabilities are relative in
light of the context, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission's report sug-
gested a refinement-the concept of flexibility in the structuring of
tasks and programs:
It is often incorrectly assumed that there is only one
way of doing something-the customary way that "normal"
people do it. But programs, activities, and facilities may
actually be organized and structured in a variety of ways.
The assignment of tasks and the methods of performing
them can be changed in response to the abilities and char-
acteristics of the person involved ....
Although it is sometimes difficult to see alternatives
when "things have always been done that way," the tasks
that comprise most jobs are often easily changed. 58 9
588. Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 206 (D.N.H. 1981).
589. ACCOMIMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 18, at 90. The Civil Rights
Commission provided a concrete illustration of this inherent flexibility in structur-
ing tasks:
A secretarial position, for example, frequently requires filing, answering
the telephone, taking dictation, and ordering supplies.' But no factor in-
herent in the position of secretary demands that all the secretaries in the
same office be able to do the same things. In an office with several secre-
taries, these tasks might be assigned in various ways to achieve the same
results despite different functional limitations. For example, a person
with no hearing might perform typing, filing and ordering supplies (and
perhaps take dictation by lipreading) but not answer telephones.
In addition, there are several different ways of performing each sec-
retarial task. Dictation, for example may be taken with a tape recorder
instead of shorthand; letters can be typed on a word processor that vocal-
izes letters or words that appear on the screen instead of a standard type-
1997]
115
Burgdorf: Substantially Limited Protection from Disability Discrimination:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
In addition to the spectrum of human abilities, these ideas-of
the role of context in determining impairment, of the need for in-
dividualized assessment in relation to particular tasks and of inher-
ent flexibility in the structuring of programs, jobs and other
opportunities-are key components for an understanding analysis
of disability nondiscrimination law.
3. Appropriate Consideration of Disabilities
a. Flawed Options
The foregoing suggests that simplistic solutions to the problem
of disability discrimination are not the answer. A traditional goal of
laws prohibiting other kinds of discrimination has been to achieve a
situation in which everyone is treated exactly the same way-what
the U.S. Civil Rights Commission has called "neutrality toward class
characteristics. '" 590 The elimination of discrimination based on race
has at times been articulated as "color blindness." While debates
have raged as to whether this is a present operational principle or
only a long-term goal, "color blindness" is a desirable ultimate
objective. 591
Identical treatment of people with and without disabilities,
however, cannot address many of the dynamics that cause this type
of discrimination. To say that everyone is treated equally is no an-
swer to the obstacle posed by a flight of stairs to many people with
disabilities. 592 Because people's abilities in relation to particular
functions and tasks vary widely, inadequate consideration of such
writer. In each case, one functional ability substitutes for another that
may be impaired or missing.
Id.
590. Id. ("With regard to race, sex, and national origin, anti-discrimination
laws aim to eliminate consideration of race, sex, and national origin from decisions
regarding rights, benefits, and services.").
591. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("At least where state or local action is at issue, only a social
emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb... can justify an
exception to the principle embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment that '[o]ur
Constitution is color blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citi-
zens.'" (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing))); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 327 (1978). (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[C]laims that the law must be 'color-
blind' or that the datum of race is no longer relevant to public policy must be seen
as aspiration rather than as description of reality.").
592. See 118 CONG. REc. 11363 (1972). In a floor statement made in 1972,
Congressman Vanik observed that "Greyhound has an official policy that states if
an individual cannot walk onto the bus on his own power he cannot ride the bus."
Id. Likewise, to say that everyone is treated equally is of no avail to a person who is
deaf and is staying in a hotel where guests are being warned of fire by alarm bells.
Treating everyone alike is hardly a helpful justification when an employer insists
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differences leads to numerous examples of denial of equal opportu-
nities. In fact, the Supreme Court of Washington has articulated
that "[i]dentical treatment may be a source of discrimination." 593
An identical treatment approach in regard to disabilities gives "the
form, but not the substance, of equal opportunity."5 94
Because equal treatment may be a form of discrimination, the
U.S. Civil Rights Commission concluded that discrimination on the
basis of disability and its remedies "differ in important ways from
other types of discrimination and their remedies."595 The Civil
Rights Commission quoted with approval the conclusion of one fed-
eral court which stated that attempting to fit the problem of disabil-
ity discrimination into the remedial scheme devised for race
discrimination is "akin to fitting a square peg into a round hole."59 6
Discounting differences in physical and mental abilities and treat-
ing all people as if they come out of the same mold does not permit
the planning for differences and individualized appraisal of, and
adjustments to, physical and mental impairments that are essential
to avoiding or eliminating discrimination on the basis of disability.
At the other extreme, singling out people with disabilities as a
distinctive group needing special treatment is equally unworkable
and perhaps even more injurious. The U.S. Civil Rights Commis-
sion has charged that the delineation of a societal grouping of "dis-
abled" people is a "distortion of reality [that] breaks an infinite
spectrum of human functions into two distinct categories,"5 97 and
"fosters the erroneous idea that all people who differ significantly
from the norm in regard to any functional ability are somehow
alike and should be treated similarly to each other and differently
from the rest of society." 598 The classification and labeling of peo-
ple with disabilities as a distinctive status group in society is not
merely a cause of discrimination, it is the "wellspring" and the "es-
sence" of discrimination on the basis of disability.599
The perception that people with disabilities are distinctively
different and "special" is closely associated with attitudes of pa-
tronization and pity that most individuals with disabilities decry.
on handwritten reports and one worker's multiple sclerosis makes it impossible for
him or her to write by hand.
593. Holland v. Boeing Co., 583 P.2d 621, 623 (Wash. 1978).
594. ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 18, at 99.
595. Id. at 149.
596. Id.
597. Id.
598. Id. at 96.
599. See id. at 94, 97.
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One commentator has labeled this type of oversolicitousness as "be-
nevolent paternalism. ' 60 0 Another authority observed that, at their
root, such attitudes are based on "a belief that such poor, blighted
creatures as these must be protected from the world, instead of
helped to become part of it."601
b. The Right Route
In lieu of the extremes of overreaction and identical treat-
ment, a constructive approach neither exaggerates people's physi-
cal and mental differences nor ignores their actual functional
limitations.60 2 Such an approach must accept that disability is a nat-
ural part of the human condition resulting from the spectrum of
human abilities60 3 and will touch most of us at some time in our
lives. 604 The goal is not to fixate on, overreact to, or ' engage in
stereotypes about such differences, but to take them into account in
the planning and dispensing of programs, services and facilities,
and in allowing for reasonable accommodation for individual abili-
ties and impairments that will permit equal participation. Such an
approach would seek to eliminate unnecessary differentiation, but
also would consider individual differences relevant to the integra-
tion of people with various levels of ability and impairment into job,
consumer, recreational and other societal opportunities. This two-
faceted objective is the goal of nondiscrimination laws such as the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Accomplishing that end demands that
nondiscrimination standards focus principally on the practices and
facilities of the employer, business or provider and only secondarily,
if at all, on the characteristics of the individual seeking protection
from discrimination. The ultimate goal is to provide equal oppor-
tunities for all Americans regardless, of disability, not to identify a
particular group of individuals who are entitled to some kind of
special treatment.
600. KENT HULL, supra note 567, at 21; see ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM,
supra note 18, at 24.
601. RICHARD C. ALLEN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, SOCIAL
AND REHABILITATION SERVICE, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE DISABLED AND DISADVANTAGED
49 (1969).
602. See ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 18, at 144.
603. See 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(3) (1994) ("[D]isability is a normal part of the
human experience."); 42 U.S.C. § 6000(a) (2) (1994) ("[D]isability is a natural part
of the human experience.").
604. See, e.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ACHIEVING INDEPENDENCE:
THE CHALLENGE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (1996) ("Most Americans will experience
disability at some point during their lives, either themselves or within their fami-
lies. Disability is not the experience of a minority of Americans. Rather, like ag-
ing, it is an experience that will touch every American family.").
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c. The Use of the "Individuals with Disabilities" Classification in
Nondiscrimination Laws
Laws that prohibit discrimination based on disability and re-
quire integration incorporate the nondifferentiation and non-
special-treatment approaches. The question arises, then, as to what
terminology, such as "individuals with disabilities," means in the
language of such laws. If all individuals have different combina-
tions of strengths and impairments that fall somewhere on the
"spectrum of abilities" for the particular function at issue, and if no
group of such individuals should be singled out as significantly dif-
ferent from the remainder, then what do laws such as the ADA
mean when they prohibit discrimination against an "individual with
a disability?"
The U.S. Civil Rights Commission provided an explanation in a
footnote in its report on disability discrimination:
The problems created by the handicapped-normal dichot-
omy paradoxically have required the use of the terms
"handicap" and "handicapped person" in Federal and
State legislation. Such terminology gives the appearance
of accepting the handicapped-normal dichotomy. It may
also create an impression that the distinctions between
those labeled handicapped and others are legislatively au-
thorized or mandated. Such appearances should not ob-
scure the fact that Federal laws use these terms in
remedial and rational ways to provide opportunities and
services previously unavailable to many people. It is ap-
propriate to speak of a class of handicapped people when
certain individuals have been singled out, designated
handicapped, and treated poorly as a result. To rectify
this situation, legislative remedies have to focus on the dis-
advantaged class of handicapped persons. 60 5
If the terms "disability" and "individuals with disabilities" are substi-
tuted for the outmoded terms "handicap," "handicapped people"
and comparable phrases, the above statement is as true now as
when the U.S. Civil Rights Commission issued its report in 1983.
The recognition that "individuals with disabilities" is a classifi-
cation created by societal mechanisms that have singled out some
people and caused them to be treated differently from others be-
cause of real or perceived mental or physical impairments has
605. ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 18, at 96 n.22.
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profound consequences. It explains the overriding importance of
the third prong of the definition of disability. If one is regarded as
having a substantial impairment by others, then one has a disability.
Satisfaction of this prong focuses solely on whether a person has
been singled out for different treatment, not upon whatever physi-
cal or mental characteristics the person possesses.
The term "individuals with disabilities" also underscores the
critical difference between laws that provide services and benefits,
on the one hand, and nondiscrimination laws, on the other. The
benefit laws aim to give something to one group of people that is
not made available to others. This necessitates a definite, circum-
scribed standard for determining who can get the services or bene-
fits-an eligibility class. A nondiscrimination law, on the other
hand, aims to provide a remedy for a much less confined class-
anyone who has been subjected to discrimination.
Congress faced a challenge in 1974 when it tried to fashion a
single statutory definition to describe the protection afforded
against discrimination under section 504 and the nondiscrimina-
tion components of sections 501 and 503 of the Rehabilitation Act
and, simultaneously, govern eligibility for "affirmative action"
under the latter two statutes. 60 6 Though affirmative action initia-
tives are designed to address the effects of previous exclusion and
discrimination, such programs operate like a special service in that
they are predicated on a definite class of eligible participants. For
example, covered employers are not free to "count" anyone whom
they choose, but only those meeting the statutory and program cri-
teria. The restrictive language of the first prong of the definition of
disability responds to this need for a definite eligibility class for af-
firmative action purposes, while the second and third prongs give
the expansive breadth needed for the prohibition of discrimina-
tion. When properly understood, the term "individual with a disa-
bility" and the prohibition of discrimination against individuals "on
the basis of disability" under the broad three-prong definition af-
ford protection to any person who has been treated differently or
unequally in relation to a real or perceived mental or physical
impairment.
606. The definition was also designed for use in regard to architectural, trans-
portation and communication barrier removal under section 502 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 792 (1994) (establishing Architectural and Transportation
Barriers Compliance Board).
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d. Is Reasonable Accommodation Special Treatment?
A possible response to much of the foregoing is that disability
rights laws do, in fact, contemplate a special protected class entitled
to something othei persons are not-reasonable accommoda-
tion.60 7 Although court opinions and regulatory comments have
done little to respond to this contention, and indeed may have ad-
ded fuel to its fire, this observation reflects a misunderstanding of
the purpose and dynamics of reasonable accommodation and why
such an element was incorporated into the disability nondiscrimina-
tion analysis. 60 8 Reasonable accommodation was not devised, and
does not operate, as a special service program for individuals with
disabilities. It has its roots in the concept of flexibility in the struc-
turing of tasks and programs. 60 9 It responds to forms of discrimina-
tion that are presumably unintended and habitual, but that
nonetheless present very real obstacles to the participation of those
whose physical and mental abilities fall below the expected norm.
In its seminal report on the concept of reasonable accommodation,
the Civil Rights Commission observed that disability discrimination
"cannot be eliminated if programs, activities, and tasks are always
structured in the ways people with 'normal' physical and mental
abilities customarily undertake them."6 10  Thus, adjustments or
modifications of opportunities-reasonable accommodations-are
necessary to permit people with disabilities to participate fully.611
607. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A), (B) (1994) ("reasonable accommo
dation"); id. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (ii) ("reasonable modifications"); Federal Sector
Equal Employment Opportunity, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(c) (1997) ("[r]easonable
accommodation"); Affirmative Action and Nondiscrimination Obligations of Con-
tractors and Subcontractors Regarding Individuals with Disabilities, .41 C.F.R. § 60-
741.21(f) (1997) ("reasonable accommodation"); Nondiscrimination on the Basis
of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 45
C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1997) ("reasonable accommodation").
608. See Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 923, 940 (E.D.N.C. 1996) ("Although
framed in terms of addressing discrimination, the Act's remedial provisions de-
mand not equal treatment, but special treatment tailored to the claimed disabil-
ity."); see also Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he
Rehabilitation Act imposes on federal employers a positive duty of accommodation
to any known physical or mental handicap of a qualified applicant or employee, as
well as the usual negative duty of nondiscrimination." (parenthetical omitted));
Hurley-Bardige v. Brown, 900 F. Supp. 567, 573 (D. Mass. 1995) ("[T]he Rehabili-
tation Act imposes greater duties on employers than other federal discrimination
statutes," including an "affirmative duty reasonably to accommodate persons with
disabilities.").
609. For a discussion of flexibility in structuring tasks and programs, see supra
notes 587-89 and accompanying text.
610. ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 18, at 102.
611. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1) (1997) (defining "reason-
able accommodation" as "modifications or adjustments" that enable applicant to
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The Supreme Court has recognized that reasonable accommoda-
tion "relates to the elimination of existing obstacles against [indi-
viduals with disabilities]. "612
Such obstacles exist because, in fashioning their facilities and
devising their practices, policies and procedures, public agencies,
employers and businesses make assumptions about the characteris-
tics of their workers, customers, clients and visitors. These assump-
tions are based upon a person with so-called "normal" physical and
mental abilities-the "ideal user." Discriminatory obstacles and
practices are, therefore, either literally built into the workplace or
incorporated into the business's ways of doing things. The reason-
able accommodation obligation merely requires the removal of the
physical obstacle or disadvantaging practice for this particular cus-
tomer, client, employee, applicant or visitor.61 3
The often ignored fact is that, in almost all circumstances, em-
ployers, businesses and government agencies put a great deal of
money and energy into "accommodating" the users of their serv-
ices, facilities and programs without denominating it as such.614
Take a simple example of offices for employees. Before any worker
occupies a particular office, many features have been installed to
facilitate comfort and efficiency: electric lights were installed; the
floor may have been carpeted; telephones have been installed; a
desk and a chair were purchased; perhaps pictures are hung on the
walls; a computer and other office equipment may be provided;
pens, pencils and writing paper are purchased; bookshelves may be
installed, and possibly stocked with a dictionary, reference works
and other relevant books, journals and reports; there may be a ta-
ble, file cabinets and other furniture in the room; in most places,
heating and air conditioning are put in; and if the employer's re-
be considered for position, that enable worker to perform essential job functions
or that enable employees to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment).
612. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 n.20 (1985); see School Bd. v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1987) (stating "[e]mployers have an affirmative
obligation to make a reasonable accommodation for a handicapped employee").
613. See McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222, 227 (7th Cir. 1992) (identify-
ing "the essence of reasonable accommodation" as "a change in the (supposedly
neutral) standard operating procedure").
614. Interview with Susan Daniels, Assistant Commissioner for Disability, So-
cial Security Administration, in Washington, D.C. (May 1995). The gist of this
analysis of reasonable accommodation, fleshed out in the remainder of this Part,
was suggested by Ms. Daniels during discussions with the author in May 1992, in
Washington, D.C. Ms. Daniels reports that she has proffered and promoted this
concept in various presentations dating as far back as 1980. Telephone Interview
with Susan Daniels (Nov. 12, 1997).
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sources permit and the employee is lucky, there may be a window
with some kind of view.
External to the particular office, other accommodations are
supplied: access to a restroom is provided and the toilet, sink and
other fixtures are installed in that room; there may be a coffee
maker and water cooler (and in some office suites even a refrigera-
tor or a mini-kitchen); photocopy and facsimile machines are pro-
vided; possibly parking spaces or some other arrangements for
parking are provided. In addition to office configuration and ac-
cessories, many policies, practices and procedures are based upon
expectations of the usual needs of workers. The work week sched-
ule, meal breaks, coffee breaks, vacation schedules, office parties
and holidays are all arranged with an eye to the presumed needs
and wishes of workers (to a greater or lesser degree depending
upon the solicitousness or austerity of the particular employer).
Of course, the number and type of such furnishings, amenities
and benefits vary greatly depending upon the type of business,
available resources and employer attitudes. Some will not have all
of the accommodations listed here, while others may be much
more posh and generous, with exercise facilities, day-care services,
expensive antique furniture, educational subsidies, paid leave and
numerous other perks. But no matter how sparse or plush a work-
place may be, almost all provide some type of facility, equipment
and supplies to enable employees to perform theirjob duties. Most
provide some types of benefits or services. Nearly all make at least
some concession to human needs.
In making these accommodations for workers, employers gen-
erally engage in assumptions about the characteristics and needs of
employees, and most of the time the assumption is that workers will
have ordinary mental and physical abilities. The choices of office
furnishings, equipment, accessories, services, benefits, policies, pro-
cedures and prerequisites are made with the standard employee in
mind. Even the heights and location of countertops, tables, light
switches, electric outlets and controls are chosen in the context of
the presumed ability of employees to use them.
For many people whose mental and physical abilities deviate
from the norm, some of the various accommodations ordinarily
provided for workers may be largely useless or even counterproduc-
tive. Thus, for a worker with quadriplegia, the desk chair may be
useless, the desk itself may not accommodate the wheelchair, the
restroom facility may not be accessible, the file cabinet and other
furniture in the office may be of less use and perhaps impede move-
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ment into and within the room, the fancy treadmill and the step
machine may not be of much value, and if the carpeting is too
plush, it may impede the individual's ability to traverse the room.
Similarly, the parking space, the pictures on the wall, the nice view,
the photocopy machine and even the lights may be of considerably
less importance to a worker with no vision. 615 The standard com-
puter, without adaptations, may be essentially useless to both of
these workers. Likewise, without adaptation, the standard office tel-
ephone and intercom system, a loudspeaker system and audio fire
alarm will be basically worthless for a worker who cannot hear.
The point is not that employers should somehow anticipate the
actual physical or mental limitations of all future employees and
have the work environment ready to meet their specific needs. It is,
rather, that employers routinely devote considerable energy and
money into providing accommodations for employees based upon
assumptions that workers will have standard physical and mental
characteristics. Reasonable accommodation for workers with disa-
bilities, then, is simply the same type of accommodation that is pro-
vided generally, but it is tailored to the actual needs of the
particular worker for whose benefit it is made. Moreover, available
evidence indicates that the costs of accommodation for workers
with disabilities are not significantly different from the expenses as-
sociated with the employment of other workers. 616
The same observations apply to opportunities and services
other than employment provided by government agencies and pub-
lic accommodations. Stores and shops, for example, make many
accommodations for putative future customers and shoppers (usu-
ally designed to induce them to spend money). Electric lighting,
signs and displays, price tags, service and check-out counters, shop-
ping carts, parking lots, fitting rooms, the loudspeaker system that
announces "Attention K-Mart shoppers," piped-in music, shopping
615. This is not to suggest that a worker who is blind might not wish to have
paintings, a good view and other features for the benefit of visitors, fellow workers
or clients and to signify a level of success or status.
616. See, e.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, VOICES OF FREEDOM: AMERICA
SPEAKS OUT ON THE ADA 19-20 (1995) (citing PETER BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES AcT-TRANSCENDING COMPLIANCE: A CASE REPORT ON
SEARS, ROEBUCK, AND Co. (1994) (reporting that average reasonable accommoda-
tion cost $121, 69% cost nothing, 28% had a cost less than $1000, and 3% ex-
ceeded $1000) and JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK, ACCOMMODATION BENEFIT/
COST DATA 4 (1994) (stating that businesses making reasonable accommodations
got $15.34 in benefit from each $1 spent)); EMPLOYING DISABLED AMERICANS, supra
note 19, at 9 (noting that 75% of managers reported that average cost of hiring
employee with disability is about same as cost of employing worker without
disability).
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bags and product packaging are all examples of accommodations
provided to patrons in the hope of securing their business; each
amenity is designed and executed with the expected characteristics
of people who do not deviate from the physical and mental norm in
mind. Likewise, restaurants and other eating establishments pro-
vide tables and chairs, lighting, menus, tableware, furnishings and
decorations, blackboards posting daily specials, restrooms, sound
systems, parking, carpeting and other accoutrements for the com-
fort and enjoyment of their customers.
Almost every type of business establishment provides accom-
modations for the benefit of its patrons, and many of these accom-
modations will not serve their intended purposes for individuals
with particular physical and mental limitations unless they are mod-
ified. Thus, requiring reasonable modifications of facilities, poli-
cies, practices and procedures is certainly not asking anything
extraordinary or beyond the bounds of that which is already being
supplied to other customers.
Similarly, government facilities open to the public, though
they are sometimes more spartan, take into account and respond to
the expected physical and mental traits of the model user. At a
minimum, they always have electric lighting, and most feature signs
suggesting where to proceed. Government service offices often
provide waiting areas with chairs; where forms need to be filled out
there may be tables or counters; detailed written instruction sheets
are common; most public buildings have restrooms; parking is fre-
quently available; public meeting places have seating and may make
use of microphones and speakers for the benefit of attendees; and
many types of government facilities, such as museums, educational
institutions, public monuments and parks, have numerous other fa-
cilities, furnishings and amenities. These are only a few examples
of accommodations routinely provided for citizens by their govern-
ment agencies, and many of these, unless modified or adjusted, will
be ineffective for people whose mental and physical abilities differ
from the norm.
Properly understood, then, reasonable accommodation is not a
special service for individuals with disabilities. It is a method for
eliminating discrimination that inheres in the planning and organi-
zation of societal opportunities based on expectations of certain
physical and mental characteristics. It is a necessary device for
achieving real equal opportunity, not deviating from it.
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4. People with Disabilities as Regular Joes and Janes
Over thirty years ago, Jacobus tenBroek characterized people
with disabilities as "normal and ordinary people caught at a physical
and social disadvantage. ' 617 In his remark, Professor tenBroek cap-
tured a truth that is both the guiding star and essential foundation
of all of the "orienting principles" that have been presented previ-
ously in this section-that individuals with disabilities are just peo-
ple, not essentially different from other people. Though this
proposition is relatively simple to state, its acceptance is the single
most universal aspiration of most individuals with disabilities, 618 a
central tenet of the Disability Rights Movement and a sine qua non
of real equality for people with disabilities.
This helps to explain why terminology in regard to disabilities
has been a sensitive issue. 619 People with disabilities have come to
recognize that processes by which they are assigned labels have re-
inforced the perception that they are substantially different from
others. In response, they have strongly insisted that "we are 'people
first,"' and have demanded that their common humanity be ac-
knowledged rather than their differences magnified. 620 It also ex-
plains why many individuals with disabilities resist attempts to
characterize them as "special," or their daily accomplishments as
"inspirational" or "courageous." 62 1 At best, such characterizations
617. Jacobus S. tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Wel-
fare, 54 CAL. L. REV. 809, 816 (1966).
618. One research study found that respondents with disabilities who were
asked to identify the objectives that should be pursued in attempting to engender
"the most positive attitudes toward persons with disabilities" identified "dispensing
with the special category of disability entirely" and "promoting attitudes that de-
fend the civil and social rights of disabled persons." Elaine Makas, Positive Attitudes
Toward Disabled People: Disabled and Nondisabled Persons'Perspectives, 44 J. Soc. ISSuEs
49, 58 (1988). For respondents without disabilities, the author of the study charac-
terized the responses as "reflect[ing] a desire to be nice, helpful, and ultimately
place the disabled person in a needy situation." Id.
619. For a discussion of terminology, see supra note 1.
620. SeeJOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 184 (1993). "People First" is the name of a self-advocacy
organization of individuals with disabilities. See id. One of the tenets of People
First is that in referring to people with disabilities, the differentiating characteris-
tic-the disability-should be affixed as a prepositional phrase after the noun that
denotes a common human identity. See id. For example, "person with a disability"
is preferred, not "disabled person" or "the disabled." Id.
6211.. A dramatic illustration of the resistance of people with disabilities to hav-
ing their accomplishments labeled "courageous" or "inspirational" occurred at the
1997 Academy Awards ceremony, when Jessica Yu, the recipient of an Oscar for
"Breathing Lessons," a documentary film about Mark O'Brien, a man with
quadriplegia, noted in receiving the award that the subject of the film did not like
such characterizations and thanked him by declaring: "Mark, it was not your brav-
ery but your humanity that earned this award." See also SHAPIRO, supra note 620, at
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mark the individual as extraordinary and different from the rest of
the population and as one whose accomplishments and success are
a surprise. At worst, they suggest that the speaker really means: "Be-
ing who you are is so bad that I could not face it; I would just give
up," "Your limitations are so severe that I don't see how you accom-
plish anything," or even "I would rather be dead than to live with
your impairments." People with disabilities do not view going
about the tasks and trials involved in their ordinary activities and
trying to achieve accomplishments and success as something atypi-
cal and heroic. 62 2 They would prefer to be seen for what they are,
as ordinary individuals pursuing the same types of goals-love, suc-
cess, sexual fulfillment, contributing to society, material comforts-
as other folks.
The "integration" that is required under the ADA and sections
501, 503 and 504623 and the "full participation" that is the ultimate
objective of federal laws relating to disabilities dictate that individu-
als with disabilities not be unnecessarily differentiated from the rest
of society. To achieve this end, analysis under these laws should not
focus on differentiating characteristics of the individual alleging
discrimination, but instead, on the practices and operations of cov-
ered entities to determine whether they are in fact discriminatory
when examined in light of latent flexibility in structuring and modi-
fying tasks, programs, facilities and opportunities. Legal standards
imposed under these laws should serve to eliminate practices, poli-
33 (rejecting "stereotype that a disabled person should be an inspiration overcom-
ing some challenge"); Susan Nussbaum, "Mishuganismo," Scene 3, reprinted in
Kenny Fries, Starting Back: The Disability Experience from the Inside Out, 367, 375
(1997) ("Miguel thinks I'm brave. That's a common error made by most people
about crips. Disabled people aren't brave to wanna live their lives, they're just sick
of holding that tin cup out all the time"); Elizabeth Clare, "How to Talk to a New
Lover About Cerebral Palsy," reprinted in Fries, supra, at 125 (complaining that
"[c]omplete strangers have patted my head, kissed my cheek, called me
courageous").
622. See Leonard Kriegel, Claiming the Self: The Cripple as American Male, in DIS-
ABLED PEOPLE AS SECOND CLASS CITIZENS 52-63 (Myron G. Eisenberg et al. eds.,
1982) (discussing that some individuals with disabilities take healthy pride (or
sometimes even arrogant pride) in their accomplishments and in surmounting ob-
stacles and disincentives that society has placed in their paths). Professor Kriegel
has written passionately about the pride, deflations, longings and arrogance that
have been part of his struggle to wrest an authentic self in the face of the roles and
expectations that others have tried to foist upon him as a man with a disability.
Kriegel, however, views this struggle as something people with disabilities have in
common with the rest of humanity-"the very essence of what we somewhat glibly
refer to as The Human Condition"-not as a peculiar or distinguishing feature of
a significantly different minority. Id. at 53.
623. For a discussion of integration, the ADA and sections 501, 503 and 504,
see supra notes 547-63 and accompanying text.
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cies, barriers and other mechanisms that discriminate on the basis
of disability, not to eliminate as many people as possible from the
protection provided in these laws. In short, these laws seek to pro-
mote real equality, not to protect a special group.
VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE WRONG COURSE
From the discussion of cases dealing with the scope of protec-
tion afforded under federal disability nondiscrimination laws, it is
possible to deduce that some courts have gone out of their way to
dismiss cases raising claims of discrimination under these laws at
the summary judgment stage. They have done so even though the
cases they were deciding are the types of cases in which summary
judgment is particularly disfavored. 624 Regarding the judicial estop-
pel rulings, one commentator has suggested that most courts "have
evidenced substantial hostility" toward plaintiffs in such cases. 625
Whatever motivations actually foster these restrictive interpre-
tations of the protection afforded by the statutes, 626 many of the
courts making such rulings have suggested majestic rationales for
their positions. Thus, in Forrisi, the progenitor of the one-job-is-not-
enough rulings, the court postulated that "[t]he Rehabilitation Act
assures that truly disabled, but genuinely capable, individuals will not
face discrimination in employment because of stereotypes about
how their handicaps are insurmountable. '" 627 The court added: "It
would debase this high purpose if the statutory protections avail-
able to those truly handicapped could be claimed by anyone whose
disability was minor and whose relative severity of impairment was
624. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 1995)
(finding in ADA case that summary judgment standard "is applied with added
rigor in employment discrimination cases, where intent and credibility are crucial
issues."); Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing sum-
mary judgment for defendant in section 501 and 504 case because "summary judg-
ment should seldom be used in employment discrimination cases"), affd, 79 F.3d
743 (8th Cir. 1996); Fitzgerald v. Allegheny Corp., 904 F. Supp. 223, 227 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) ("Summary judgment in employment discrimination cases must be ap-
proached with great caution .... ").
625. See Mary-Kathryn Zachary, Between A Rock and Hard Place-Disability Bene-
fits and/or ADA Relief, LAB. L.J., Mar. 1997, at 115, 119.
626. The unworkability of simply transferring Title VI and Tide VII analysis to
discrimination based on disability, and a lack of desire to undertake the challenge
of mastering the principles and nuances of disability nondiscrimination law may
help to explain why many courts have seemed reluctant to take on such cases. As
the numbers of ADA cases have grown rapidly, overcrowded dockets may offer
another partial explanation. Offering the theoretical justifications discussed
above, many courts appear to have jumped at the chance to clear such cases from
their dockets.
627. Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).
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widely shared."628 This high-sounding rationale was parroted by
some of the courts that adopted the Forrisi analysis.
629
The notion of protection for only the "truly disabled" has been
reiterated in the context of excluding temporary disabilities from
statutory protection. One federal district court announced that its
ruling was in furtherance of "the paramount interest of Congress in
enacting the ADA [that] was to protect the truly disabled."630 Simi-
larly, in McDonald v. Pennsylvania Department of Welfare,631 the Third
Circuit dismissed the suit of an employee discharged during a tem-
porary absence of seven weeks for abdominal surgery.632 The court
cloaked its ruling in lofty purposes:
To apply the Rehabilitation and [Americans with] Disabili-
ties Acts to circumstances such as those presented here
would be a massive expansion of the legislation and far
beyond what Congress intended. In the absence of statu-
tory language, or even legislative history, indicating that
the Acts are to cover an impairment of such limited dura-
628. Id.
629. See Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Forrisi ra-
tionale and holding that appellant's alleged disability could be described as com-
monplace and did not rise to level of disability); Venclauskas v. Connecticut Dep't
of Pub. Safety, 921 F. Supp. 78, 81 (D. Conn. 1995) (quoting Forrisi rationale and
holding that plaintiffs visual impairment, 20/80 and 20/120, was not unusually
severe or rare and does not limit plaintiffs ability to work); Everette v. Runyon,
911 F. Supp. 180, 184 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (quoting Forrisi rationale and holding that
Rehabilitation Act cannot shield employees whose disabilities render them unable
to perform their jobs); Williams v. Avnet, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1124, 1131-32
(E.D.N.C. 1995) (quoting Fonisi rationale and holding that Fourth Circuit im-
posed "a strong variant" of substantial impairment test in Forrisi), affd sub nom.
Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 1996), and
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1844 (1997); Elstner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 659 F.
Supp. 1328, 1342-43 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (quoting Forrisi rationale and holding that
plaintiff's physical impairment did not substantially limit plaintiffs major life activ-
ities), affd, 863 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57
F.3d 1446, 1460 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that ADA and Rehabilitation Act seek "to
ensure that the truly disabled will not face discrimination").
630. Sutton v. New Mexico Dep't of Children, Youth and Families, 922 F.
Supp. 516, 519 (D.N.M. 1996).
631. 62 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1995).
632. See id. at 97 (affirming district court's dismissal of case). The plaintiff
was hired as a charge nurse on September 8, 1992 by the defendant, Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare. See id. at 93-94. The plaintiff underwent surgery on
December 31, 1992, after becoming disabled with severe abdominal pain. See id.
On January 14, 1993, plaintiff requested that she be placed on unpaid sick leave
until February 14, 1993, at which point she would be able to return to work. See id.
The defendant denied the request because she was still a probationary employee
and, therefore, not eligible for extended sick leave. See id. The court held that the
plaintiff did not qualify for relief under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act because her
inability to work was not permanent. See id. at 96.
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tion, and not within the general concept of handicap, we
cannot conclude that plaintiff was entitled to the benefits
of the legislation. 633
Similarly, the courts that have applied judicial estoppel to pre-
vent recipients of disability benefits from pursuing ADA claims have
asserted that they were doing so to preserve the integrity of the judi-
cial process,634 to prevent the legal system "from being manipulated
by 'chameleonic litigants, ' ' 63 5 to avoid inconsistent results636 and to
keep plaintiffs from "speaking out of both sides of [their]
mouths."63 7 Some courts have invoked the lack of any legislative
history indicating an intent "to provide disability benefits to persons
capable of obtaining gainful employment" and have ruled that it is
the province of the legislatures rather than the courts to authorize
such a "double recovery."638 The courts that have precluded for-
mer employees from filing ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims to
challenge alleged discrimination in regard to benefits have pro-
fessed to be respecting and protecting the statutory language.639
633. Id.
634. See Bennett v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. CIV.A.H-94-3270, 1995 WL
819035, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 1995) (barring plaintiff from claiming discrimina-
tion under ADA where plaintiff had previously claimed total disability for social
security purposes).
635. Blanton v. Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc., 108 F.3d 104, 108 (6th Cir. 1997).
636. See Bennett, 1995 WL 819035, at *2 (discussing purposes of docirine of
judicial estoppel).
637. Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963, 970 (E.D.N.C.
1994); see Bollenbacher v. Helena Chem. Co., 934 F. Supp. 1015, 1028 (N.D. Ind.
1996) (following rationale set forth in Reige/); Miller v. U.S. Bancorp, 926 F. Supp.
994, 1000 (D. Or. 1996) (same); Pegues v. Emerson Elec. Co., 913 F. Supp. 976,
980-81 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (same); Cheatwood v. Roanoke Indus., 891 F. Supp. 1528,
1537-38 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (same); McNemar v. Disney Stores, Inc., No. CIV.A.94-
6997, 1995 WL 390051, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 30, 1995) (same), affid, 91 F.3d 610
(3d Cir. 1996), and cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 958 (1997).
638. McNemar, 1995 WL 390051, at *4; see Bennett, 1995 WL 819035, at *3 (us-
ing similar reason of similar double recovery rationale as in McNemar to deny ADA
claim).
The court in McNemar applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel to the plain-
tiff's ADA claim. See McNemar, 1995 WL 390051, at *4. The court stated that there
is no indication that Congress intended to provide disability benefits to persons
capable of obtaining gainful employment, and that it is the province of the legisla-
ture to authorize such a "double recovery." Id.
639. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181,187 (6th Cir. 1996)
(stating that court should not rewrite statute in way that conflicts with "fairly clear
language"); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 1996) (conclud-
ing that plaintiff did not suffer discrimination cognizable under Title I of ADA
based on statutory language of applicable provisions); Gonzales v. Garner Food
Serv., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1526 (11 th Cir. 1996) (holding plaintiff was not "qualified
individual with disability" within meaning of ADA based on review of statutory lan-
guage), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997).
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The Sixth Circuit, for example, admitted that the actual legislative
intent might have been to let such claims proceed, but concluded
that "[w]e should not try to rewrite the statute in a way that con-
flicts with what appears to be fairly clear language." 640
Despite the various declarations of magnanimous purposes in
these lines of decisions, however, they have had consequences that
have been anything but benevolent. Consistent with the religious
adage which tells us that "[b]y their fruits ye shall know them," 641
this Part will discuss the actual effects these restrictive approaches
to the protection afforded under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act
have produced.
A. Unjust Outcomes, Illogic and Convoluted Reasoning
The "exalted" purposes of the narrow interpretations of statu-
tory protection are belied by the concrete results in litigation in
which these interpretations have been applied. The results in many
of these decisions are manifestly inequitable and, because the con-
striction of the protection against discrimination is at odds with the
underlying aims of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, often illogical.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes counseled that "[t] he life of the law
has not been logic." 642 He did not say that the law's life is illogic,
and yet illogic is at the core of many of the rulings in this area.
Reaching such results has precipitated some exceedingly compli-
cated, convoluted and counterintuitive legal reasoning.
1. Exclusion-from-Only-One-Job Cases
The restrictions on the term "disability," imposed in the name
of reserving the protection of the statute for "the truly disabled,"
have caught many plaintiffs with serious, highly disabling condi-
tions in their webs. The exclusion-from-one-job-is-not-enough
formula has resulted in, or contributed to, the dismissal of ADA or
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act claims by plaintiffs with,
among others, the following kinds of impairments: replacement of
hips and shoulders (as a result of avascular necrosis) ;643 diabetes; 644
640. Parker, 99 F.3d at 187. In Parker, a former employee brought action
against former employer and its insurer under Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act (ERISA) and ADA. Id. at 183. Plaintiffs action stemmed from a termi-
nation of long-term benefits after two years because her disability was deemed to
be caused by a nervous and mental disorder rather than a physical disorder. See id.
641. Matthew 7:20.
642. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
643. See Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 228 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment to employer because employee who un-
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cancer; 645 laryngectomy (removal of larynx) ;646 hemophilia;647
heart attack;648 absence of one eye;649 degenerative hip disease re-
sulting in a limp;650 permanent severe limitations in use of the right
arm and shoulder;651 various serious back injuries; 652 depression
derwent surgeries to replace hips and shoulders failed to show he was substantially
limited under ADA).
644. See Schluter v. Industrial Coils, 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1440 (W.D. Wis. 1996)
(concluding defendant is entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff with dia-
betes could not establish she was disabled under ADA); Gilday v. Mecosta County,
920 F. Supp. 792, 793 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (holding plaintiffs diabetic condition did
not substantially limit his major life activities and was not disability as defined in
ADA); Deckert v. City of Ulysses, Kansas, No. 93-1295-PFK, 1995 WL 580074, at *9
(D. Kan. Sept. 6, 1995) (holding that termination of employee with diabetes did
not violate ADA).
645. See Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 915 (11th Cir.
1996) (holding that cancerous growth on shoulder was not disability under ADA);
Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 189 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding em-
ployee did not establish that breast cancer was "disability" within meaning of
ADA); Demming v. Housing & Redevelopment Auth., 66 F.3d 950, 955 (8th Cir.
1995) (concluding that plaintiff failed to establish that thyroid cancer limited her
major life activities); Andrews v. Jones Truck Lines, 741 F. Supp. 867, 869, 871-72
(D. Kan. 1990) (holding that cancerous tumor on knee was not physical handicap
under state nondiscrimination statute, with analysis based on Rehabilitation Act).
646. See Chastain v. USF & G Corp., No. CIV-95-694-M, 1996 WL 88409, at *2
(W.D. Okla. Jan. 3, 1996) (noting plaintiff with physical impairment failed to sub-
mit evidence that plaintiff was substantially limited in other major life activities-
breathing and speaking).
647. See Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 351 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that plaintiff with hemophilia is not disabled under ADA), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
770 (1997).
648. See Czopek v. General Elec. Co., No. 93 C 7664, 1995 WL 374036, at *3-4
(N.D. Il. June 21, 1995) (granting defendant's summary judgment motion be-
cause plaintiff who suffered mild heart attack failed to prove that defendants did
not accommodate his impairment).
649. See Hallums v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 874 S.W.2d 30 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that plaintiff born without sight in right eye did not have handicap
that triggers protection of antidiscrimination law).
650. See Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 108 (3d Cir. 1996) (dismissing
claim of plaintiff with degenerative hip disease resulting in limp who alleged im-
pairment of major life activity of walking).
651. See Freund v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 930 F. Supp. 613, 615-18
(S.D. Ga. 1996) (dismissing claim of plaintiff with serious limitations in shoulder
involving numerous limitations including inability to push, to pull, to perform
tasks above the shoulder level, to make repetitive motions or to lift anything weigh-
ing more than 10 pounds).
652. See Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 943 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting
pain, numbness and limited ability to lift); Mowat-Chesney v. Children's Hosp., 917
F. Supp. 746, 748 (D. Colo. 1996) (deciding that cervical spine injuries did not
amount to disability under ADA); Partlow v. Runyon, 826 F. Supp. 40, 41 (D.N.H.
1993) (stating that chronic lumbosacral strain did not amount to disability under
ADA).
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and paranoia;653 a six-inch scar on the face resulting in supervisors
calling the employee "scarface;" 654 "bilateral carpal tunnel syn-
drome;"65 5 asthma;65 6. asbestosis; 65 7 HIV infection;658 traumatic
brain injury resulting in vision limitations, memory deficiencies,
problems with verbal fluency, problems abstracting and motor defi-
cits; 6 59 and stroke resulting in the loss of use of the left hand, arm
and leg.6 60 The individuals who had these conditions hardly fit the
Forrisi image of someone "whose disability was minor and whose rel-
ative severity of impairment was widely shared."661 Yet, the claims
of the plaintiffs who had these conditions were thrown out of court
on the basis that the plaintiffs did not have a "disability" under the
statutes. They never had the opportunity to litigate their conten-
tions that their employers had engaged in illegal discrimination
against them.
A closer examination of some such decisions further illustrates
the obvious injustice they have countenanced. For example, one
such case is Redlich v. Albany Law School of Union University,662 in
653. See Palmer v. Cook County Soc. Serv. Dep't, 905 F. Supp. 499, 506 (N.D.
Ill. 1995) (holding that plaintiff did not establish that depression and paranoia
were disabilities under ADA), affd, 117 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 1997).
654. See Van Sickle v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1213,
1215 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (concluding that employee with six-inch scar on face was
not limited in major life activity and, therefore, not disabled under ADA).
655. See Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 384 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding
that employee with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was not qualified individual
with disability under ADA).
656. See Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding
that plaintiff with asthma was not handicapped under Rehabilitation Act because
she was not limited in major life activity); Mobley v. Board of Regents, 924 F. Supp.
1179, 1186-87 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (concluding that plaintiffs asthmatic condition did
not substantially limit her major life activities).
657. See Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 36 (5th Cir.
1996) (concluding shortness of breath when walking up stairs is not sign of disabil-
ity because not major life activity), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1820 (1997). Asbestosis is
"a progressive and often fatal condition of the lungs" that had reduced the Robin-
son plaintiff's lung capacity to 50%. See id.
658. See Cortes v. McDonald's Corp., 955 F. Supp. 531, 532 (E.D.N.C. 1996)
(discussing plaintiffs claim that he was terminated from his employment in viola-
tion of ADA because of HIV-positive status).
659. See Riblett v. Boeing Co., No. 94-1055-PFK, 1995 WL 580053, at *6 (D.
Kan. Sept. 22, 1995) (holding that individual with lack of peripheral vision on one
side and learning impairments is not substantially limited under ADA).
660. See Redlich v. Albany Law Sch. of Union Univ., 899 F. Supp. 100, 106-08
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (deciding that plaintiff who suffered stroke that impaired use of
left leg, arm and hand was not disabled within meaning of ADA because his condi-
tion did not substantially limit or affect his major life activity of teaching).
661. Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986).
662. 899 F. Supp. 100 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
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which the plaintiff, a tenured law professor, suffered a stroke.663
Although the stroke resulted in paralysis of his left hand, arm and
leg, the plaintiff managed to teach his law school classes, to per-
form committee work and even to write some law review articles
after a medical leave of absence for some months.664 This contin-
ued for ten years, when the plaintiff allegedly discovered that the
law school had been secretly granting him smaller annual raises
than those given to other comparable tenured faculty members.665
He alleged that the disparity occurred because of "a discriminatory
bias against him as a disabled individual" and filed a section 504
action.666
The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, ruling that the professor neither had an impairment that sub-
stantially limited a major life activity nor was regarded as having
such an impairment.667 The court opined that the plaintiff's im-
pairment was not one that "substantially affected the major life ac-
tivity of working, such that he was significantly restricted in his
ability to perform the class of job in which he was engaged, that of
law professor."668 As to the "regarded as" contention, the court re-
lied on Forrisi and similar rulings and indicated that the relevant
issue was whether the employer "regards the employee as having a
substantial limitation on his ability to work in general. '669
Perhaps the plaintiff was correct that he had been intentionally
discriminated against because of bias against him based on his disa-
bility. Perhaps he was wrong, and he could not have successfully
proven discrimination. Perhaps he could have produced additional
evidence to prove the presence of bias and to rebut the defendant's
alternative explanations for the salary differentials. 670 In any case,
he never got the chance because he was deemed not to have a disa-
bility and the defendant was granted summary judgment.671
663. See id. at 102.
664. See id. at 106-07.
665. See id. at 102.
666. See id. at 102, 105.
667. See id. at 106-08.
668. Id. at 107.
669. Id. In Redlich, the employer was aware of the plaintiffs basic limitations
but took no actions to accommodate any alleged perceived physical impairment.
Id. The court held that the employer did not "perceive" any limitation. See id.
670. See id. at 108 (noting that law school contended that salary differences
were based on unbiased assessment and were related to substandard performance
by plaintiff).
671. See id. (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment as to claims
brought pursuant to ADA and Rehabilitation Act).
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The plaintiff in Wooten also did not get past the summary judg-
ment stage even though the Eighth Ciruit expressly found that the
defendant employer had fired him because of his disability.672 Hu-
bert Wooten was a ham boner who suffered work-related injuries to
his shoulder that were diagnosed as "bilateral carpal tunnel syn-
drome," "generalized inflammation" and "tendinitis of the left
hand and left shoulder."673 After a period of light duty work, Woo-
ten and his supervisors met to discuss the work restrictions-no
work in a cold environment and limited lifting-prescribed in a
note from his doctor.674 According to the opinion of the Eighth
Circuit, "[t] he supervisors then terminated Wooten, stating that the
termination was due to his disability. '675
The court nonetheless ruled that Wooten did not have a disa-
bility within the meaning of the ADA.676 It recited the Forrisi-in-
spired formula that "[a]n impairment that disqualifies a person
from only a narrow range of jobs is not considered a substantially
limiting one," and concluded that the defendant had not regarded
Wooten as having a disability, because Wooten's impairments "only
appeared to prevent him from performing a narrow range of
meatpackingjobs. ''677 Wooten's employer thus said that he was ter-
minated "due to his disability" and then turned around and success-
fully claimed in court papers that he did not have a disability. This
puts in a different light the comments of various courts, discussed
above, about not permitting litigants "to talk out of both sides of
their mouths."678 Does this concern apply only to plaintiffs and not
defendants?
Wooten is representative of other cases in which plaintiffs have
suffered work-related injuries that prevent them from performing
some job duties, their employers have then discharged them or
forced them out of their jobs by refusing to accommodate their
conditions, and in court papers the employers take the position
that the employees do not have a disability and prevail on summary
672. Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 384 (8th Cir. 1995).
673. See id.
674. Id.
675. Id.
676. See id. at 386.
677. Id. (quoting Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 32 F.3d 718 (2d Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1095 (1995)).
678. Id. For a discussion of cases in which courts apply judicial estoppel to
prevent litigants from talking "out of both sides of their mouths," see supra note
637 and accompanying text.
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judgment.679 It is difficult to see how these decisions further any
conceivable policy of the ADA and sections 501, 503 and 504, each
of which seeks to eliminate discrimination against employees and to
get employers to make accommodations.
Taking the one-job-is-not-enough approach to an extreme, a
federal district court in North Carolina viewed the congruence of a
substantial limitation in working and being qualified as "impossi-
ble." In Everette v. Runyon,680 the court, examining a situation in
which the plaintiff claimed to have been discharged because of his
impaired vision, declared:
Of course, it is impossible to demonstrate that one is both
completely disabled from work, thus qualifying as a pro-
tected member of the Rehabilitation Act class, while at the
same time fully capable of performing the work as well as
anyone else .... For purposes of claiming job discrimina-
tion based on handicap, the protected group cannot in-
clude those completely unable to work by reason of their
disability. Any language in the code of federal regulations
that suggests otherwise is superfluous. The "major life ac-
tivity" cited by handicapped or disabled plaintiffs as the
basis for their claims of discrimination cannot be the very
ability to work.681
Applying the Forrisi one-job-is-not-enough rationale, the court in
Everette concluded that the plaintiff was not a member of "the pro-
tected group."682 At the same time, the court ruled that plaintiff's
vision limitation rendered him not "qualified."683 Simultaneously,
679. See, e.g., Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 526 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that stress-induced temporal mandibular joint disorder did not
make employee disabled under ADA and did not obligate employer to provide
reasonable accommodation); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 944 (10th Cir.
1994) (finding grocery warehouse employee was not substantially limited in major
life activity after work-related injury); McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc.,
878 F. Supp. 1012, 1016 (E.D. Ky. 1995) (granting summary judgment to factory
employer who denied job accommodation requests by worker diagnosed with car-
pal tunnel syndrome brought on by repetitive factory work); Taylor v. Albertson's,
Inc., 886 F. Supp. 819, 823 (W.D. Okla. 1995) (finding insufficient evidence of
nature and duration of work-related injury to overcome summary judgment in
favor of employer). See also Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718 (2d Cir.
1994) (involving plaintiff whose asthma was seriously aggravated by air in blood
bank); Fruend v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 930 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Ga. 1996)
(involving plaintiff injured in altercation with coworker).
680. 911 F. Supp. 180 (E.D.N.C. 1995).
681. Id. at 183-84.
682. Id. at 184-85.
683. Id. at 185.
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then, Everette's condition was ruled too insubstantial to amount to
a disability and so substantial that it rendered him -not qualified.
Another example of the illogic inherent in this line of cases is
provided by Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hospita 68 4 which involved a wo-
man with asthma and bronchiectasis who alleged that her em-
ployer, the hospital, had refused to accommodate her condition
and had demoted and discharged her because of it.685 Although
the plaintiff desired the hospital to transfer her to a work area other
than the unventilated blood bank that caused her to experience
serious respiratory problems, because of the one-job-is-not-enough
standard applied by the court, it was the hospital, not the plaintiff,
that benefitted from evidence that the air in the blood bank was the
source of her difficulties. The Second Circuit observed that
"Mount Sinai proved . . .that it was the conditions of the blood
bank that worsened her asthmatic symptoms, leaving no genuine
issue of material fact as to what caused her respiratory problems at
her place of employment. '" 68 6 One might have thought that this
statement would precipitate summary judgment for the plaintiff on
the reasonable accommodation issue, but because of the Forrisi rea-
soning, the court in Heilweil ruled that the plaintiff was not disabled
because she "was medically restricted from working in only one
place in the hospital-the blood bank"-and affirmed summary
judgment in favor of the defendant. 68 7
The Sixth Circuit has identified another aspect of illogic in For-
risi and its progeny. In Taylor v. United States Postal Service,688 the
court noted the language in Forrisi declaring that permitting every
unsuccessful applicant who was rejected because of a job require-
ment to be deemed as having a disability "would stand the Act on its
head. '" 68 9 In response, the Sixth Circuit declared:
However, a per se rule that never permitted an unsuccess-
ful job applicant to prove he was perceived as being handi-
684. 32 F.3d 718 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1095 (1995).
685. Id. at 721. Bronchiectasis is a change in the lining of the lung that ren-
ders it more sensitive and susceptible to fluid infiltration and infection. See id.
686. Id. at 723.
687. Id. at 724.
688. 946 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir. 1991). In Taylor, the court found that the de-
fendant's determination that the applicant with back and knee impairments was
medically unqualified for positions as mail carrier and distribution clerk was suffi-
cient to establish it had regarded the plaintiff as having a disability. Id. at 1218.
The Taylor court also permitted the applicant "to prove he was perceived as being
handicapped by pointing to the fact that he did not possess a so-called job require-
ment due to physical impairment." Id.
689. Id. (quoting Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986)).
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capped by pointing to the fact that he did not possess a so-
called job requirement due to physical impairment would
likewise stand the Act on its head. How else would a per-
son who, for example, had a cosmetic disfigurement ever
prove that he was handicapped under the Act except by
pointing to the fact that an employer did not hire him for
that reason. 690
This example serves to demonstrate the fact that it is the employer's
conduct that it is at issue in a nondiscrimination case not the exact
dimensions of the plaintiff's condition.
The cases discussed here provide only a sampling of the unto-
ward results engendered by the restrictive interpretation of impair-
ments to the activity of working. One commentator has catalogued
and explored some of the doctrinal and practical consequences of
the one-job-is-not-enough analysis suggested in the EEOC regula-
tions and imposed in the Rehabilitation Act decisions.691 He ob-
served that such analysis and decisions contain the following
deficiencies: (1) inadequate accounting for the employee's training
and expectations; 692 (2) restricting the protection afforded to non-
skilled employees; 693 (3) failing to assume that all other similarly
situated employers will apply the same exclusionary criteria; 694 (4)
rewarding employers for saying one thing and doing another;695
(5) imposing an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs;69 6 (6) re-
warding the first-in-time discriminator;697 (7) rewarding big-city dis-
criminators;698 and (8) ignoring the fact that the loss of one job can
constitute a substantial limitation on an individual's ability to
work.699
2. Temporary Disability Rulings
One effect of the temporary disability cases is that the types of
conditions that have been ruled not to be disabilities seem quite
serious. Conditions that have been held not to be disabilities be-
690. Id. (citations omitted).
691. See Bales, supra note 18, at 203, 23542.
692. See id. at 235.
693. See id. at 236.
694. See id. at 237.
695. See id. at 239.
696. See id.
697. See id. at 240.
698. See id. at 241.
699. See id.
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cause of their temporary nature include: epilepsy;700 breast cancer,
lumpectomy and radiation treatment;701 cancer of the shoulder,
bone marrow tests and chemotherapy treatments; 702 psychological
reaction to having bladder cancer; 70 3 "dysthymia," a chronic depres-
sive disorder characterized by intermittent bouts of depression;704
arthritis hampering the ability to walk;70 5 severe abdominal pain ne-
cessitating stomach surgery;70 6 painful back injury ("trapped
nerve");70 7 kidney obstruction, surgical treatment, periodic bladder
infections, sharp pain and fever.708 These conditions seem a far cry
from the "transitory illnesses" mentioned in Stevens, the case prece-
dent relied upon by the EEOC in concocting its temporary-impair-
ment exclusion. 70 9 These conditions are also a far cry from the
"simple infected finger" mentioned in the ADA congressional
reports.7 10
700. See Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 950 F. Supp. 693, 696
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (concluding that plaintiff with epilepsy did not have physical or
mental impairment that substantially limited his life activities within meaning of
ADA).
701. See Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 189-92 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that plaintiff with breast cancer who underwent lumpectomy and radia-
tion treatment was not "disabled" within meaning of ADA).
702. See Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 91.5 (11th Cir.
1996) (holding that plaintiff with cancerous growth on shoulder did not have disa-
bility under ADA because plaintiff was not substantially limited in major life
activity).
703. See Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1353-54 (9th Cir. 1996)
(stating that employee's temporary psychological impairment, which was related to
his cancer diagnosis was of insufficient duration to constitute disability under
ADA).
704. Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1997) (hold-
ing that plaintiff with dysthymia was not disabled under ADA because plaintiff 'did
not suffer substantial impairment of major life activity).
705. See Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 725-26 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding
that plaintiff's arthritic condition was not substantial enough to render him dis-
abled within meaning of Rehabilitation Act); Sutton v. New Mexico Dep't of Chil-
dren, Youth and Families, 922 F. Supp. 516, 517 (D.N.M. 1996) (finding that
plaintiff's arthritic condition was not substantial limitation and did not affect ma-
jor life activity).
706. See McDonald v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 96 (3d
Cir. 1995) (concluding that plaintiff suffering from severe abdominal pain was not
disabled under ADA or Rehabilitation Act because her inability to work was of
limited duration).
707. See Rakestraw v. Carpenter Co., 898 F. Supp. 386, 390 (N.D. Miss. 1995)
(stating that ADA does not encompass "transitory injuries" such as plaintiff's
trapped nerve).
708. See Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding
that plaintiffs kidney condition was not disability within ADA because it did not
substantially limit major life activity within meaning of ADA).
709. See Stevens v. Stubbs, 576 F. Supp. 1409, 1414 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
710. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 52 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22
(1989).
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The concept that conditions that can be characterized as "tem-
porary" or that have not been proven to be long-term or permanent
are not disabilities has produced many harsh and inequitable rul-
ings. For example, in Sutton v. New Mexico Department of Children,
Youth and Families,711 the plaintiff suffered from degenerative arthri-
tis in her hip, which had deteriorated to the point that she could
walk only by using a walker.712 She had surgery to address the con-
dition and, while recuperating, was allegedly terminated by her em-
ployer because of her disability.713 The court granted the
employer's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's ADA action on the
ground that plaintiff had not made sufficient allegations that her
condition was substantially limiting.714 In explaining this severe
outcome, the court proclaimed that "the paramount interest of
Congress in enacting the ADA was to protect the truly disabled."715
It would surely come as a big surprise to Congress that a person like
the plaintiff in Sutton is not protected by the ADA. 716
711. 922 F. Supp. 516 (D.N.M. 1996).
712. See id. at 517.
713. See id.
714. See id. at 518-19. The court stated:
Paragraphs 10 through 13 of the complaint allege the existence of Plain-
tiff's condition, her use of medication, her use of a walker, the occur-
rence of surgery, her physical inability to work for four weeks, and her
ability to work only four hours per day for some unspecified period there-
after. No inference of permanence or long-term impact, and thus of sub-
stantial limitation, can be drawn from these allegations.
Id.
715. See id. at 519.
716. It certainly engenders incredulity for persons, such as the author, who
drafted the actual language of the ADA definition.
Another example of the harsh effects of the "temporary disability" interpreta-
tion occurred in Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997). In
Soileau, the plaintiff had dysthymia, a chronic depressive disorder characterized by
intermittent bouts of depression. Id. at 14. During a bout of depression caused by
the condition, Soileau was allegedly terminated from his job because of his disabil-
ity, immediately after he requested an accommodation. See id. at 14, 16. The de-
fendant employer successfully moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs
ADA claim. See id. at 17. The First Circuit affirmed, ruling that while Soileau's
doctor had concluded that his "underlying disorder (dysthymia) will be a life-long
condition, [plaintiff] has failed to adduce any evidence that his impairment-the
acute, episodic depression-will be long-term." Id. at 16. The court noted that the
plaintiffs last previous bout of depression "required only a five week work ab-
sence." Id. at 16. The result in Soileau should be contrasted with the ruling of the
Seventh Circuit in a case where the plaintiff sought a reasonable accommodation
for pressure ulcers that she was prone to develop periodically as a result of her
paralysis below the waist. See Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d
538, 546 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that employee prone to developing pressure
ulcers as result of paralysis below waist did not suffer unlawful discrimination be-
cause employer made reasonable accommodations and only turned down requests
for unreasonable accommodations). Although the Seventh Circuit accepted the
dubious proposition that "[i]ntermittent, episodic impairments are not disabili-
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Another example of the problematic and pernicious results of
the exclusion of temporary conditions from the definition is pro-
vided by Rakestraw v. Carpenter Co. 717 Rakestraw involved a truck
driver who suffered a back injury while performing job duties. 718
The court noted that "it is evident from the record that [plaintiff's]
injury was painful and required frequent medical attention."719
This situation continued for nearly a year and ten months until the
plaintiff was discharged because, he alleged, accommodating his
condition by adjusting driver assignments to avoid his having to
make deliveries involving heavy lifting was considered inconvenient
by the company. 720
Although the EEOC has indicated that a broken leg that re-
quires eleven months to heal is a disability,721 the Rakestraw court
found a duration of twice that much insufficient. 722 Sometime after
he had been terminated, the plaintiffs doctors conducted addi-
tional tests and discovered a "trapped nerve."723 This diagnosis re-
sulted in back surgery that corrected the problem and led to
plaintiff's full recovery.724 The fact that the plaintiff had fully recov-
ered by the time that the court considered the case convinced it
that "the relatively short duration" of the plaintiff's injury rendered
its limitations "insubstantial."725 Thus, the court held, a finding
that the injury constitutes a disability would be contrary to the
weight of relevant precedent. 726
ties," it ruled that the plaintiffs pressure ulcers were "a characteristic manifestation
of an admitted disability" and, as a part of the underlying disability, were a condi-
tion that the employer must reasonably accommodate even though, in themselves,
they were only "intermittent." Id. at 544.
717. 898 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
718. See id. at 388.
719. Id. at 390.
720. See id. at 389. The defendant alleged that the plaintiff was fired for late-
ness, a charge that he argued was "mere pretext." Id.
721. See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 325, 6884 (stating that broken leg
requiring 11 months to heal is disability because of abnormally long healing
period).
722. See Rakestraw, 898 F. Supp. at 389.
723. See id.
724. See id.
725. See id. at 390. The court declared: "The evidence in this case demon-
strates that surgery has corrected [plaintiffs] back injury, and the impairment no
longer exists." Id.
726. See id. It added that the plaintiff's condition "was not a significant bar-
rier to employment because the injury was not long-lasting." Id.
The court noted that it was "sympathetic to the fact that [plaintiff] lost his job"
and acknowledged that the employer's actions "may demonstrate a lack of sensitiv-
ity and compassion," but believed that such sentiments "must be tempered with
the legal reality that not every decision to terminate an employee gives rise to a
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. The fact that the cause of the Rakestraw plaintiffs incapacity
was only discovered after he had been terminated underscores an-
other flaw in the temporary disability exclusion rationale. Suppose
that doctors had not conducted further tests until ten years after his
termination, or that the underlying cause of the severe back pain
had never been discovered. Presumably, his condition could not
have been deemed "temporary" in those circumstances. And yet
the conduct of the employer, and what the employer and the em-
ployee knew about the condition at the time of the discharge,
would have been exactly the same. How can the legality of some-
one's conduct at point A in time depend upon what occurs at some
later point B in time? Does the outcome depend upon getting a
court to decide the case before improvement in the condition oc-
curs? If a court decides a nondiscrimination case in favor of the
plaintiff, would the court have to reopen the proceedings if it
turned out that the plaintiffs condition improved or was cured at
some later time? Obviously such questions are absurd and the only
relevant question is whether the plaintiff was discriminated against
on the basis of disability at the time the alleged discrimination
occurred.
A similar problem confronts plaintiffs who have a condition of
indefinite duration, are discharged because of the condition and
try to prove, under the third prong of the definition of disability
that the employer regarded them as having a substantial impair-
ment. If the court follows the Forrisi line of analysis, such plaintiffs
cannot rely simply on the fact that the employer terminated them.
They are then reduced either to trying to prove by medical evi-
dence and other experts that their conditions are long-term, when
in fact they and their doctors may not know how long the condi-
tions will continue and they may hope that they will soon improve,
or to prove that their employers regarded their conditions as per-
manent. The latter requires a terminated employee to prove some-
federal cause of action." Id. at 390-91. It indicated that it was bound by constraints
imposed in the ADA:
[A]lthough a precise delineation of the term "impairment" is not set
forth within the ADA's provisions, the court does not believe that it en-
compasses transitory injuries such as that suffered by [the plaintiff]. The
injury's non-permanent nature, and the fact that it was perceived as such,
prevent a finding that it rose to the required status of a disability.
Id. The court exhibits no awareness that the exclusion of "temporary" conditions
is nowhere suggested in the statutory language or legislative history of the ADA,
and makes no acknowledgment that it has taken the concepts of "temporary" and
"transitory" to an extreme far beyond that comprehended in any regulatory lan-
guage or interpretation by any other court.
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thing within the mind of the employer, and "reward[s] employers
for saying one thing and doing another."727
A further effect of the temporary disability line of cases is ex-
emplified by a federal district court which put a bizarre twist on the
temporary disability issue. 728 The court ruled that a trucking com-
pany employee who suffered a serious back injury was not eligible
for accommodation in a modified work program for injured em-
ployees because the program was limited to employees whose disa-
bilities were temporary, and the employer regarded this employee's
condition as permanent. 72 9 Such a ruling, coupled with an exclu-
sion of temporary conditions from the definition of disability,
would mean that an employee with a disabling condition would not
be entitled to a reasonable accommodation if the, condition is tem-
porary because such conditions are not protected. If the condition
is permanent, however, the employee is not eligible because the
accommodation is only available to those having a temporary condi-
tion.730 The analysis in these cases distorts both the meaning of
disability in the context of an impaired ability to work and the role
of reasonable accommodation.
3. Estoppel from Proving that the Plaintiff Is Qualified
Many inequities arise from decisions in which plaintiffs, who
have represented that they are disabled while applying for disability
benefits, are judicially estopped or otherwise precluded from con-
tending that they are "qualified" in the context of the ADA or Reha-
bilitation Act. After an extensive review of case law, one
727. Bales, supra note 18, at 239.
728. See Collins v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 942 F. Supp. 449, 452-53 (W.D. Mo.
1996) (holding that employee with back injury was not "qualified individual"
under the ADA because he was not physically capable of returning to his former
job that required much reaching and bending).
729. See id. at 452-53.
730. Similarly, in another case, a choice between the frying pan and the fire
was imposed by the court. SeeJohnson v. Foulds, Inc., No. 95 C 5062, 1996 WL
41482, at *5 (N.D. Ill.Jan. 30, 1996) (dismissing plaintiffs discrimination claim for
failure to allege that she was "qualified" due to her request for an extended leave
of absence, a reasonable accommodation). In Johnson, while discussing the plain-
tiffs request for medical leave as a reasonable accommodation, the court declared:
[T] he implication of the plaintiff s request for medical leave as a re-
sult of her mental depression is that once she has recovered, she will be
able to return to work. If that is so, then her impairment must be consid-
ered to be a temporary condition that does not meet the requirements of
a disability under the ADA. On the other hand, if the impairment is not
of short duration, then her request for medical leave appears to be a
concession that she cannot work.
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commentator has observed that "an individual in the 'prior incon-
sistent statement' situation is, as described by more than one ob-
server, between a rock and a hard place. 731
The decision of the Third Circuit in McNemar v. Disney Stores,
Inc.73 2 illustrates the hard-hearted application of such reasoning.
The plaintiff in McNemarwas the assistant store manager of a Disney
store, having worked his way up from lower positions.733 He was
terminated from his job several hours after informing his supervi-
sors that he had acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS).734
Although McNemar did not give any permission for disclosure of
his AIDS status, a casual telephone caller to the store was told that
McNemar had resigned because he had AIDS.73 5 When McNemar
did not find other employment after his termination, he applied for
and obtained social security and state disability benefits. During
the application process, McNemar represented that he was "totally
and permanently disabled. '73 6 McNemar sued the store, alleging
discrimination in violation of the ADA and state statutes, along with
violation of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress and
other claims.73 7
The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defend-
ant on McNemar's ADA claim, applying the doctrine of judicial es-
toppel. 73 8 The plaintiff, with the EEOC as amici curiae, argued that
the lower court decision applying judicial estoppel had "stretched
the doctrine to address a problem that properly should be decided
by looking to the legislative purposes of antidiscrimination that un-
731. Zachary, supra note 625, at 133.
732. 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 958 (1997).
733. SeeMcNemarv. Disney Stores, Inc., 1995 WL 390051, at *1 (E.D. Pa.June
30, 1995) ("McNemar held different positions at Disney, starting as Receiving Man-
ager at Disney's Cherry Hill, NewJersey store, moving up to Second Assistant Man-
ager at Disney's Christiana, Delaware store, and finally being promoted to Assistant
Store Manager at the Cherry Hill store.").
734. See id. at *2 ("McNemar told [his supervisors] that he did have AIDS.
Several hours after this meeting, [a supervisor] informed McNemar that he was
terminated.").
735. See id.
736. See id. at *2, *3 ("Following his dismissal, McNemar applied for and re-
ceived disability benefits from the Social Security Administration and the New
Jersey Department of Labor.... [O]n his applications for... disability benefits,
McNemar and his physicians certified .. . that he was 'totally and permanently
disabled.'").
737. See id. at *1.
738. See McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996)
(agreeing with district court's application ofjudicial estoppel because of plaintiffs
inconsistent statements made while applying for disability benefits), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 958 (1997).
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derlie the ADA." 73 9 The appellate court stated, however, that the
argument for not applying judicial estoppel in such circumstances
"carries the implication that a person afflicted with HIV somehow
should be permitted to misrepresent important information."740
The EEOC argued that the plaintiffs representations of total
disability were "after-acquired evidence" that should be relevant
only as a defense and should not be evidence of whether the plain-
tiff had made a prima facie case.741 The Third Circuit responded to
this argument by accusing the EEOC of attempting "to mix apples
* . .with oranges. '742 Ironically, the EEOC's basic argument was
that the court was mixing apples-a potential defense-with or-
anges-an element of the plaintiffs prima facie case-in applying
judicial estoppel.
The double irony lies in the fact that the Third Circuit, like
other courts that have applied estoppel in such cases, does not ap-
pear to be at all aware of, or open to, the fact that linking represen-
tations regarding disability under social security and other disability
benefits programs with the question of whether one is qualified to
do the job from which one has been terminated is itself mixing
apples and oranges. Both the SSA, which administers the social se-
curity disability programs, and the EEOC, which implements the
employment requirements of the ADA and the federal agency obli-
gations under sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, have
declared that the two federal programs have such different pur-
poses and standards that the representations and findings made
under either should not be deemed relevant to the other.743
739. Id. at 620.
740. Id. The court declared:
The fact that the choice between obtaining federal or state disability
benefits and suing under the ADA is difficult does not entitle one to
make false representations with impunity. Nothing in the reasoned juris-
prudence ofjudicial estoppel goes this far. Nothing grants a person the
authority to flout the exalted status that the law accords statements made
under oath or penalty of perjury. Nothing permits one to undermine the
integrity of the judicial system by "playing fast and loose with the courts
by asserting inconsistent positions." Nothing vests such an immunity.
Id. (quoting Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355,
358 (3d Cir. 1996)).
741. See id. at 620-21 (arguing that prior declaration of total disability has no
bearing on prima facie issue of status as qualified individual with disability).
742. See id. at 621 ("[T]he EEOC wants to mix apples-a plaintiffs prima
facie case-with oranges-a defendant's non-discriminatory reasons.").
743. Similarly, in another case, the Eighth Circuit noted that "[t] he Associate
Commissioner of Social Security issued a statement that the ADA and the disability
provisions of the Social Security Act have different purposes and have no direct
relationship to each other." Eback v. Chater, 94 F.3d 410, 412 (8th Cir. 1996).
The court quoted the following portion of the statement:
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4. Ability of Former Employees to Challenge Discriminatory Denials of
Benefits
Delineation of the reasoning that led some courts to rule that
former employees, particularly those who are eligible for disability
benefits, are precluded from challenging discrimination regarding
benefits indicates the inequity of such rulings. A constricted inter-
pretation of the protection afforded under statutes that undeniably
cover discrimination in regard to the availability of benefits serves
no statutory purpose nor any other apparent purpose, except per-
haps a miserly insistence on tortuous technicalities.
Some of the problems with such decisions are illustrated by the
ruling of the Eleventh Circuit in Gonzales v. Garner Food Services.744
The plaintiff, Timothy Bourgeois, worked at a Hardee's restaurant
owned and operated by Garner Food Services and participated in a
group health insurance plan that provided coverage up to a lifetime
limit of $1 million.745 When Bourgeois was diagnosed with AIDS,
Garner discharged him from employment (in April 1991-prior to
the effective date of the ADA's applicable employment provisions),
"to avoid paying future health insurance claims."746 Bourgeois paid
the necessary premiums to continue his health insurance benefit
[The inquiry into other available jobs] is based on the functional
demands and duties ofjobs as ordinarily required by employers through-
out the national economy, and not on what may be isolated variations in
job demands (regardless of whether such variations are due to compli-
ance with anti-discrimination statutes or other factors). Whether or how
an employer might be willing (or required) to alter job duties to suit the
limitations of a specific individual would not be relevant because our as-
sessment must be based on broad vocational patterns.., rather than on
any individual employer's practices. To support a . . . finding that an
individual can perform "other work," the evidence would have to show
that a job, which is within the individual's capacity because of employer
modifications, is representative of a significant number of other such jobs
in the national economy.
Id. In Eback, the Eighth Circuit ruled that determinations of ability to work for
purposes of Social Security disability benefits could not assume that prospective
employers would make reasonable accommodations for an employee's disability.
See id. For our present purposes, the ruling's significance is that a discharged
worker can perfectly well say that "because of my disability I cannot find other
employment, but if I had not been discharged I would have been perfectly capable
of continuing to do the job I had, with reasonable accommodation to my
impairment."
744. 89 F.3d 1523 (l1th Cir. 1996) reh'g denied en banc, 104 F.3d 373 (11th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1822 (1997). The Eleventh Circuit held that a former
employee whose ADA claim arose after his termination did not meet the "qualified
individual with a disability" definition.
745. See id. at 1524 (summarizing Bourgeois' employment background and
health insurance coverage).
746. See id. (summarizing events leading up to Bourgeois' termination).
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coverage.747 Garner subsequently amended the plan and placed a
$10,000 annual and $40,000 lifetime cap on AIDS-related treat-
ment.748 By the time of Bourgeois's death, he had exhausted the
benefits available to him under the cap and had incurred some
$90,000 in additional claims for which payment was denied.7 49 The
administrator of Bourgeois's estate filed suit under Title I of the
ADA alleging that the defendants had discriminated against Bour-
geois by placing the cap on AIDS-related treatment benefits. 750
The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the
case. 75 1 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit assumed that maintenance
of the cap on treatment benefits might constitute a continuing vio-
lation to which the ADA, once its effective dates were reached,
would apply.75 2 The remaining question was whether Bourgeois
was a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA defini-
tion, "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employ-
ment position that such individual holds or desires. '753
The appellant estate argued that the term "employee" in this
definition should be interpreted consistently with the meaning
given that term under Title VII where courts had ruled it includes
former employees.75 4 The Eleventh Circuit had itself ruled in a Ti-
tle VII case that the "plain-meaning rule should not be applied to
produce a result which is actually inconsistent with the policies un-
747. See id. ("Following his termination, Bourgeois paid the necessary premi-
ums to continue his health insurance benefit coverage pursuant to the Consoli-
dated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA).").
748. See id. ("At least partly because of Bourgeois' continued participation in
the health insurance benefit plan after his discharge, GFS amended the plan on
October 1, 1991, to cap AIDS-related treatment to $10,000 annually with a lifetime
maximum limit of $40,000.").
749. See id. at 1525 (summarizing status of Bourgeois' insurance claims at time
of his death).
750. See id. at 1524 (describing Gonzales' claim against Garner Fast Food Serv-
ices, Inc., as administrator of Bourgeois' estate).
751. See id. ("The district court granted a motion to dismiss jointly filed by
Garner Fast Foods, Inc. (GFF) and Garner Food Services, Inc. (GFS). Thereafter,
Appellant dismissed claims against all Defendants other than GFF and moved for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal. This motion was denied . . ").
752. See id. at 1525 (explaining that, although AIDS cap on benefits was im-
plemented prior to ADA's effective date, court will treat denial of benefits after
effective date as continuing ADA violation for purposes of analysis).
753. 42 U.S.C. § 12118 (1994).
754. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1527 ("Appellant points to the Title VII retalia-
tion statute, contending that although the statute on its face only protects 'employ-
ees' and 'applicants for employment' from illegal retaliation, . . .courts have
broadened the class of protected persons under the statute to include former em-
ployees." (citation omitted)).
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derlying the statute," and that "a strict and narrow interpretation of
the word 'employee' to exclude former employees would undercut
the obvious remedial purposes of Title VII."7 5 5 In Gonzales, how-
ever, the court distinguished such rulings as limited to retaliation
claims 756 and declared that "a review of both the ADA and its legis-
lative history suggests that Congress intended to limit the protec-
tion of Title I to either employees performing, or job applicants
who apply and can perform, the essential functions of available jobs
which their employers maintain."757
Where did the court find evidence of such legislative intent? It
inferred it from the absence of any legislative expression on the
issue. 758 In the absence of statutory language or legislative history,
the rules of statutory construction dictate that deference should be
given to the interpretation of the statute by the implementing
agency. 75 9 The EEOC, the implementing agency, indicated that the
Beauford line of cases is wrong and that former employees are pro-
tected under Title 1.760
As an alternative theory, the appellant in Gonzales, joined by
the EEOC, contended that the term "qualified individual with a dis-
ability" should be interpreted comparably to the Supreme Court's
755. Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that
former employees may sue for retaliation under Title VII).
756. See Gonzaes, 89 F.3d at 1528-29 ("The expansion of the term 'employee'
to confer standing to sue upon former employees claiming retaliation is necessary
to provide meaning to anti-retaliation statutory provisions and effectuate congres-
sional intent .... [H]owever .... excluding former employees from protection
under the ADA is not inconsistent with the policies underlying the statute."). Id. at
1529.
757. Id. at 1527 (recognizing as well that definitions in Title I are substantially
identical to those found in Title II and therefore deserve equivalent
interpretation).
758. See id. at 1528 ("We find no clearly expressed legislative intent suggesting
that former employees such as Bourgeois should be covered under the Act as
well.").
759. See, e.g., Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412 (1985) (de-
ferring to Department of Labor and EEOC on interpretation of Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) ("If the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."), reh'g denied, 468
U.S. 1227 (1984); EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17
(1981) (stating that contemporaneous and consistent interpretation by agency re-
sponsible for Act's enforcement is entitled to "special deference").
760. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 186 (6th Cir. 1996)
(noting EEOC's assertion, in amicus brief, that Beauford was wrongly decided and
should not be followed), vacated, 107 F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 1997), affd, 121 F.3d 1006;
EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., No. 95 C 5835, 1996 WL 26879, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23,
1996) (noting EEOC urged the court, in amicus brief, to reject Parker as wrongly
decided), affd, 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996).
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interpretation of the term "otherwise qualified handicapped indi-
vidual. ' 761 In Davis, the Supreme Court determined that being an
"otherwise qualified handicapped individual" simply required the
plaintiff to be qualified to receive or gain from the benefit or pro-
gram at issue. 762 Essentially, the appellant and EEOC in Gonzales
asked the Eleventh Circuit to rule that the "employee or applicant"
language of the ADA applies to discrimination in hiring or employ-
ment, but that discrimination in regard to benefits should use the
Davis-like eligibility concept. The Eleventh Circuit "decline [d] this
invitation," and indicated that "comparing the qualifications neces-
sary for admission to the nursing program in Davis to those re-
quired for Bourgeois to receive health benefits is like comparing
apples to oranges .... "763 The court stated that such arguments
were actually an attempt to "create a new job category, a 'post-em-
ployment benefits recipient.' ' 764 The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that "Bourgeois, a former employee, was not a 'qualified individual
with a disability' as defined under the ADA and therefore not enti-
fled to the Act's protection."765
Circuit Judge R. Lanier Anderson III wrote a strong dissenting
opinion, criticizing "the majority's conclusion that the ADA pro-
vides protection only for currently active employees."7 66 In his sum-
mary paragraph, he wrote:
I respectfully submit that the majority sees "plain mean-
ing" where there is none. The majority ignores the com-
mon sense reading of the statute and the evident
congressional purpose as revealed in the structure of the
statute, its legislative history, and the overwhelming case
761. See id. at 1259 (noting that appellant correctly recognizes that Rehabilita-
tion Act is ADA's predecessor, and thus interpretation of Rehabilitation Act is apt
precedent in interpreting ADA).
762. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979)
(construing "otherwise qualified" persons protected by section 504 of Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 as persons who are able to meet all program requirements despite
handicap).
763. See Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., 89 F.3d 1523, 1530 (11th Cir. 1996),
reh'g denied en banc, 104 F.3d 373 (1lth Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1822 (1997)
(disagreeing with EEOC's analysis of Davis interpretation of phrase "otherwise
qualified handicapped individual" and characterizing it as creating new job cate-
gory of "post-employment benefits recipient").
764. See id. (acknowledging Eighth Circuit's appropriate rejection of the in-
terpretation of "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" as creating new job
category).
765. Id. at 1531.
766. Id. (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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law which provided the background against which Con-
gress legislated. 767
Despite Judge Anderson's protestations, however, the outcome of
Gonzales was that, although Bourgeois was allegedly subjected to bla-
tant and egregious discrimination by Garner Food Services in re-
gard to employment benefits, an aspect of the employer/employee
relationship that is manifestly covered by the ADA, his estate was
denied an opportunity to try the case on its merits.
The problems with this line of cases go back to its origins in
Beauford.768 The Beauford court determined that the application of
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to employees of a recipient of
federal financial assistance only covered employees who could per-
form the essential functions of the job and did not provide protec-
tion to former employees who were alleging discrimination in
regard to disability benefits. 769 In making this determination, the
Beauford court mangled the statutory term used in section 504 at
that time-"otherwise qualified handicapped individual"-by inter-
preting it as meaning only an "employee" and refusing to apply the
provisions of the regulation dealing with "other services." 770 Subse-
quent cases, such as Gonzales, have proceeded, in the spirit of
Beauford, to go even further by limiting the word "employee" to cur-
rent employees only. In his Gonzales dissent, Judge Anderson seems
to have responded appropriately to these strained interpretations:
It is a matter of common knowledge that fringe benefit
plans routinely and commonly cover retirees and other
former employees. Indeed, pension and profit-sharing
plans are designed primarily for the post-employment
years. It is entirely reasonable to infer that Congress in-
tended the Act's protection to extend to those individuals
767. Id. at 1536 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
768. Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1987)
(holding that section 504 of Rehabilitation Act does not protect former employees
alleging discrimination in regard to disability benefits who can no longer perform
essential functions ofjob). For a discussion of Beauford, see supra notes 509-24 and
accompanying text.
769. See Beauford, 831 F.2d at 771-72 ("With respect to employment, the fed-
eral regulations define a handicapped individual as one who, with reasonable ac-
commodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in question.
Beauford admits that she cannot perform the essential functions of the job ...
[tiherefore, she does not meet the prerequisites to be protected under this provi-
sion." (citation omitted)).
770. See id. (holding that statutory interpretation only extends to "potentially
functional employment relationships" and that clause pertaining to "other serv-
ices" is not applicable to Beauford's claim).
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routinely and commonly included within such fringe ben-
efit plans. It would be counter-intuitive, and quite surpris-
ing, to suppose . . . that Congress intended to protect
current employees' fringe benefits, but intended to then
abruptly terminate that protection upon retirement or ter-
mination, at precisely the time that those benefits are
designed to materialize. 771
B. The Underlying Problems
The problematic outcomes in specific cases are the manifesta-
tion of deeper deficiencies-broader and more systemic difficul-
ties-that rest upon analytical mistakes and basic misun-
derstandings of the nature of the laws being interpreted and ap-
plied. It is necessary to identify and discuss some of these underly-
ing problems.
1. Focusing on the Wrong Issues
The decision of the court in Hatfield v. Quanium Chemical
Corp. 7 7 2 illustrates several of the problems arising from the mis-
guided analytical approaches to the ADA discussed above. The
Hatfield court invoked the one-job-is-not-enough principle in dis-
cussing whether the plaintiff has a disability under the ADA and
considered the significance of statements made in applying for disa-
bility benefits to determining whether the plaintiff is qualified.7 73
As an employee at Quantum, Hatfield allegedly was subjected to
personal and sexual harassment by his supervisor.774 The supervi-
sor directed Hatfield to engage in oral sex with him, pulled
Hatfield's head toward his groin while asking if Hatfield was ready
to perform oral sex and summoned him on some occasions by call-
ing him "pussy."7 75 Hatfield claimed these incidents were so trau-
771. Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1532 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
772. 920 F. Supp. 108 (S.D. Tex. 1996). The court held that plaintiff's mental
condition caused by interaction with his supervisor did not render him "substan-
tially limited" in the activity of working and, thus, not "disabled" under the ADA.
See id. at 110.
773. See id. at 110. Plaintiff asserted that his mental disorder substantially cur-
tailed his ability to work as a plant technician. See id. The court responded that:
"A person is substantially limited in working if the person is significantly restricted
in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs .... The
ability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limita-
tion on working." See id.
774. See id. at 109.
775. See id. (summarizing facts of plaintiff's complaint).
1997]
151
Burgdorf: Substantially Limited Protection from Disability Discrimination:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW
matic that they caused a mental disability.776 Hatfield eventually
entered a mental hospital on the advice of a psychiatrist and was
diagnosed as having severe major depression, post-traumatic stress
disorder and borderline personality disorder.7 77 Hatfield requested
his employer to transfer him to a different supervisor. 7 78 When the
employer refused, Hatfield filed an ADA claim based on the em-
ployer's failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. 779
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defend-
ants, finding that Hatfield was neither disabled nor qualified, and
thus, was not entitled to a reasonable accommodation. 780 The
court concluded that Hatfield was not substantially limited in his
ability to work because "Hatfield present[ed] no evidence that his
condition prevent[ed] him from performing either a class of jobs
or a range ofjobs in whatever class. Hatfield's testimony show[ed]
that the only reason he could not return to work was that he would
be in contact with his former supervisor."781 As to whether Hatfield
was qualified to perform his job, the court ruled that his claim that
he was "totally disabled" as stated in his application for Social Secur-
ity disability benefits and similar benefits from Quantum's insur-
ance carrier were "enough to conclude that Hatfield was not a
'qualified individual with a disability.' 78 2 After reaching out to a
disability benefits proceeding to find evidence sufficient to con-
clude as a matter of law that Hatfield was "totally disabled," the
court could find no evidence that he had a "disability." Even
though the court found, in the same paragraph, that the supervisor
had precipitated a serious mental disability for Hatfield that made
him "totally disabled," Hatfield was not disabled. 78 3
Apart from serving as an example of astounding illogic,
Hatfield is instructive because the court never considered the con-
duct of the supervisor and the employer. If this were a case of race,
religion or gender discrimination, the court would not focus on the
776. See id.
777. See id.
778. See id.
779. See id.
780. See id.
781. Id. at 110.
782. Id. at 111. The court summarized its holding as follows:
Hatfield is not disabled as a matter of law because he presents no
summaryjudgment evidence that he is substantially limited in a major life
activity as required by the act. Even if Hatfield could demonstrate the
existence of a disability, he cannot recover because he is not a qualified
individual. By Hatfield's own admission, he is totally disabled.
Id.
783. See id.
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relative darkness or lightness of the plaintiff's skin, how religious
the plaintiff was, how feminine or masculine the plaintiff was or on
the plaintiffs job performance (unless the pleadings raised poor
performance as a justification for the defendants' conduct).
Rather, it would focus primarily, and often solely, on the alleged
conduct of the defendants. The restrictive interpretations of statu-
tory protection under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, however,
have engendered a situation in which many cases are decided solely
by looking at the characteristics of the plaintiff.
For any nondiscrimination law, this would be a strange state of
affairs. These laws prohibit certain kinds of conduct by covered in-
dividuals and entities. They are not intended as engines for evaluat-
ing, comparing, differentiating and classifying plaintiffs.
For discrimination based on disability, the focus on the limita-
tions and capabilities of plaintiffs is particularly unfortunate. As
previously discussed, a major form of disability discrimination is dif-
ferentiating, classifying and labeling people as disabled. Proving
that one is disabled is the direct antithesis of the goals underlying
the nondiscrimination mandates of the ADA and sections 501, 503
and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Having to turn around and
prove that, despite having a disability, one is not so disabled that
one cannot do the job that one has been performing or has applied
for simply adds insult to injury.
The intense focus on the abilities and impairments of the com-
plainant instead of on the allegedly discriminatory conduct of the
employer is reminiscent of the complaint leveled at investigations
and trials of rape and other sexual offense charges-that the al-
leged victim is often on trial rather than the alleged perpetrator.
This author once had a client whose former employer had deliv-
ered to him a discharge notice that said "because your disability,
multiple sclerosis, prevents you from hand writing your reports, you
are being terminated from your position." The client also had writ-
ten documentation that he had purchased a dictation recorder and
had requested the employer to accommodate him by having a sec-
retary type up his reports, which the employer refused to do. Thus,
there was irrefutable evidence that the employer had terminated
the author's client because of his disability and that the employer
had refused to make a reasonable accommodation. Imagine the
difficulty the author had in explaining to the client why, in these
circumstances, we still had to produce medical and other evidence.
Such evidence would have to prove that the client had a substantial
limitation in a major life activity and that he was qualified to per-
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form the essential tasks of the job that he had been doing. Because
these matters were at issue, the client would have to grant the em-
ployer, as part of discovery, access to all of his medical and psychiat-
ric records. Naturally, the client came to feel that he, not the
employer, was on trial.
2. Imposing Technical Evidentiary Hurdles Contrary to Common Sense
and Statutory Purposes
In addition to being diametrically opposed to statutory objec-
tives, the restrictive interpretation of the protection afforded under
disability nondiscrimination laws also has engendered procedural
and evidentiary hurdles that are frequently misunderstood by plain-
tiffs, their attorneys and the courts. These hurdles are misunder-
stood largely because they defy common sense and statutory
purpose.
Regarding the one-job-is-not-enough concept, for example, the
EEOC is aware of its harsh effects. The agency has offered some
ameliorative suggestions. It has suggested that an individual avoid
the analysis of substantial limitation in employment by alleging an
impairment to some other major life activity.78 4 It also indicated
that, in certain circumstances, exclusion from a single position may
be sufficient to satisfy the "regarded as" prong of the definition.785
Finally, the EEOC offers the general palliative that its requirements
about the numbers and types of jobs that are limited "are not in-
tended to require an onerous evidentiary showing."
786
784. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. A § 1630 (1997) ("If an individual is substan-
tially limited in any other major life activity, no determination should be made as
to whether the individual is substantially limited in working.").
785. See id. The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the ADA de-
clares: "An individual rejected from ajob because of the 'myths, fears and stereo-
types' associated with disabilities would be covered under this part of the
definition of disability, whether or not the employer's or other covered entity's perception
were shared by others in the field." Id. (emphasis added). The EEOC also considers
exclusions based on "common attitudinal barriers" toward individuals with disabili-
ties, including "concerns regarding productivity, safety, insurance, liability, attend-
ance, cost of accommodation and accessibility, workers' compensation costs, and
acceptance by coworkers and customers," to constitute discrimination based on
perceptions of disability. See id. If an individual with a physical or mental impair-
ment can show that he or she was terminated from, or not hired for, a particular
job because of that impairment, and the employer took the exclusionary action
because of one of the listed concerns, such a showing may be sufficient to establish
that the individual was "regarded as having" a substantially limiting impairment.
Unless the employer can articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the employ-
ment action, "an inference that the employer is acting on the basis of myth, fear or
stereotype can be drawn." Id.
786. See id.
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Such sentiments and alternatives are of little avail. Many plain-
tiffs and their legal counsel, as well as many courts that hear their
cases, are not aware of or do not understand these nuances. Also,
many do not see why these nuances are necessary given the com-
monsense deduction that employers who discriminate against em-
ployees because of their physical or mental impairment have
regarded the employees as having a disability that impairs their abil-
ity to work.78 7 Whatever validity or good intentions the EEOC's
ameliorative suggestions may have, Allen Redlich, the veteran law
professor who suffered a stroke with resulting permanent paralysis
of his left hand, arm and leg, was not aware of and able to take
advantage of them, nor was his attorney aware. 788 Many other
plaintiffs, like Redlich, have had their cases tossed out of court be-
cause of lack of disability even though they have been discharged,
paid lower wages or denied promotions because of their physical or
mental impairment. These- other plaintiffs were also not aware.
The judges in many such cases have not applied any of the
aforementioned ameliorative approaches. In the Redlich case, for
example, the court recited the list of major life activities delineated
in the regulations. 789 Included in this list of activities was perform-
ing manual tasks and walking, each of which would seem to have
been applicable to Redlich, but the court then ruled that "[t]he
relevant 'major life activity' at issue in this case [was] 'working.' ' 790
In practical effect, the one-job-is-not-enough precept has extin-
guished the claims of numerous plaintiffs who alleged that they
were subjected to express and sometimes extreme discrimination
prohibited under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Any pleading or
procedural maneuvers that might theoretically have been available
to them to avoid such results were too subtle, too complicated and
too antithetical to common sense or were not accepted by the
courts hearing their cases.
787. See Bales, supra note 18, at 225 ("If [the plaintiffs] supervisor denied
him the promotion because of his disability, how can it be that the supervisor did
not regard [the plaintiff] as disabled?").
788. See Redlich v. Albany Law Sch. of Union Univ., 899 F. Supp. 100, 107
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (dismissing plaintiffs discrimination claim under Rehabilitation
Act because plaintiff did not establish that major life activity of working was sub-
stantially impaired or that defendant regarded him as substantially limited in ma-
jor life activity).
789. See id. at 106.
790. See id. ("Under the Department of Health and Human Services regula-
tions 'major life activity' is defined as functions such as caring for one's self, per-
forming manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and
working.").
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Theoretically, there may also be a few techniques for trying to
avoid the damaging effects of excluding temporary disabilities.
Thus, the EEOC has fashioned the somewhat illogical premise that
a temporary condition that takes longer than normal to heal may
thereby constitute a disability.7 91 Few plaintiffs are in a position,
however, to avail themselves of this argument even if they happen
somehow to be aware of it. In one of the few cases in which the
facts supported such an approach, the issue was not raised.792
Even if a court subscribes to the temporary disability exclusion,
the plaintiff may nonetheless argue that the length of time his or
her disability persisted is sufficient to avoid its application. In Wood
v. County of Alameda,793 for example, the court denied a motion for
summary judgment filed by the defendant and granted a prelimi-
nary injunction to the plaintiff, who had a mental impairment that
rendered her unable to work for about a year.79 4 The court de-
clared that "a mental impairment which renders an individual un-
able to work for a full year constitutes a disability under the
ADA."'7 95 Such arguments will not necessarily prevail. In Rakestraw,
the court ruled that an injury lasting one year and ten months was
not of sufficient duration to constitute a disability.796 Again, as with
the onejob-is-not-enough approach, many plaintiffs and their attor-
neys are amiss of the need to pursue strategies that sidestep the
temporary disability exclusion because of the cogency of the reason-
ing that an employer who terminates or otherwise penalizes a per-
son because of a temporary disability has "regarded" that person as
having a disability under the third prong of the statutory defini-
791. See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 325, at 6885 ("Temporary impair-
ments may be disabilities if they take significantly longer than normal to heal and
significantly restrict the performance of major life activities during the healing
period.").
792. See Grindley v. Royal Indemnity Co., No. 94-1251 1-RGS, 1996 WL 780557,
at *5 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 1996) (holding that plaintiffs temporary limitations from
surgery to correct knee injury not disability, even though "typical recovery period"
for plaintiff's type of knee surgery was two to four weeks, and plaintiff was on medi-
cal leave for five months, had to have second surgery approximately 10 months
after first, and was on medical leave for two months after second surgery).
793. No. C 94 1557 TEH, 1995 WL 705139 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 1995) (holding
that reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff's mental impairment rendered
her substantially limited in major activity of working even though several doctors,
including plaintiff's, determined she could return to work after one year).
794. Id. at *10.
795. Id. at *8 (noting factors set forth in EEOC regulations).
796. Rakestraw v. Carpenter Co., 898 F. Supp. 386, 389 (N.D. Miss. 1995). For
a discussion of Rakestraw, see supra notes 717-26 and accompanying text.
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tion.797 Once a person has been subjected to discriminatory treat-
ment because of a disability, it simply appears irrelevant how long
thereafter the plaintiffs condition persists. Few people can readily
grasp the logic of reasoning that denies statutory protection from
discrimination for an employee when recovery is more rapid and
the impact on the employer's operations are less, but affords it if
the disruption takes longer and thus the burden on the employer is
greater. Try explaining to clients with a temporary disability that
the law does not stop their employer from firing them because their
disability will make them miss some work, but if they had a condi-
tion that forced them to be out of work for a longer time, they
might be protected.
Obviously, the line of cases holding that plaintiffs who have
made representations of total disability in applying for disability
benefits are precluded from establishing that they are "qualified,"
as well as cases holding that former employees cannot pursue ac-
tions under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act places overwhelm-
ing procedural obstacles in the way of plaintiffs. Courts endorsing
these approaches dismiss the plaintiffs' claims in such cases. Re-
garding the first of these-estoppel or preclusion of plaintiffs who
apply for disability benefits-various approaches were suggested
previously by which plaintiffs may be able to thwart its potential ap-
plication. These include focusing upon different time parameters
for the representations made, scrutinizing the exact content of the
representations made and arguing that representations made in un-
successful applications for benefits do not trigger estoppel. Yet
such strategies have obviously not prevented many plaintiffs from
being deprived of their day in court. After reviewing such cases,
one commentator observed that "[d] espite the arguments of plain-
tiffs, the EEOC, and other interested parties, and the decisions of
some courts who find these arguments persuasive, it is clear that
many courts are unwilling to accept them. '79 8
Until such decisions became fairly common, most plaintiffs
and their attorneys had no reason to suspect that courts would in-
terpret their disability benefits applications and their ADA claims as
inconsistent. Far from trying to "put something over" on the court,
one plaintiffs attorney included a disability insurance claim and an
ADA claim in two different counts in the same complaint. In Bollen-
797. See Bales, supra note 18, at 244 ("A plaintiff ... who proves that her
employer fired her because she has an infected finger is entitled to the Act's
protection.").
798. See Zachary, supra note 625, at 132.
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bacher v. Helena Chemical Co., 799 Count I of the complaint made a
claim of wrongful denial of long-term disability benefits in violation
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ER-
ISA),800 while Count II alleged that the defendant employer had
terminated Bollenbacher because of his disability in violation of the
ADA.801
The Bollenbacher court applied judicial estoppel to the plain-
tiffs ADA claim. 802 It did not differentiate the situation before it in
which the supposedly inconsistent allegations were made in a single
proceeding from prior cases in which the representations of "total
disability" were made in applications to the SSA or other disability
benefits provider. Recognizing that the Bollenbacher situation might
merit different treatment than the other cases, the plaintiff argued
that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 8(e) permit a party
to seek alternative forms of relief and to assert separate or alterna-
tive claims "regardless of consistency. "803
The court did not respond to this argument directly; it merely
noted the defendant's argument that plaintiffs claims were "not
merely alternative claims or inconsistent claims, but rather, are mu-
tually exclusive. °80 4 The court did not suggest how one distin-
guishes between "inconsistent" and "mutually exclusive" claims.
Moreover, the Bollenbacher plaintiffs position that representations
made in a complaint can be inconsistent is an accurate statement of
modern pleading rules.805 Also, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 (b), which provides ethical standards for representations in pa-
pers filed with a federal court, provides that allegations and factual
799. 934 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (holding that plaintiff could not
claim he was "qualified individual with a disability" under ADA after having alleged
he was totally disabled in applying for disability benefits).
800. See 29 U.S.C. §1132(a) (1) (B) (1994) (empowering persons to bring civil
action to recover benefits due, or to enforce rights, under the terms of their plan).
801. See Bollenbacher, 934 F. Supp. at 1026 (describing Count II of Bollen-
bacher's complaint).
802. See id. at 1027-28 ("The cases cited [by the defendant] are sufficiently
persuasive to convince this court that a plaintiff who claims to be totally disabled in
one proceeding should be estopped from asserting an ADA claim in a subsequent
suit . . ").
803. See id. at 1026 (responding to defendant's contention that plaintiff can-
not claim that he is totally disabled and also that he is qualified individual with
disability).
804. See id. (responding to plaintiff's argument that Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure permit alternative claims regardless of consistency).
805. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CML PROCEDURE 415-16 (4th ed. 1996) ("As
a result, a defendant may deny that she ever entered into a contract with plaintiff
and at the same time assert that she kept her side of the bargain . . ").
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contentions shall "have evidentiary support,"80 6 not that they shall
be true or consistent. In any event, as noted previously, familiarity
with the nature and context of the representations made in disabil-
ity benefits claims and in ADA and Rehabilitation Act nondiscrimi-
nation claims has convinced the fiontline federal agencies involved
in implementing these federal laws-the SSA and the EEOC-that
such representations cannot be transferred from one of these situa-
tions to the other. Some courts, however, with less expertise re-
garding both processes, have continued to insist that being "totally
disabled" for disability benefits purposes is equivalent to being un-
qualified under the ADA.
Likewise, the Beauford line of cases imposes a total bar against
former employees suing under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act to
challenge discrimination in regard to benefits for which they are
eligible by virtue of their former employment. Most plaintiffs and
their attorneys have not anticipated that courts might apply this rea-
soning. This is because a straightforward reading of the statutes
and regulations makes it clear that discrimination in regard to ben-
efits is actionable, and regulations and legislative history make it
clear that the term "employee" is intended to be given the same
meaning as that under Title VII, a meaning that has consistently
been read to include former employees. To the extent that plain-
tiffs and their counsel identify this potential difficulty, there is little
that they can do to avoid it. There are no clever maneuvers or
pleading alternatives that can enable a plaintiff to dodge this line of
analysis if a court chooses to follow Beauford and its ilk.
The upshot is that numerous plaintiffs who believe they have
been subjected to serious discrimination in violation of the ADA or
sections 501, 503 or 504 of the Rehabilitation Act find .themselves
on the wrong side of a summary judgment or dismissal order, ask-
ing their surprised and dismayed attorneys what went wrong. The
attorneys are then faced with trying to explain the illogical and
counterintuitive doctrines, antithetical to the purposes of the fed-
eral nondiscrimination statutes, that derailed their cases. None of
this advances, by one iota, the goals of eliminating discrimination
on the basis of disability that prompted Congress to enact the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act. On the contrary, it suggests to employ-
ers that there are huge loopholes that will enable them to escape
with impunity when they have violated the requirements of nondis-
crimination laws.
806. FED. R. Crv. P. 11(b)(3) (detailing ethical requirements for court
documents).
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3. The Protected-Class Approach
The focus on the wrong issues and the counterproductive tech-
nical evidentiary and procedural obstacles are symptoms of a more
basic analytical error-the protected class mentality. Perhaps, in
part, because people with disabilities have historically been viewed
as objects of pity and charity, and because many governmental and
private programs provide special benefits and programs for people
with disabilities, disability nondiscrimination laws have become
tainted with a special, protected-class perspective. During the Rea-
gan and Bush Administrations, the EEOC, under the chairmanship
of Evan Kemp, helped to promote such a view-that there is a cer-
tain core group of severely disabled people who are deserving of
the special service of being protected from discrimination. Pro-
grams providing services and benefits to targeted groups of citizens
with disabilities are, of course, an appropriate and worthwhile gov-
ernmental undertaking. In many areas, including personal assist-
ance services and community living alternatives, much more needs
to be done.80 7 But in the area of prohibiting and eliminating dis-
crimination, the protected-class approach has absolutely no place.
Nondiscrimination is a guarantee of equality. It is not a special ser-
vice reserved for a select few.
The history of gender discrimination in this country counsels
that it can be very harmful to be deemed "special." As Justice Bren-
nan wrote, traditionally discrimination against women "was rational-
ized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical
effect, put women not on a pedestal, but in a cage."808 Similarly, for
people with disabilities, the special class mentality-the notion that
these people are quite different from others and need special help
and protection-has helped spawn such historical and, in some
cases, present practices as confinement in residential institutions
(supposedly for treatment and habilitation), segregated schools,
laws restricting marriage rights, segregated housing, laws restricting
voting rights, all-or-nothing guardianship laws that deprive "wards"
of all decision-making authority and even compulsory sterilization
laws (to prevent these poor unfortunates from having to deal with
807. See, e.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 348, at 96-114 (dis-
cussing how need for providing services, especially community living services, is
sorely needed).
808. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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menstruation, accidentally getting pregnant or fathering a
child) .809
The protected-class approach has certainly framed the re-
stricted interpretation of protection from discrimination in the line
of cases discussed in this Article. Many of the cases have explicitly
referred to the "protected class" or "protected group" entitled to
protection under the ADA or sections 501, 503 or 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act.810 These terms can, of course, be used to simply
identify those individuals able to sue under the Rehabilitation Act,
who, given the "regarded as" prong of the statutory definition,
would include anyone who has been discriminated against on the
basis of disability, whether or not the individual has any impairment
at all. Most of the court decisions discussed have used the "pro-
tected class" phrasing in this context. Usually, implicit in these de-
cisions, but made explicit by one court that reviewed numerous
precedents to arrive at a comprehensive framework for addressing
ADA cases, the "protected class" phrasing is in the spirit of the
"threshold question": Is the plaintiff disabled enough to seek relief
under the ADA?8 1 1
The protected-class perception of the protection afforded by
disability nondiscrimination statutes does violence to the very es-
sence of statutes designed to prevent unnecessary differentiation,
i.e., discrimination. The courts have been clear that the ADA and
section 504 are not supposed to require preferences. The Supreme
Court has identified "the central purpose of [section] 504" as assur-
ing "'evenhanded treatment' in relation to nonhandicapped indi-
viduals."8 12 Other courts have declared that "it is the aim of the
ADA to merely ensure equality and not preference to disabled em-
ployees"8 13 and that the purpose of the nondiscrimination require-
ments of the ADA and sections 501, 503 and 504 is to ensure that
individuals with disabilities "receive the same treatment as those
809. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
462-64 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that cus-
todial institutions were erected for lifetime committal of individuals with mental
retardation with aim of halting their reproductive capabilities and removing them
from society).
810. See, e.g., Everette v. Runyon, 911 F. Supp. 180, 183 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (stat-
ing that plaintiff must be within "protected group"); Reiff v. Interim Personnel,
Inc., 906 F. Supp. 1280, 1288 (D. Minn. 1995) (referring to "protected class").
811. See Muller v. Hotsy Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1389, 1411 (N.D. Iowa 1996)
(determining such question to be typical and even threshold in any ADA case).
812. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1988).
813. Emrick v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 398 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
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without disabilities. 1s 4 These statutes prohibit discrimination, "no
more and no less." 8 15
The restrictive interpretation of statutory protection, induced
by the preferred group or protected-class mentality has done no
favors for any group of persons with disabilities. The one-job-is-not-
enough and temporary disability exclusion problems have defeated
the discrimination claims of individuals with a variety of severe im-
pairments and what might be viewed as "traditional" disabilities.
The rulings in the judicial estoppel and preclusion line of cases ap-
ply to all persons who have filed for disability benefits, certainly in-
cluding those with severe disabilities. The former employee-
benefits discrimination decisions can snare any former employee,
no matter what the nature or degree of the person's impairment.
These lines of cases present harrowing obstacles for all complain-
ants of disability discrimination, no matter how "truly disabled"
their attorneys or they themselves believe they are.
At the very least, these lines of cases require plaintiffs to shoul-
der heavy burdens of proving the substantiality of their impair-
ments, often by presenting medical evidence and sharing the
details of their medical conditions with the defendants, the court
and, ultimately, anyone else who views the court documents. Plain-
tiffs also must prove that their physical or mental impairments sub-
stantially limit major life activities, i.e., prove how really disabled
and disadvantaged they are in performing daily activities, a very un-
welcome task for a person with a disability who is striving to prove
to oneself and to others that he or she can be capable, independent
and self-supporting. If they wish to rely on the major life activity of
working, plaintiffs will have to prove, often by vocational experts,
that they will be precluded from performing a class or a broad
range of jobs, i.e., proving based on speculation and statistics how
other employers will react to their impairments.8 1 6 The need for
medical and vocational experts asks for quite a sizable financial in-
vestment for a recently unemployed individual with a disability.
814. Robinson v. City of Friendswood, 890 F. Supp. 616, 620 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
815. Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[The
ADA does not require] affirmative action in favor of individuals with disabilities, in
the sense of requiring that disabled persons be given priority in hiring or reassign-
ment over those who are not disabled. It prohibits employment discrimination
against qualified individuals with disabilities, no more and no less."), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1263 (1996).
816. See, e.g., Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992)
(noting that plaintiff failed to present evidence from vocational experts in reach-
ing decision that plaintiff had not proven that he was precluded from wide range
of jobs).
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Even with medical and vocational experts, plaintiffs may still be
held not to have satisfied these weighty burdens.817
Having expended all this money and energy, to demonstrate
that they have a disability, would-be plaintiffs then have to turn
around and prove that the impairment is not so serious as to pre-
vent doing the job. To the extent that the "disability" criterion has
been made too expansive, it then becomes harder to show that the
plaintiff's condition does not interfere with job performance. The
possibility of reasonable accommodation may explain, however,
why a person's ability to work is significantly impaired by a disability
(without accommodation) and yet the person is fully able to do the
job (with accommodation). Proving an ability to perform particu-
lar job tasks may again require testimony of medical or vocational
experts.
While preparing and litigating an ADA or Rehabilitation Act
claim, which may include footing the bill for expert witnesses, the
jobless individual with a disability may, depending upon the rulings
of the courts in the jurisdiction in which the cause of action will be
litigated, need to avoid applying for disability benefits to which he
or she may be entitled. In addition, again depending upon the rul-
ings in the relevant jurisdiction, a former employee, who believes
that he or she has been subjected to discrimination in regard to the
fringe benefits that accrued out of the former employment relation-
ship may have to face the fact that pursuing litigation may be a
futile undertaking unless the individual has the will and assets to
take the matter to a higher judicial level. Thus, a former employee
who is out of work because of a disability and is discriminatorily
denied disability benefits under a program obtained through the
employer or who has such benefits discriminatorily cut off or de-
creased may have to choose between undertaking protracted, ex-
tensive and expensive litigation with unclear chances of prevailing,
or simply giving up on challenging the discrimination.
Despite a widespread misconception to the contrary, none of
these dire results and ponderous burdens are inherent in the statu-
tory formulations of the ADA and sections 501, 503 and 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. Properly understood, the need to prove that
one is "disabled" is amply satisfied by proving that an employer pur-
817. See, e.g., McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 1012,
1015-16 (E.D. Ky. 1995) (ruling that plaintiffs evidence at summary judgment
stage, which included testimony of two orthopedic surgeons and one vocational
expert, did not establish that she was disabled under ADA, in part because voca-
tional expert had made only "conclusory" unsupported statement that plaintiff wa~s
"perceived as impaired"), affid, 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1997).
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posefully inflicted a negative consequence upon an individual be-
cause of a physical or mental impairment (whether real or
perceived), thus satisfying the "regarded as" prong of the defini-
tion. The "qualified" criterion appears in the statute to make sure
that people who cannot perform the essential tasks of a job, even if
they are provided a reasonable accommodation, do not have to be
hired and retained. It was not intended to set up an elaborate pre-
trial contest in which the plaintiff is required to prove how excel-
lent he or she is in performing every element of the job before
getting a chance to proceed with the case. Finally, nothing in any
of the federal nondiscrimination laws or their legislative history
hints that people who represent that they have or are found to have
a total disability under disability benefits standards are not "quali-
fied" and should not be permitted to pursue their nondiscrimina-
tion claims or that former employees should not be able to
challenge discrimination they encounter in regard to their employ-
ment fringe benefits.
These burdensome interpretations are entirely judge-made
doctrines that represent a substantial misunderstanding of the
wording of the nondiscrimination laws and the policies that under-
lie them, do an egregious disservice to the people who are sup-
posed to be protected by these laws, benefit no one but
perpetrators of discrimination and are largely the product of the
misguided concept of a special protected class.818 The federal disa-
bility nondiscrimination statutes do not contemplate that there is
some core group of people whose statutory protection needs to be
narrowly and carefully restricted so as not to be used up by the un-
deserving others. Such a construction is antithetical to any nondis-
crimination law and certainly to one prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of disability-an area of the law that recognizes the dan-
gers of differentiating and meting out disparate treatment for par-
ticular segments of society.
VII. ANALYTICAL ALTERNATIVES
There are clear and sometimes obvious alternatives to the lines
of analysis that have engendered restricted protection under the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Some of these alternatives have been
suggested in court decisions that have taken a more informed and
less penurious view of the scope of these laws. Others are derived
from an examination of the original purposes of the phraseology in
818. Perhaps some courts simply may want to lighten their dockets without
regard to the meritoriousness of claims that are jettisoned.
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the statutes and of the conceptual principles underlying disability
nondiscrimination laws and the disability rights movement. This
Part first presents suggested alternatives to the analysis that has
spawned the four major constricting interpretations of statutory
coverage discussed in this Article. Part VII also recommends some
basic principles that should be adopted for a clearer, more coher-
ent and analytically sound conceptual framework for interpreting
and applying disability nondiscrimination laws.
A. Discrimination in One Job Is Enough
Proof that an employer purposefully inflicted a negative conse-
quence upon an individual because of a physical or mental impair-
ment, whether real or perceived, should be deemed sufficient to
establish that the individual has been "regarded as" having a disabil-
ity that impairs the activity of working and, thus, is an "individual
with a disability" under the statutory definition. One author has
labeled this approach the "once is enough" standard.819 He has
also suggested that in this context the phrase "substantially limits"
could be useful in distinguishing between employer actions or deci-
sions that have a serious impact on the employee's work status (e.g.,
termination, refusal to hire or promote, lower pay, segregating the
employee) and actions or decisions that have a minor impact (e.g.,
choosing an accommodation that is merely adequate and effective
instead of an alternative that is the optimal first choice of the
employee) .820
Some courts, including several federal circuit courts, have re-
jected the Forrisi rationale on the exclusion-from-a-single-job issue.
819. Bales, supra note 18, at 245 (stating that initial burden should be on
plaintiff to show that employer took adverse action against plaintiff because of ac-
tual or perceived impairment, shifting burden to employer to prove statutorily cre-
ated affirmative defenses).
820. See id. at 230-31 (offering alternative way of using phrase "substantially
limits"). The commentator offered this interpretation in response to the conten-
tion, articulated in Forrisi and other decisions, that without the one-job-is-not-
enough principle, the words "substantially limits" would be rendered meaningless
in regard to the major life activity of working. See id. at 230; see also Forrisi v.
Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986) ("It would debase [the high purpose of
the Rehabilitation Act] if the statutory protections.., could be claimed by anyone
whose disability was minor."); Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir.
1992) ("[A]n impairment that an employer perceives as limiting an individual's
ability to perform only one job is not a handicap under the [ADA]. Any other
interpretation would render meaningless the requirement that the impairment
substantially limit a major activity."); Reeder v. Frank, 813 F. Supp. 773, 780 (D.
Utah 1992) (interpreting phrase "substantially limits" narrowly to prevent broad
protection), affd, 986 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1993). The commentator labels this
contention "nonsense." Bales, supra note 18, at 230.
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Other courts have continued to find rationales for avoiding its ap-
plication.8 21 The reasoning of Forrisi and its followers on this issue
is a product of flawed logic, misunderstandings of the basic nature
and purposes of disability nondiscrimination laws and misguided
impulses to protect the "truly disabled" by treating them differently
from everyone else. The results have been harsh and inequitable
even to those with severe disabilities whom it was purported to as-
sist. It is time for this erroneous line of reasoning to be challenged
head on and rooted out of American jurisprudence. The EEOC
should take the lead in repudiating this pernicious misinterpreta-
tion of federal statutes it is charged with implementing.
B. Inclusion of Temporary Disabilities
Individuals with temporary disabilities should not be excluded
from the protection provided under disability nondiscrimination
laws. Persons with temporary disabilities should be considered indi-
viduals with disabilities under disability nondiscrimination laws if
(1) except for its limited duration, the condition is substantial
enough to otherwise constitute a disability or (2) evidence indicates
that an employer purposefully inflicted a negative consequence
upon an individual because of a temporary impairment, whether
real or perceived. In the first situation, the individual has an actual
disability. In second situation, the individual has been "regarded
as" having a disability that impairs the activity of working and, thus,
is an "individual with a disability" under the statutory definition.
Several courts have already rejected the notion that a tempo-
rary disability is not a "disability" under the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act.822 It is time for other courts to reject this senseless, irrelevant
821. See, e.g., Webb v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 1996)
(reversing summary judgment for defendant because district court "should have
determined what class of jobs was relevant.., taking into consideration the job
from which Webb was fired and the specialized skills that he developed in his
twenty-four years with Garelick," and "should have considered whether Webb was
significantly restricted in his ability to perform that class ofjobs as compared to the
average person with his supervision and production development skills"); Lee v.
Trustees of Dartmouth College, 958 F. Supp. 37, 43 (D.N.H. 1997) ("Certainly, a
fact finder could determine that defendants viewed plaintiff as unable to be a sur-
geon, the class ofjob he had spent years training to become."); Smith v. Kitterman,
Inc., 897 F. Supp. 423, 427-29 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (denying defendant's motion for
summary judgment because of genuine issues of material fact regarding whether
plaintiff's limitations created significant barrier to employment positions compara-
ble in stature to former job, especially given plaintiff's "limited educational, train-
ing, and employment background" and whether plaintiff was regarded as having
disability under ADA).
822. See, e.g., Wood v. County of Alameda, No. C-94-1557-THE, 1995 WL
705139, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 1995) (denying defendant's motion for summary
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technicality that has no basis in the statutes or their legislative his-
tory. The DOJ and especially the EEOC should join the DOT in
recognizing that "any condition that meets the criteria of the defini-
tion, regardless of its duration, is a disability."823
If an individual has a disability at the time that an employer
discriminates against him or her because of it, then the individual
has a disability under the statutes. Whether the condition vanishes,
improves or worsens thereafter does not matter. The only relevant
question is whether the individual had, or was "regarded as" having,
a disability at the time the alleged act of discrimination occurred.
C. Recognition of Ability to Pursue Both Disability Benefits and
Nondiscrimination Rights
Representations of "total disability" or "inability to work" made
in the context of obtaining disability and similar types of benefits
should not estop or otherwise preclude an individual from pursu-
ing discrimination claims based on disability. Judicial unwillingness
to preclude, or estop, plaintiffs who have previously applied for dis-
ability benefits from pursuing claims that their employers have dis-
criminated against them based on their disability is growing. Some
courts have simply dodged the application of estoppel and preclu-
sion by distinguishing the time periods covered by, or the exact na-
ture of, the disability benefits representations and the
discrimination claim.8 24 Others have rejected the estoppel ap-
judgment and granting preliminary injunction to plaintiff and finding that factor
of "permanent or long-term impact of the individual's impairment" in EEOC ADA
Title I regulation was not meant to be dispositive); Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F.
Supp. 991, 998 (D. Or. 1994) ("The employer cannot terminate the employee be-
cause he is temporarily unqualified if that condition can be alleviated through
reasonable accommodation."); Patterson v. Downtown Med. & Diagnostic Ctr.,
Inc., 866 F. Supp. 1379, 1381 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (denying defendant's motion to
dismiss and stating that "the definition of 'disability' does not require
permanency").
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994),
affords some alternative relief to some workers who have temporary disabilities. See
id. § 2612(a)(1). It requires employers to provide eligible employees up to 12
workweeks of unpaid leave in any 12-month period for "a serious health condition
that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such
employee." Id.
823. 49 C.F.R. pt. 37, app. § 37 (1997) (emphasis added).
824. See, e.g., D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs. Corp., 92 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1996) (re-
versing summary judgment for defendant and holding estoppel not appropriate
under Massachusetts nondiscrimination law because of precise nature of represen-
tations made in disability benefits process and because plaintiff never claimed to
be totally disabled during time when she requested reasonable accommodation
from employer); Nixon v. Digital Equip. Corp., No. 94 CV 3120, 1996 WL 772521,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1996) (denying defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment due to evidence that plaintiff was capable of performing job duties at time of
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proach more directly.825 In Mohamed v. Marriott International,
Inc.,826 the court summarized previous decisions that had rejected
the application of judicial estoppel in such circumstances and con-
cluded that "it would be inappropriate to invoke the fact-sensitive
and limited doctrine of judicial estoppel to erect a per se bar to
ADA protection for individuals who have also applied for and/or
received [SSDI] benefits."827 Regarding the analysis in cases where
judicial estoppel had been applied, the court declared:
Such uncritical application ofjudicial estoppel fails to rec-
ognize significant differences in: (1) the applicable legal
standards of the ADA and the Social Security Act; (2) the
types of fora and procedures involved in ADA cases
and SSDI administrative determinations; and (3) the pol-
icy goals animating the two statutes' definitions of
disability. 828
The court pointed out that an individual may be "disabled" for pur-
poses of disability benefits because few potential jobs are currently
structured to accommodate his or her disability.8 29 Yet that individ-
ual may still be protected by the ADA because a particularjob he or
she held, or is interested in, could be modified to accommodate his
disability.8 30 The court also noted that "the Social Security Act itself
permits individuals to receive benefits and work at the same time,
demonstrating that the classes of individuals entitled to protection
under the two statutes are not mutually exclusive."8 31
Thus, the court said that "in light of these differing legal stan-
dards, Mohamed's assertion of inability to work for SSDI purposes
is not necessarily inconsistent with his claim here to be capable of
performing the essential functions of the job from which he was
discharged. 8s32 It also observed that the doctrine of judicial estop-
pel properly applies "in cases where parties made inconsistent rep-
resentations to two different courts, not to an administrative agency
his discharge, fact that he did not apply for social security disability benefits until
one year later and his attorney's representation to court that SSA filing was necessi-
tated by marked worsening of plaintiff's condition).
825. For a discussion of the decisions rejecting the estoppel approach, see
supra notes 447-52 and accompanying text.
826. 944 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
827. Id. at 282.
828. Id. at 282-83.
829. See id.
830. See id.
831. Id.
832. Id.
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and a court."8 33 The court also found that "applying estoppel in
the circumstances here could undermine the policy goals of the
ADA without advancing the separate goals of the Social Security
Act."834 Ultimately, the Mohamed court reached the following
conclusion:
[T]he SSA's determination, while amounting to an adop-
tion of Mohamed's claim of disability, was hardly the result
of a formal adjudication on the merits that he is not a
"qualified individual with a disability" within the meaning
of the ADA. Finally, estopping Mohamed under the cir-
cumstances of this case would undermine the legislative
policy of providing the disabled with both protection
against destitution and a genuine opportunity to partici-
pate fully in the job market.8 35
Similarly, the court in Dockery examined the purposes of judi-
cial estoppel and rules governing its application and concluded that
it should not be applied in ADA cases in which the plaintiff has
made allegedly inconsistent representations in applying for disabil-
ity benefits. Initially, the court ruled that estoppel only applies to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to statements made
under oath in "administrative filings," such as benefits applica-
tions.83 6 The court also noted that "[a]t its core, the doctrine of
judicial estoppel ensures that a party will not argue 'inconsistent
positions to gain an unfair advantage over its adversary.' 8 3 7 It
found that " [t] he receipt of disability benefits in no way provides an
unfair advantage to a plaintiff in an ADA case."8 38 The court fur-
ther stated that "[t] o the contrary, such an admission can only hin-
der any attempt by a plaintiff to later claim that she was not totally
disabled."839
To the extent that an individual has made false statements in
applying for disability benefits, the court states that "a plaintiff may
833. Id.
834. Id. at 284.
835. Id.
836. See Dockery v. North Shore Med. Ctr., 909 F. Supp. 1550, 1558 (S.D. Fla.
1995) ("[Regarding] whether 'prior proceedings' applies to any action taken
under oath, including the filing of a disability application, or is intended to apply
to judicial, or at least quasijudicial proceedings; [this] Court believes the latter
837. Id. at 1559 (quoting Sullivan Properties, Inc. v. City of Winter Springs,
899 F. Supp. 587, 591 (M.D. Fla 1995)).
838. Id.
839. Id.
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be exposing herself to potential liability in a separate fraud pro-
ceeding." 40 If that is the case, however, it is not the job of the
court hearing the nondiscrimination action to provide a remedy:
[T]he appropriate sanction in such an instance is for the
governing authority to take action against the party in
question. It is not the province of the courts in cases like
these to enforce perjury or fraud penalties by excluding a
plaintiff from formulating her case as she sees fit within
the bounds of allowable procedure.8 41
For these various reasons, the Dockery court decided to deviate from
the "chorus of judicial opinions which proceed to dismiss cases
brought under the ADA purely on the technical grounds that an
inconsistent position was taken by the plaintiff in his or her admin-
istrative filings."8 42
840. See id. at 1559 n.16 (reasoning that fraud proceeding, not judicial estop-
pel, is appropriate means of sanctioning plaintiff for making false representations
in administrative filing).
841. Id. A few other courts have suggested that statements by disability bene-
fits recipients that they can perform the essential functions of ajob with a former
employer provide a basis for an insurance fraud investigation. See Miller v. U.S.
Bancorp, 926 F. Supp. 994, 999 (D. Or. 1996) (citing Reige4 859 F. Supp. at 969);
Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963, 969 n.7 (E.D.N.C. 1994)
("[A] ny attempt by plaintiff to rebut the accuracy or veracity of [prior] statements
may serve as a foundation for the instigation of an insurance fraud investigation.").
This suggestion raises the question alluded to in Dockery about the logic of the
estoppel decisions in precluding the plaintiffs from pursuing their nondiscrimina-
tion actions even if one accepts those courts' premise that being disabled for pur-
poses of disability benefits and being qualified under nondiscrimination laws are
inconsistent. In order to pursue a nondiscrimination claim, the plaintiff will have
to produce evidence that he or she is qualified, i.e., can perform the essential
functions of the job. If such evidence is produced, why should the nondiscrimina-
tion action be precluded when the allegations in that situation are apparently the
ones that are true? It would appear that the representations made in the disability
benefits process are the ones that are suspect. If so, why not let the benefits pro-
vider pursue reimbursement, damages or file criminal charges? If the plaintiff can-
not produce evidence of ability to perform the job, the nondiscrimination action
will fail anyway, so the plaintiff will not gain any inequitable advantage. Further-
more, if the nondiscrimination claim is found to be frivolous or without basis, the
courts certainly have other avenues for sanctioning irresponsible plaintiffs and
their attorneys, including Rule 11 sanctions, contempt of court charges and per-
jury proceedings. None of these require sheltering employers who have engaged
in discrimination that violates federal laws. As the Tenth Circuit noted in rejecting
the application ofjudicial estoppel in another context, "[e]ven in the case of false
statements in pleadings, public policy can be vindicated otherwise-and more
practicably and fairly in most instances-than through suppression of truth in the
future." Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 438 (10th Cir. 1956). See also
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1351, 1359 (D. Kan. 1995) (quoting
Parkinson, 233 F.2d at 438).
842. Dockey, 909 F. Supp. at 1559 (concluding that judicial estoppel is not
applicable in situations like case at bar).
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Unlike its complicity or acquiescence on the one-job-is-not-
enough and temporary disability exclusion issues, the EEOC has
taken a forceful and positive role in challenging the estoppel ap-
proach. On February 12, the EEOC issued guidance on the effect
of representations made in applications for benefits on the determi-
nation of whether a person is a qualified individual with a disability
under the ADA.843 The guidance indicates that it "explains why
representations about the ability to work made in the course of ap-
plying for social security, workers' compensation, disability insur-
ance, and other disability benefits do not bar the filing of an ADA
charge.1"844
The guidance discusses the particular standards and purposes
of the ADA, social security, worker's compensation and disability
insurance plans.8 45 Among its conclusions, the EEOC found that
(1) the ADA's purposes and standards are fundamentally different
from the purposes and standards of other statutory schemes and
contractual rights;8 4 6 (2) the ADA definition of "qualified individ-
ual with a disability" always requires an individualized assessment of
the particular individual and the particular position, and other defi-
nitions permit generalized inquiries and presumptions; 847 (3) the
ADA's definition of "qualified individual with a disability" requires
consideration of reasonable accommodation, and other definitions
do not consider whether an individual can work with reasonable
accommodation; 848 (4) because of fundamental differences be-
tween the ADA and other statutory and contractual disability bene-
fits programs, representations made in connection with an
application for benefits may be relevant to-but are never determi-
native of-whether a person is a "qualified individual with a disabil-
ity;"'8 49 (5) representations made in connection with an application
843. See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 325, 5415.
844. Id. The EEOC guidance is an extensive document that (1) analyzes the
differences between the ADA's purposes and standards and those of other statu-
tory schemes, disability benefits programs and contracts; (2) discusses recent and
significant court decisions that have addressed this issue; (3) explains why the doc-
trine of judicial estoppel and summary judgment procedures should not be used
to bar the ADA claims of individuals who have applied for disability benefits; (4)
delineates why public policy supports the EEOC's position; and (5) explains how
to assess what weight, if any, to give to such representations in determining
whether an individual is a "qualified individual with a disability" for purposes of
the ADA. Id. 5416.
845. See id. 5419-24.
846. See id. 1 5417.
847. See id. 1 5424.
848. See id. 5426.
849. See id. 5428.
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for disability benefits are not determinative of whether a person is a
"qualified individual with a disability;"850 (6) a determination of
what, if any, weight to give to representations made in support of
applications for disability benefits depends on the context and tim-
ing of the representations;8 51 (7) public policy supports the conclu-
sion that representations made in connection with an application
for disability benefits are never an absolute bar to an ADA claim;
852
(8) permitting individuals to go forward with their ADA claims is
critical to the ADA's goal of eradicating discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities;853 and (9) individuals should not have to
choose between applying for disability benefits and vindicating
their rights under the ADA.854 The EEOC also concludes that
neither judicial estoppel nor summary judgment is appropriate in
such cases.855 The EEOC guidance, along with the reasoning in
cases such as Mohamed and Dockery, provide ample rationale and an
alternative analysis for rejecting the estoppel lines of cases.
D. Recognition of Rights of Former Employees to Challenge
Discrimination in Regard to Benefits
Former employees should be permitted to pursue discrimina-
tion claims based on disability that arise out of the former employ-
ment relationship, whether or not they are currently able to
perform the essential functions of their former job. The analytical
alternative to the Beauford line of cases is simply to discontinue the
fundamentally unsound analysis that led to this irrational, mean-
spirited group of decisions. The notion that a former employee is
not "qualified" because he or she cannot perform the "essential
functions" of the former job makes no sense as a limitation on pro-
tection from discrimination in regard to benefits that apply after
the worker has left employment. This notion becomes even more
ridiculous once one appreciates that the "qualified" limitation was
not inserted in the statutes to narrow the scope of statutory protec-
tion. Rather, the qualified limitation was inserted to make it clear
that discrimination does not include refusing to hire or retain peo-
ple who cannot do the essential functions of the job.8 5 6 Implicitly,
850. See id.
851. See id. 5430.
852. See id. 5432.
853. See id.
854. See id. 5433.
855. See id. 5428-29.
856. For a discussion of the reasons for the "qualified" limitation, see supra
notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
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the language of the section 504 regulations that the Beauford court
relied on-"can perform the essential functions of the job in ques-
tion"-is relevant only if there are functions of the job that the em-
ployee is going to be called on to perform. The assurance that the
employee is capable of doing the essential tasks is necessary only
where the employee is going to be called on to perform these tasks.
The related rationale propounded by the court in Gonzales,
that former employees do not fit into categories of employee or
applicant who are afforded protection under the ADA, is equally
unsound. The term "employee" should be interpreted, as Congress
assumed it would be when it enacted the ADA, consistent with Title
VII precedents that construe the term broadly to include former
employees. The pretense that the Gonzales court was simply apply-
ing the plain language of the statute is punctured by recognizing
that the statutory language does not say current employee. Thus,
the term itself is ambiguous on this issue. Moreover, all the other
indicators of its meaning-other portions of the statute that pro-
vide for coverage of fringe benefits, the overall objectives of the
statute in eliminating discrimination, the Title VII precedents indi-
cating that "employee" should be interpreted broadly and includes
former employees, the general rule that remedial and civil rights
measures are to be construed liberally and the interpretations of
the agency statutorily charged to implement the statute-support
permitting former employees to pursue ADA charges when they are
subjected to discrimination arising out of their former
employment.
Both the Beauford and Gonzales rationales are directly and bla-
tantly contrary to the announced purposes of the ADA, prohibiting
discrimination and providing remedies to those who have been sub-
jected to such discrimination. This point was forcefully made by
the court in Graboski v. Guiliani,8 57 in which New York City firefight-
ers who retired on disability retirement pensions challenged their
exclusion from certain supplemental benefits available to other re-
tirees.858 The defendant New York City officials made both the
Beauford and Gonzales arguments, i.e., that the plaintiffs were not
"qualified" because they could not perform the essential functions
of their former jobs and that only "employees," not "former em-
ployees," were protected by the ADA.85 9 The court said: "In other
words, the City argues that once plaintiffs retired on the basis of
857. 937 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
858. See id. at 260.
859. See id. at 265-66.
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disability, the ADA no longer requires that they be treated even-
handedly."860 The court responded to these arguments as follows:
Such a crabbed view of the ADA's coverage would under-
mine the statute's unambiguous remedial purpose. Tide I
of the ADA expressly prohibits discrimination in the provi-
sion of fringe benefits. As certain fringe benefits (such as
pensions and health insurance continuation) are mean-
ingful only post-employment, it is only logical that the stat-
ute's coverage reaches the period when the employment
benefits are to be reaped.8 6 1
The Graboski court also noted that the ADA incorporates by
reference the Tide VII definition of employee and was intended to
have the same meaning, and that under Title VII, "'discrimination
related to or arising out of an employment relationship, whether or
not the person discriminated against is an employee at the time of
the discriminatory conduct' is actionable. '8 62 The court ruled that
the definition of the term "qualified" in Tide I of the ADA "was not
intended to distinguish this employment discrimination law from
Title VII by abrogating coverage of former employees challenging
discrimination arising out of the employment relationship. '" 863 The
court expressly declined to follow Beauford and Gonzales and similar
rulings.864
Ultimately, the court concluded that "t] his standing argument
simply begs the question of whether or not the exclusion of disabil-
ity retirees from [supplemental] payments states a claim of discrimi-
nation under the ADA."'865 The pertinent question for the Graboski
court, then, as it should be in all such cases, was whether or not the
defendants had discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of
disability. All the rest is obfuscation.
E. Overall Framework
Getting rid of these four problematic and unfortunate lines of
analysis and avoiding other similar problems depends upon recog-
nition of some underlying principles. Thus, it is necessary to sum-
860.. Id. at 266.
861. Id.
862. Id. (quoting Pantchenko v. C.B. Dodge Co., Inc., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055
(2d Cir. 1978)).
863. Id.
864. See id. at 266-67 n.12 (noting holdings of Beauford and Gonzales and ex-
pressly declining to follow them).
865. Id. at 267.
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marize a few of the most important conceptual foundations of
informed analysis under disability nondiscrimination laws.
First, the "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" lan-
guage of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as it was originally
enacted, and its analogs in the current language of section 504 and
the ADA were included in the statutes, not to establish a limited
class of persons eligible for protection, but to make it imminently
clear that people who cannot perform the essential functions of the
job or activity do not have to be included anyway.866 To the extent
that the formulation of the nondiscrimination provision as origi-
nally enacted in 1973, and emulated thereafter might suggest a lim-
ited protected class, Congress corrected such an impression when it
enacted the three-prong definition in 1974. The coverage of these
disability nondiscrimination laws should not be limited to any spe-
cial protected class.
Second, the classification "individuals with disabilities" is an ar-
tificial social categorization. Its usefulness lies principally in that it
identifies a grouping of people who have been labeled as different
from the rest of society and have been the objects of discrimination
and prejudice because of such identification. 867 It does not demar-
cate a group of people who are drastically different from others
and, therefore, should be treated differently and given special pro-
tection. Strict eligibility criteria may be necessary in programs that
provide benefits or specialized services for particular groups of peo-
ple within the portion of the population denominated as having
disabilities. Affirmative action programs of the federal government
make use of a list of "targeted disabilities."8 68 Protection from dis-
crimination based upon disability, however, belongs to everyone.
Third, the three-prong definition and protection under fed-
eral nondiscrimination laws were intended to be very broad. Reme-
dial and civil rights statutes such as the ADA and Rehabilitation Act
should be interpreted expansively to achieve their remedial pur-
poses.869 In regard to the three-prong definition of disability, the
866. For a discussion of the purpose of the "otherwise qualified handicapped
individual" language of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and its analogs in the
current language, see supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
867. For a discussion of the purposes of the "individuals with disabilities" clas-
sification, see supra notes 605-06 and accompanying text.
868. See ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 18, at 55.
869. See, e.g., Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 63 F.3d 1404, 1415 (6th Cir.
1995) ("Section 504 is a civil rights statute, and as such, should be broadly con-
strued."), vacated and decided on other grounds, 70 F.3d 782 (6th Cir. 1996); Ander-
son v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Del., 924 F. Supp. 763, 771 (E.D. Tex. 1996)
("ADA has a comprehensive reach and should be interpreted with this goal in
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Second Circuit has observed that "its legislative history... indicates
that the definition is not to be construed in a niggardly fashion."870
Fourth, reasonable accommodation is an essential part of elim-
inating discrimination. It is not a special service or opportunity for
people with disabilities.8 71
Fifth, analysis under disability nondiscrimination laws should
focus on the alleged discriminatory treatment meted out by the
party charged with discriminating, not on the characteristics of the
person allegedly subjected to such discrimination. These laws seek
to regulate the conduct of employers and other covered entities
and to induce them to stop discriminating. To the extent that
these parties can divert the focus to a microscopic dissection of the
complaining party, the central objectives of these laws will be
frustrated.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In Germany, disability rights laws have taken a very different
road from that of American laws. In the German system, people
who meet statutory criteria can apply to be certified as a "handi-
capped person. '872 Certifications record the degree of disability
based upon a numerical scale of functional limitations and establish
an overall percentage of handicap. There are some subcategories
for people falling within certain ranges of percentages. 873 Once
they have obtained such a certificate, individuals are eligible for a
variety of benefits. Each employer in the country having over six-
teen job slots is required to employ a specified percentage of work-
ers with disabilities.874 Among other special rights, benefits and
mind."); Lincoln CERPAC v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 920 F. Supp. 488, 497
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The ADA must be broadly construed to effectuate its remedial
purpose.") (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335 (1967)); Civic Assoc. of
the Deaf v. Giuliani, 915 F. Supp. 622, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("As a remedial statute,
the ADA must be broadly construed to effectuate its purpose."); Lundstedt v. City
of Miami, 5 A.D. Cases 568, 574 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (construing term "applicant for
employment" and stating that "the broad remedial purpose enunciated by Con-
gress in the passage of the ADA also counsels against imposing an overly cramped
interpretation."); Kinney v. Yerusalim, 812 F. Supp. 547, 551 (E.D. Pa.) ("The ADA
is a remedial statute, designed to eliminate discrimination against the disabled in
all facets of society. As a remedial statute it must be broadly construed to effectu-
ate its purposes."), affd, 9 F.3d 1067 (3d Cir. 1993).
870. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981).
871. For a discussion of "reasonable accommodation," see supra notes 498-507
and accompanying text.
872. See BURGDORF, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra
note 1, at 1175-98.
873. See id.
874. See id.
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protections, persons with the certificates receive extra vacation time
and cannot be fired without advance notice to and approval by a
government office.875 The German system is truly a preferential
treatment model provided to a special class of German citizens who
are treated differently from others. The majority of Americans with
disabilities recoil at the paternalistic and denormalizing underlying
assumptions of this model.
The United States, however, has endorsed a model that stresses
integration, full participation and nondiscrimination. The goal of
such a model has been frustrated by a special class and preferential
treatment mentality that has crept into the interpretation and en-
forcement of some of the very laws that were designed to assure
equality and integration. And in the name of restricting this special
treatment to the supposed truly deserving beneficiaries, obstacles
have been erected that have kept many of the supposed core group
along with many other citizens from the protection these laws were
enacted to provide. Through the several lines of cases discussed in
this Article that have imposed restrictive standards upon the protec-
tions afforded by nondiscrimination statutes, legal analysis under
these statutes has proceeded quite a long way down the wrong road.
There are countervailing authorities, however, and if the basic
premises that underlie disability rights initiatives can be articulated,
understood and incorporated into the analytic framework, then it is
not too late for the jurisprudence in this area to get back on the
right track.
875. See id.
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